Frontiers in Operations: The Confidence Trap in Operations Management Practices: Anatomy of Man-Made Disasters

Akhil Bhardwaj, Henk Akkermans
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Abstract

Problem definition: Reducing the likelihood of man-made disasters that cause harm to life, property, and the environment is a key societal goal. To that end, regulatory agencies are responsible for ensuring man-made disasters do not occur. In practice, to accomplish this task, regulators have to rely on and cooperate with operators. However, how much cooperation is optimal? In this study, we explore the prudent level of cooperation between operators and regulators to avoid man-made disasters and the role whistleblowers and other policy levers can play in maintaining it within a Goldilocks range. Methodology/results: We synthesize various theories and accounts of man-made disasters to construct a system dynamics model of the mechanisms that lead up to these unwanted outcomes. We employ simulations to uncover how changes in crucial parameters related to cooperation lead to different outcomes and influence the likelihood of the occurrence of man-made disasters. Managerial implications: We resist explanations for man-made disasters rooted in regulatory capture and offer instead a nuanced account rooted in excess cooperation between operators and regulators emerging as a result of everyday operational imperatives and constraints. Our findings indicate that absence of disasters leads operators and regulators to fall into a “confidence trap” that perpetuates limited regulatory oversight and excess cooperation and eventually leads to a disaster. To mitigate this tendency, we investigate, in particular, the role that timely whistleblowing and other policy levers can play in mitigating man-made disasters. We provide managerial and policy implications such as incentivizing and safeguarding whistleblowers, limits on the revolving door between operators and regulators, and more stringent operating and safety scientific standards. Overall, we offer a new frame and potentially fruitful frontier for the operations management community to explore.History: This paper has been accepted in the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Frontiers in Operations Initiative.Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0034 .
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运营前沿运营管理实践中的信心陷阱:剖析人为灾难
问题定义:减少人为灾害对生命、财产和环境造成危害的可能性是一个重要的社会目标。为此,监管机构有责任确保人为灾难不会发生。实际上,要完成这项任务,监管机构必须依靠运营商并与运营商合作。然而,怎样的合作才是最佳的?在本研究中,我们探讨了运营商与监管机构之间为避免人为灾难而进行合作的谨慎程度,以及举报人和其他政策杠杆在将合作维持在黄金分割范围内所能发挥的作用。方法/结果:我们综合了有关人为灾难的各种理论和说法,构建了一个导致这些意外结果的机制的系统动力学模型。我们通过模拟来揭示与合作相关的关键参数的变化如何导致不同的结果,以及如何影响人为灾难发生的可能性。管理意义:我们抵制以监管俘获为根基的人为灾难解释,而是提供了一种细致入微的解释,即运营商和监管机构之间的过度合作是日常运营需要和限制的结果。我们的研究结果表明,缺乏灾难会导致运营商和监管机构陷入 "信任陷阱",从而使有限的监管监督和过度合作长期存在,最终导致灾难的发生。为了缓解这种趋势,我们特别研究了及时举报和其他政策杠杆在减轻人为灾难方面可以发挥的作用。我们提供了管理和政策方面的启示,如激励和保护举报人、限制运营商和监管机构之间的 "旋转门",以及更严格的运营和安全科学标准。总之,我们为运营管理界提供了一个新的框架和潜在的富有成效的探索领域:本文已被《制造与amp; 服务运营管理》(Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Frontiers in Operations Initiative)接受:在线补充材料可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0034 上获取。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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