Hume and the fiction of the self

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI:10.1111/ejop.12939
Matthew Parrott
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Abstract

In the Treatise, Hume attempts to explain why we all believe that the self is a single unified entity that persists over time, a belief which Hume calls a fiction. In this paper, I demonstrate how Hume uses a type of functional explanation to account for this belief. After explicating Hume's view, I shall argue that it faces two related problems, which constitute a sort of dilemma. In the final section, I show how one of the horns of this dilemma is plausibly what troubles Hume in the famous Appendix passage where he retracts his positive account of personal identity.
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休谟与自我的虚构
在《论文集》中,休谟试图解释为什么我们都相信自我是一个单一的统一实体,而且会随着时间的推移而持续存在,休谟称这种信念为虚构。在本文中,我将展示休谟是如何使用一种功能性解释来解释这种信念的。在阐释休谟的观点之后,我将论证它面临着两个相关的问题,这两个问题构成了一种两难困境。在最后一部分,我将说明这一困境的其中一个犄角是如何在著名的附录段落中困扰休谟的,在该段落中,休谟收回了他对个人身份的正面解释。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
11.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: ''Founded by Mark Sacks in 1993, the European Journal of Philosophy has come to occupy a distinctive and highly valued place amongst the philosophical journals. The aim of EJP has been to bring together the best work from those working within the "analytic" and "continental" traditions, and to encourage connections between them, without diluting their respective priorities and concerns. This has enabled EJP to publish a wide range of material of the highest standard from philosophers across the world, reflecting the best thinking from a variety of philosophical perspectives, in a way that is accessible to all of them.''
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Issue Information The Dissatisfactions of Self-Consciousness Bradley's Regress and a Problem in Action Theory The Culmination: Reply to my Critics The wonder of being: Varieties of rationalism and its critique
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