<p>Michael Della Rocca's project in his bold and iconoclastic book<sup>1</sup> is to reject all distinction and multiplicity: there is only being. He calls this view strict monism.<sup>2</sup> And, as the title of his book indicates, he sees his project as Parmenidean. There are accordingly references to Parmenides throughout the book, as well as a more focused discussion of Parmenides' views in Chapter 1. This is in line with something on which Della Rocca insists in Chapter 7, in keeping with such monism, namely that we should reject any distinction between doing philosophy and doing its history.</p><p>I share Della Rocca's mistrust of that distinction. But I do not share it for the same reasons nor to the same extent. There seems to me a clear sense in which his project is more fundamentally philosophical than historical. Partly I have in mind the fact that his primary aim is simply to defend strict monism. And I think that the philosophical challenges that he thereby presents us with are more significant than any lessons that he has to teach us about where any given philosopher stands in relation to the view.<sup>3</sup> My own focus in what follows will therefore likewise be on the issues themselves, though I too will engage with the work of other philosophers to the extent that I think it is relevant to do so.</p><p>A preliminary before I proceed. Even the two short paragraphs that I have written so far contain material that is question-begging in this context. An obvious case in point is the very reference to ‘other philosophers’. That is illegitimate in strict monist terms. So too, come to that, are the references to ‘Chapter 1’ and ‘Chapter 7’. My excuse for begging questions in this way is something to which Della Rocca's book itself bears ample witness: anyone who wants to engage seriously with his views has no alternative. One of the issues that we shall need to confront is what this means as far as Della Rocca's own text is concerned. But there is no equivalent issue as far as my text is concerned. True, I would prefer not to beg questions. But, since I am not a strict monist, I feel no other compunction about writing in the way that I have; and I am reassured that I am at least not begging questions against myself.</p><p>Della Rocca's starting point is the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or the PSR to use his own abbreviation. This is ‘the principle according to which each fact or each thing has an explanation’ (p. xiv). That this is his starting point straightway illustrates what I said in the previous section. For Della Rocca takes the PSR to serve as a basic principle for Parmenides too. As it happens, here already I have exegetical qualms: passages which, on Della Rocca's interpretation, show Parmenides to be rejecting distinctions that, if real, would involve things that could not be explained seem to me to show Parmenides to be rejecting distinctions that, if real, would involve things that could not so much as be.<sup>4</sup>
{"title":"Back Down","authors":"A. W. Moore","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13048","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Michael Della Rocca's project in his bold and iconoclastic book<sup>1</sup> is to reject all distinction and multiplicity: there is only being. He calls this view strict monism.<sup>2</sup> And, as the title of his book indicates, he sees his project as Parmenidean. There are accordingly references to Parmenides throughout the book, as well as a more focused discussion of Parmenides' views in Chapter 1. This is in line with something on which Della Rocca insists in Chapter 7, in keeping with such monism, namely that we should reject any distinction between doing philosophy and doing its history.</p><p>I share Della Rocca's mistrust of that distinction. But I do not share it for the same reasons nor to the same extent. There seems to me a clear sense in which his project is more fundamentally philosophical than historical. Partly I have in mind the fact that his primary aim is simply to defend strict monism. And I think that the philosophical challenges that he thereby presents us with are more significant than any lessons that he has to teach us about where any given philosopher stands in relation to the view.<sup>3</sup> My own focus in what follows will therefore likewise be on the issues themselves, though I too will engage with the work of other philosophers to the extent that I think it is relevant to do so.</p><p>A preliminary before I proceed. Even the two short paragraphs that I have written so far contain material that is question-begging in this context. An obvious case in point is the very reference to ‘other philosophers’. That is illegitimate in strict monist terms. So too, come to that, are the references to ‘Chapter 1’ and ‘Chapter 7’. My excuse for begging questions in this way is something to which Della Rocca's book itself bears ample witness: anyone who wants to engage seriously with his views has no alternative. One of the issues that we shall need to confront is what this means as far as Della Rocca's own text is concerned. But there is no equivalent issue as far as my text is concerned. True, I would prefer not to beg questions. But, since I am not a strict monist, I feel no other compunction about writing in the way that I have; and I am reassured that I am at least not begging questions against myself.</p><p>Della Rocca's starting point is the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or the PSR to use his own abbreviation. This is ‘the principle according to which each fact or each thing has an explanation’ (p. xiv). That this is his starting point straightway illustrates what I said in the previous section. For Della Rocca takes the PSR to serve as a basic principle for Parmenides too. As it happens, here already I have exegetical qualms: passages which, on Della Rocca's interpretation, show Parmenides to be rejecting distinctions that, if real, would involve things that could not be explained seem to me to show Parmenides to be rejecting distinctions that, if real, would involve things that could not so much as be.<sup>4</sup>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"339-353"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13048","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>While reading <i>The Parmenidean Ascent</i>, you will likely shake your head in disbelief. “Is Michael Della Rocca serious?” you will probably think “Has he gone mad?”. Well, let's put it like this. If Della Rocca went crazy, he did it with a lot of elegance, method and philosophical rigor. He, in fact, delivers a series of impressive arguments in support of the most important and bewildering thesis of his whole work, namely, <span>strict monism</span>. According to <span>strict monism</span>, there are no relations whatsoever. If we think in metaphysical terms, this means that there are no chairs, tables, stars and human beings. For the existence of all these entities would entail that there are some relations (or, at least, a relation of difference) between all of them. Chairs are <i>not</i> tables, and stars are <i>not</i> human beings. The same can be said about substances, properties, modes, accidents, and many of the other metaphysical categories with which we are so accustomed. Della Rocca, thus, concludes that, according to <span>strict monism,</span> there is nothing but pure, undifferentiated, not at all relational being. “We are looking at pure being” he writes “Undifferentiated being (…) is purely positive and not at all relational” (<span>2020</span>, p. 82).</p><p>As we all know, Della Rocca is also a great champion of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Much of his philosophy has been informed by an uncompromising endorsement of this rationalist <i>credo</i>, and such a <i>credo</i> does not cease to play an important role in <i>The Parmenidean Ascent</i>. I have, however, no intention to put pressure on his Eleatic endeavor by questioning the PSR. First of all, I do not believe that an attempt to challenge the PSR will score any point against <span>strict monism</span>, for Della Rocca's argument against the existence of relations does not <i>necessarily</i> rely on the PSR. Secondly, I would like to take this opportunity to make a confession and bring myself out of the closet. As with Della Rocca, I am a great fan of the PSR. If this principle is taken to be the hallmark of rationalist thinking, well, let me tell you, I am more than happy to be called a rationalist. For this reason, I cannot be further from thinking that the PSR represents the heart of the problem.<sup>1</sup></p><p>Rather than criticizing <i>that</i> Della Rocca employs the PSR, I would like to question <i>how</i> he uses it. In particular, I suspect that the way in which Della Rocca uses the PSR forces him to face the following predicament. On the one hand, his employment of the PSR might commit him to what he calls a ‘darkest hour’. According to Della Rocca, a darkest hour takes place when a philosopher “reject[s] some rationalist commitment” (<span>forthcoming</span>, p. 1) by accepting something – a thing, a fact or even a philosophical principle – as ‘brute’ or ‘arbitrary’. On the other hand, any attempt to avoid such a darkest hour will get some o
如果我们忽略 PSR2 前件的第二个连接词，PSR2 将与 PSR1 相同。因此，PSR2 的前件为真，后件为假。因此，与 PSR1 一样，严格的一元论会使 PSR2 成为假的。然而，情况恰恰不同，因为德拉罗卡在 PSR2 的前件（即 PSR2 前件的第二个连接词）中加入了上述说明。正如我们已经讨论过的，这第二个连接词是假的。因为严格一元论认为不存在任何关系，因此，事物与其必要条件之间也不存在差异关系。既然前件的两个连接词中有一个是假的，那么前件的连接词也是假的。这也意味着，在严格一元论的前提下，PSR2 是真的。如果这是正确的，那么德拉罗卡应该能给我们一个认可 PSR1 和 PSR2 的理由。他还应该给我们一个理由，说明他为什么将前者用于某些目的（如解释历史人物、为理性主义平反、批评许多抛弃了这一哲学传统的思想家），而将后者用于某些其他目的（如表明任何驯服 PSR 的尝试都注定是不连贯的）。如果德拉-罗卡不能做到这一点，那么他就会陷入他极力想避免的武断之中，他的处境也不会比其他所有哲学家好多少，德拉-罗卡自己也认为这些哲学家正面临着他们自己最黑暗的时刻。与弗雷格、罗素、摩尔和基姆希一样，德拉罗卡也会因接受某些东西--PSR1、PSR2及其各自的运用--为 "野蛮 "或 "武断 "而拒绝他所钟爱的理性主义承诺。事实上，这样我们就会发现，他早期的一些作品一直在关注为《巴门尼德升天论》辩护的可能性。尽管我认为这些论证是令人信服的，但重要的是要注意到，这些论证以不同的方式、出于不同的原因，都涉及 PSR 的第一种表述，即 PSR1。而第二种表述，即 PSR2，在这些前人的著作中找不到任何理由。由于我刚才已经说明了这两种表述在逻辑上并不等同，而且 PSR1 和 PSR2 是两个不同的原则，因此，在德拉罗卡的哲学中，PSR2 和将这两个原则用于不同目的的决定似乎都是不合理的。因此，德拉罗卡可能会两次遭遇自己最黑暗的时刻。首先，他可能会在武断、不合理地采用 PSR2 时遭遇自己最黑暗的时刻。其次，他在选择使用 PSR1（用于某些目的）和 PSR2（用于另一些目的）时，可能会遇到自己最黑暗的时刻。根据我在第 4 节中的论证，只使用这两个原则中的一个是不可能避免德拉-罗卡的第二次最黑暗时刻的。如果德拉罗卡使用的是 PSR1，那么《帕门尼德的上升》第 10 章中的论证就会变得站不住脚。如果德拉-罗卡使用的是 PSR2，那么他就永远无法确信自己是一个 PSR 解释者。令他大失所望的是，他可能总是发现自己是 PSR 的践行者。在这两种情况下，德拉-罗卡在与 PSR-tamers 搏斗时都会面临重要问题。说到这里，我认为还有最后一个选择。既然 PSR2 似乎存在问题，因为它无法排除无缘无故发现某些东西的可能性，那么我们为什么不对 PSR2 进行修改，从而最终消除这种威胁呢？我们是否可以修改 PSR2，使德拉-罗卡成为一个没有 "如果 "和 "但是 "的 PSR 煽动者？这意味着，为了有一个明确的桀骜不驯的 PSR2，我们需要认可 PSR2 以及 S1 和 S2。在我看来，答案是肯定的。有了 S1 和 S2 的补充，PSR2 显然是桀骜不驯的。因为 PSR2、S1 和 S2 的结合意味着，无论我们如何看待 x 的必要条件，如果 x 被提出，x 就有理由。如果有一个 x 除了自身之外还有其他必要条件，那么 x 就有一个充分的理由。这是因为 PSR2。如果有一个 x 根本没有必要条件，那么 x 就有充分理由。这是因为 S1。如果有一个 x，而必要条件不适用于 x 本身，那么 x 就有充分的理由。这是因为 S2。由于这些选项涵盖了事物具有或不具有必要条件的所有可能方式，因此，在 PSR2 以及 S1 和 S2 的前提下，无论假设什么，都是有理由的。
{"title":"Della Rocca's Darkest Hour","authors":"Filippo Casati","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13051","url":null,"abstract":"<p>While reading <i>The Parmenidean Ascent</i>, you will likely shake your head in disbelief. “Is Michael Della Rocca serious?” you will probably think “Has he gone mad?”. Well, let's put it like this. If Della Rocca went crazy, he did it with a lot of elegance, method and philosophical rigor. He, in fact, delivers a series of impressive arguments in support of the most important and bewildering thesis of his whole work, namely, <span>strict monism</span>. According to <span>strict monism</span>, there are no relations whatsoever. If we think in metaphysical terms, this means that there are no chairs, tables, stars and human beings. For the existence of all these entities would entail that there are some relations (or, at least, a relation of difference) between all of them. Chairs are <i>not</i> tables, and stars are <i>not</i> human beings. The same can be said about substances, properties, modes, accidents, and many of the other metaphysical categories with which we are so accustomed. Della Rocca, thus, concludes that, according to <span>strict monism,</span> there is nothing but pure, undifferentiated, not at all relational being. “We are looking at pure being” he writes “Undifferentiated being (…) is purely positive and not at all relational” (<span>2020</span>, p. 82).</p><p>As we all know, Della Rocca is also a great champion of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Much of his philosophy has been informed by an uncompromising endorsement of this rationalist <i>credo</i>, and such a <i>credo</i> does not cease to play an important role in <i>The Parmenidean Ascent</i>. I have, however, no intention to put pressure on his Eleatic endeavor by questioning the PSR. First of all, I do not believe that an attempt to challenge the PSR will score any point against <span>strict monism</span>, for Della Rocca's argument against the existence of relations does not <i>necessarily</i> rely on the PSR. Secondly, I would like to take this opportunity to make a confession and bring myself out of the closet. As with Della Rocca, I am a great fan of the PSR. If this principle is taken to be the hallmark of rationalist thinking, well, let me tell you, I am more than happy to be called a rationalist. For this reason, I cannot be further from thinking that the PSR represents the heart of the problem.<sup>1</sup></p><p>Rather than criticizing <i>that</i> Della Rocca employs the PSR, I would like to question <i>how</i> he uses it. In particular, I suspect that the way in which Della Rocca uses the PSR forces him to face the following predicament. On the one hand, his employment of the PSR might commit him to what he calls a ‘darkest hour’. According to Della Rocca, a darkest hour takes place when a philosopher “reject[s] some rationalist commitment” (<span>forthcoming</span>, p. 1) by accepting something – a thing, a fact or even a philosophical principle – as ‘brute’ or ‘arbitrary’. On the other hand, any attempt to avoid such a darkest hour will get some o","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"325-338"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13051","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>I want to start with a movie: <i>Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb</i>.<sup>1</sup></p><p>This 1964 film, directed by Stanley Kubrick, and starring Peter Sellers in multiple roles, satirizes the Cold War defense establishment. It tells the story of a renegade base commander, General Jack D. Ripper, played by Sterling Hayden, who takes advantage of a malfunction in the communications system to send his wing of B-52 bombers to attack the Soviet Union. When the President of the United States is alerted to this dire state of affairs by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Buck Turgidson, played by George C. Scott, he tries to make a deal with his Soviet counterpart, Premier Kissov, for a limited proportional response, but is startled to discover, as his advisor, the former Nazi scientist, Dr. Strangelove, informs him, that the Soviets have recently activated a “Doomsday” device, whose purpose is to deter a single attack by immediately triggering a conflagration that would destroy the entire world. After failed attempts to thwart the attack, whether by the visiting British officer, Group Captain Lionel Mandrake, at Burpelson Airbase, or by the Soviet Air Defense system, the defense officials gathered in the War Room are left to contemplate their only option, which is to gather top government officials in a deep underground shelter, where they will work to repopulate the world. At the end, one bomber, piloted by Major T. J. “King” Kong, manages to get through to deliver the payload and trigger Armageddon. The final scene is of Dr. Strangelove getting out of his wheelchair, exclaiming ecstatically, “<i>Mein Führer</i>, I can walk!,” which then cuts to scenes of giant nuclear mushroom clouds exploding in the air accompanied by the melancholy song, “We'll meet again.”</p><p>This is a great movie, undoubtedly a classic, and you should see it, if you haven't already. But why am I bringing it up here? The answer is that, in my view, it perfectly illustrates the nature of acosmism. As I was reading Michael Della Rocca's recent book, <i>The Parmenidean Ascent</i>, this was the story that almost immediately came to mind. At first, I tried to ignore it, thinking that it was just a glib association, but when it came back again, I realized that my philosophical unconscious was speaking to me and that perhaps I should pay attention to it. Here are some of the points of comparison.</p><p>The main point is the doomsday principle of deterrence. Half measures don't add up to much. If you want to preserve the world, then you must threaten to destroy it completely.</p><p>There is the mad scientist, Dr. Strangelove, whose very name embodies the paradox. He is one of the designers of the system itself, the Parmenides figure. One thing to note is that in the movie, this character has a dubious past, as a servant to a totalizing Reich, and also a weak character. In contrast to Major Kong, who has the simple-minded audacity
{"title":"Parmenides and Dr. Strangelove, Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying about Monism and Accept the World of Relations, at least for the sake of the Good","authors":"Michael A. Rosenthal","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13057","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I want to start with a movie: <i>Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb</i>.<sup>1</sup></p><p>This 1964 film, directed by Stanley Kubrick, and starring Peter Sellers in multiple roles, satirizes the Cold War defense establishment. It tells the story of a renegade base commander, General Jack D. Ripper, played by Sterling Hayden, who takes advantage of a malfunction in the communications system to send his wing of B-52 bombers to attack the Soviet Union. When the President of the United States is alerted to this dire state of affairs by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Buck Turgidson, played by George C. Scott, he tries to make a deal with his Soviet counterpart, Premier Kissov, for a limited proportional response, but is startled to discover, as his advisor, the former Nazi scientist, Dr. Strangelove, informs him, that the Soviets have recently activated a “Doomsday” device, whose purpose is to deter a single attack by immediately triggering a conflagration that would destroy the entire world. After failed attempts to thwart the attack, whether by the visiting British officer, Group Captain Lionel Mandrake, at Burpelson Airbase, or by the Soviet Air Defense system, the defense officials gathered in the War Room are left to contemplate their only option, which is to gather top government officials in a deep underground shelter, where they will work to repopulate the world. At the end, one bomber, piloted by Major T. J. “King” Kong, manages to get through to deliver the payload and trigger Armageddon. The final scene is of Dr. Strangelove getting out of his wheelchair, exclaiming ecstatically, “<i>Mein Führer</i>, I can walk!,” which then cuts to scenes of giant nuclear mushroom clouds exploding in the air accompanied by the melancholy song, “We'll meet again.”</p><p>This is a great movie, undoubtedly a classic, and you should see it, if you haven't already. But why am I bringing it up here? The answer is that, in my view, it perfectly illustrates the nature of acosmism. As I was reading Michael Della Rocca's recent book, <i>The Parmenidean Ascent</i>, this was the story that almost immediately came to mind. At first, I tried to ignore it, thinking that it was just a glib association, but when it came back again, I realized that my philosophical unconscious was speaking to me and that perhaps I should pay attention to it. Here are some of the points of comparison.</p><p>The main point is the doomsday principle of deterrence. Half measures don't add up to much. If you want to preserve the world, then you must threaten to destroy it completely.</p><p>There is the mad scientist, Dr. Strangelove, whose very name embodies the paradox. He is one of the designers of the system itself, the Parmenides figure. One thing to note is that in the movie, this character has a dubious past, as a servant to a totalizing Reich, and also a weak character. In contrast to Major Kong, who has the simple-minded audacity ","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"354-364"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13057","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>I think both steps (1) and (2) of Della Rocca's argument are problematic as I will show in this paper: (1) treats relations as addenda to the relata which seem to exist independently of the relation. This is one way of thinking about relations – a way we will see very clearly also in Aristotle's account of relation. But it is by no means the only one as Della Rocca suggests for his argument; I will give several examples below of relations that cannot be thought along these lines. Subsequently, I will demonstrate problems with step (2), with the way in which Della Rocca gets the infinite regress going. This does not mean, however, that the core concern Della Rocca raises is not a real concern; it is in fact one dealt with in many debates about metaphysical foundationalism and coherentism.</p><p>Before I demonstrate this descent of Bradley's regress, I will first stay on the positive side and show how the kind of relations Della Rocca sketches are indeed problematic and have been shown to be worrisome already in ancient times, starting from Parmenides.</p><p>Della Rocca ties his argument against any distinctions to Parmenides and his monism, since a strict monism is the only position that, following Della Rocca's main argument, will ultimately be left for us. Parmenidean monism is based on his rejection of any distinctions. According to Della Rocca, this is in turn based on Parmenides' rejection of all forms of relations.<sup>5</sup></p><p>The notion of relation is indeed a notion that is very problematic in ancient philosophy: Parmenides does not allow for any relations, and Plato and Aristotle point out problems with them. The main worry seems to be that if something is a relation or relational, then it seems to have only derivative existence, but no full being. We can see this in Plato's characterisation of Forms as being simple in itself while sensible things only exist in relation to Forms, or in Aristotle's account of accidentals, which can only exist in relation to some substance. Della Rocca stands in this long tradition of raising problems for the very notion of relation. Since Aristotle is the thinker who shows the problems relations may raise most explicitly, we can think of Della Rocca as an Aristotelian in this sense. However, like Aristotle, Della Rocca only takes certain kinds of relations into view which will turn out not all that there is to relations. But let us look at the problems Plato and Aristotle raise with respect to relations first.</p><p>Plato, like Parmenides, attempts to conceive what truly is, for him the Forms, as possessing no complexity, no distinctions. For Plato there is, however, a plurality of what-is, of Forms, and so the freedom from distinctions only concerns each Form internally: each is of one kind (<i>monoeidês</i>), simple, not composed, and indivisible (see, for example, <i>Phaedo</i> 78b-d). The late Plato, however, changes this, as we can see in the <i>Sophist</i>. There he not only demonstrates tha
{"title":"Relations as basic – the Bradleyan descent","authors":"Barbara M. Sattler","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13056","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I think both steps (1) and (2) of Della Rocca's argument are problematic as I will show in this paper: (1) treats relations as addenda to the relata which seem to exist independently of the relation. This is one way of thinking about relations – a way we will see very clearly also in Aristotle's account of relation. But it is by no means the only one as Della Rocca suggests for his argument; I will give several examples below of relations that cannot be thought along these lines. Subsequently, I will demonstrate problems with step (2), with the way in which Della Rocca gets the infinite regress going. This does not mean, however, that the core concern Della Rocca raises is not a real concern; it is in fact one dealt with in many debates about metaphysical foundationalism and coherentism.</p><p>Before I demonstrate this descent of Bradley's regress, I will first stay on the positive side and show how the kind of relations Della Rocca sketches are indeed problematic and have been shown to be worrisome already in ancient times, starting from Parmenides.</p><p>Della Rocca ties his argument against any distinctions to Parmenides and his monism, since a strict monism is the only position that, following Della Rocca's main argument, will ultimately be left for us. Parmenidean monism is based on his rejection of any distinctions. According to Della Rocca, this is in turn based on Parmenides' rejection of all forms of relations.<sup>5</sup></p><p>The notion of relation is indeed a notion that is very problematic in ancient philosophy: Parmenides does not allow for any relations, and Plato and Aristotle point out problems with them. The main worry seems to be that if something is a relation or relational, then it seems to have only derivative existence, but no full being. We can see this in Plato's characterisation of Forms as being simple in itself while sensible things only exist in relation to Forms, or in Aristotle's account of accidentals, which can only exist in relation to some substance. Della Rocca stands in this long tradition of raising problems for the very notion of relation. Since Aristotle is the thinker who shows the problems relations may raise most explicitly, we can think of Della Rocca as an Aristotelian in this sense. However, like Aristotle, Della Rocca only takes certain kinds of relations into view which will turn out not all that there is to relations. But let us look at the problems Plato and Aristotle raise with respect to relations first.</p><p>Plato, like Parmenides, attempts to conceive what truly is, for him the Forms, as possessing no complexity, no distinctions. For Plato there is, however, a plurality of what-is, of Forms, and so the freedom from distinctions only concerns each Form internally: each is of one kind (<i>monoeidês</i>), simple, not composed, and indivisible (see, for example, <i>Phaedo</i> 78b-d). The late Plato, however, changes this, as we can see in the <i>Sophist</i>. There he not only demonstrates tha","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"314-324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ejop.13056","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Replies to Critics of The Parmenidean Ascent","authors":"Michael Della Rocca","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13054","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"365-376"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"History of Philosophy as a Source of Meaning","authors":"Hannah Ginsborg","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13060","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"3-16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143638859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant: The Violence and the Charity, by Morganna Lambeth Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. ISBN: 9781009239271","authors":"Fridolin Neumann","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13044","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"381-386"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143639312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Critique of Judgment and the Unity of Kant's Critical System. by Lara Ostaric Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. ISBN: 9781009336857","authors":"Michael Rohlf","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13046","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"377-380"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143639227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vieldeutigkeit: zur ästhetischen Umstellung der Philosophie by Günter Figal Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2023","authors":"Theodore George","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"33 1","pages":"392-397"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143639239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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