{"title":"Capital Structure Models and Contingent Convertible Securities","authors":"Di Meng, Adam Metzler, R. Mark Reesor","doi":"10.3390/risks12030055","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We implemented a methodology to calibrate capital structure models for banks that have issued contingent convertible securities (CoCos). Typical studies involving capital structure model calibration focus on non-financial firms as they have lower leverage and no contingent convertible securities. From a theoretical perspective, we found that jumps in the asset value process were necessary to obtain a satisfactory fit to the market data. In practice, contingent capital conversion triggers are discretionary, and there is considerable uncertainty around when regulators are likely to enforce conversion. The market-implied conversion triggers we obtain indicate that the market expects regulators to enforce conversion while the issuing bank is a going concern, as opposed to a gone concern. This fact is presumably of interest to potential dealers, regulators, issuers, and investors.","PeriodicalId":21282,"journal":{"name":"Risks","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Risks","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12030055","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We implemented a methodology to calibrate capital structure models for banks that have issued contingent convertible securities (CoCos). Typical studies involving capital structure model calibration focus on non-financial firms as they have lower leverage and no contingent convertible securities. From a theoretical perspective, we found that jumps in the asset value process were necessary to obtain a satisfactory fit to the market data. In practice, contingent capital conversion triggers are discretionary, and there is considerable uncertainty around when regulators are likely to enforce conversion. The market-implied conversion triggers we obtain indicate that the market expects regulators to enforce conversion while the issuing bank is a going concern, as opposed to a gone concern. This fact is presumably of interest to potential dealers, regulators, issuers, and investors.