Hard Paternalism and Confucian Familism

Abstract

In this paper, I criticize Joel Feinberg’s argument of soft paternalism, which stands against hard paternalism, as being untenable. As assessing one’s voluntariness is very difficult and controversial, paternalistic measures would be preferable to be implemented by hard paternalism rather than soft paternalism. I then examine four usual criticisms of hard paternalism from the perspective of utilitarianism and the principle of autonomy. I argue that these criticisms are unsound and unfounded, and I defend hard paternalism from the perspective of Confucian familism. I argue that as one’s life and identity are inseparable from one’s family, “self-regarding” actions, traditionally understood, do not only affect the self, but also one’s family members. Thus, paternalistic measures to protect individuals from self-harming are also aimed to protect their family members which are indeed compatible with Mill’s harm principle.