{"title":"Myšlení svobody u Martina Heideggera","authors":"Pavel Hlavinka","doi":"10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Being and Time it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of release ( Freisein ) and freedom ( Freiheit ). The term \"release\" refers to the facticity of Dasein, that is, the provision of a field of orientation for Dasein in being-in-the-world, and \"freedom\" refers to its existentiality, that is, the authentic grasping of this field in the form of one's own projection ( Entwurf ). There seems to be no place for the traditional notion of freedom. In spite of this impression, the author of Being and Time leaves us in no doubt that the notion of freedom in the sense of liberum arbitrium is inseparable from existential analytics. After the turn in Heidegger's thought, Being ( Sein ) is no longer thought from the position of a modern subjectivism transformed into Dasein. It is not we who think Be-ing ( Seyn ), but Be-ing itself thinks us. It is not we who are free, but Be-ing itself realizes its freedom through us.","PeriodicalId":502748,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Filozofia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.3.5","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In Being and Time it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of release ( Freisein ) and freedom ( Freiheit ). The term "release" refers to the facticity of Dasein, that is, the provision of a field of orientation for Dasein in being-in-the-world, and "freedom" refers to its existentiality, that is, the authentic grasping of this field in the form of one's own projection ( Entwurf ). There seems to be no place for the traditional notion of freedom. In spite of this impression, the author of Being and Time leaves us in no doubt that the notion of freedom in the sense of liberum arbitrium is inseparable from existential analytics. After the turn in Heidegger's thought, Being ( Sein ) is no longer thought from the position of a modern subjectivism transformed into Dasein. It is not we who think Be-ing ( Seyn ), but Be-ing itself thinks us. It is not we who are free, but Be-ing itself realizes its freedom through us.