Green design strategies for sustainable supply chain considering channel leadership

Fengmin Yao, Yingluo Yan, Likun Liu, Jiayi Sun
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Abstract

We have observed from practice that both the upstream and downstream firms in sustainable supply chain are motivated to invest in green design to create new economic and environmental values. Channel leadership as an important factor affecting the channel profit distribution will reshape the investment motivation of enterprises. In this paper, we construct six kinds of pricing and green design decision models to explore the optimal green design strategies for sustainable supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer under different channel leadership, and investigate the interaction between channel leadership and green design strategy, and their impact on sustainable supply chain performance, environment and consumer surplus. We find that regardless of the channel leadership, the wholesale and retail prices of products under different green design strategies are always affected by the cost effect of green design. In terms of boosting the green design level and market demand, increasing the consumer surplus and enterprises profits, only when the manufacturer is the channel leader and the green design cost effect is small, the retailer can implement green design better. Moreover, when the manufacturer implements green design, the better channel structure between the retailer-led and Nash equilibrium game depends on the green design cost effect, but both are better than the manufacturer-led. However, when the retailer implements green design, the channel structure of Nash equilibrium game is always better. We finally illustrate that under different channel leadership, which green design strategy is more conducive to reducing the total environment impact of products depends on the joint effect of green design cost effect and green design environment effect.
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考虑渠道领导力的可持续供应链绿色设计战略
我们从实践中观察到,可持续供应链的上下游企业都有投资绿色设计的动机,以创造新的经济和环境价值。渠道领导力作为影响渠道利润分配的重要因素,将重塑企业的投资动机。本文构建了六种定价与绿色设计决策模型,探讨了不同渠道领导力下由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的可持续供应链的最优绿色设计策略,并研究了渠道领导力与绿色设计策略之间的互动关系,以及它们对可持续供应链绩效、环境和消费者剩余的影响。我们发现,无论渠道领导力如何,不同绿色设计策略下的产品批发价和零售价都会受到绿色设计成本效应的影响。在提升绿色设计水平和市场需求、增加消费者剩余和企业利润方面,只有当制造商是渠道领导者且绿色设计成本效应较小时,零售商才能更好地实施绿色设计。此外,当制造商实施绿色设计时,零售商主导的渠道结构与纳什均衡博弈的优劣取决于绿色设计成本效应,但都优于制造商主导的渠道结构。然而,当零售商实施绿色设计时,纳什均衡博弈的渠道结构总是更好。最后,我们说明了在不同的渠道主导下,哪种绿色设计策略更有利于降低产品对环境的总影响取决于绿色设计成本效应和绿色设计环境效应的共同作用。
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