Incentive mechanism for allocating wastewater discharge responsibility based on cooperative game theory

Yue Li, Xudong Chen, Qiufeng Zhang, Yangxi Lv, Zixuan Zhang, Xue Feng
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Abstract

Clarifying responsibility for wastewater discharges and enhancing reasonable allocation of wastewater emission permits are critical for controlling wastewater discharge in the context global sustainable development plans. The traditional wastewater allocation approach has several drawbacks, such as sub-regional "free-riding," imbalanced regional development and demand, and unfair allocation mechanism. This study developed a model based on cooperative game theory to allocate responsibility for wastewater discharge in China's Tuojiang River Basin. In this model, the level of impact of a watershed sub-region on the water environment is determined, according to which the wastewater discharge responsibility is assigned. The stronger the impact of upstream sub-regions on downstream wastewater discharge, the greater the responsibility for wastewater discharge. Furthermore, by implementing the wastewater cooperation model, sub-regions can monitor and incentivize each other, through which wastewater discharges can be reduced by 16.38%, compared to the baseline mechanism and overall discharges can be reduced by 5007.99 tons. This study provides recommendations for appropriate management authorities to improve the allocation of wastewater discharge responsibility at the watershed scale.
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基于合作博弈论的污水排放责任分配激励机制
明确污水排放责任,加强污水排放许可的合理分配,是在全球可持续发展计划背景下控制污水排放的关键。传统的排污权分配方式存在次区域 "搭便车"、区域发展与需求不平衡、分配机制不公平等弊端。本研究基于合作博弈理论,建立了中国沱江流域污水排放责任分配模型。在该模型中,确定了流域子区域对水环境的影响程度,并据此分配污水排放责任。上游分区域对下游污水排放的影响越大,污水排放责任就越大。此外,通过实施废水合作模式,各分区域可以相互监督和激励,与基准机制相比,废水排放量可减少 16.38%,总体排放量可减少 5007.99 吨。本研究为相关管理部门提供了建议,以改善流域范围内的废水排放责任分配。
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