Candrakīrti on lokaprasiddhi: A Bad Hand, or an Ace in the Hole?

IF 0.4 2区哲学 0 ASIAN STUDIES JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI:10.1007/s10781-024-09557-9

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Abstract

The Indian Buddhist Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti (ca. 7th century CE) grounds his philosophy in lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, “that which is common knowledge / generally accepted among people in the world.” This raises the question of whether Candrakīrti accepts everything that is “common knowledge” or instead distinguishes and privileges certain justifiable beliefs within common knowledge. Tom J.F. Tillemans has argued that Candrakīrti advocates a “lowest common denominator” version of lokaprasiddhi instead of a model which promotes “in some areas at least, more of a qualitative hierarchy of opinions and thus criticism by optimally qualified, insightful individuals.” In this way Candrakīrti is characterized as a “typical Prāsaṅgika” who advocates “a populist lokaprasiddha and global error theory,” leading to “a dismal slough of relativism” in which Candrakīrti is compelled to uncritically acquise in the opinions of “average worldlings.” I argue that Candrakīrti instead employs a version of lokaprasiddhi that distinguishes expert knowledge from the untutored notions of the hoi polloi. This argument is based upon a new interpretation of āgama Candrakīrti twice quotes, and Candrakīrti’s usage of the terms lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha, loka- / laukikavyavahāra, saṃvṛti and saṃvṛtisatya, and laukika paramārtha. I conclude that Candrakīrti presents himself as an expert in the determination of mundane affairs (laukikārthaviniścayanipuṇa), the foremost of which is the “mundane ultimate” (laukika paramārtha), the Buddha’s teaching of the path to liberation. Candrakīrti illucidates this for those following “the Victor’s path of reasoning” (jinasya yuktipathānuyāyin). He bases his philosophy in a position that is simply mundane (laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā), but which is nevertheless rationally demonstrable within the parameters of that which is common knowledge among people in the world (lokaprasiddhi).

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Candrakīrti on lokaprasiddhi：一手烂牌，还是洞中王牌？

摘要印度佛教马扎弥迦大师坎德拉基尔提（Candrakīrti，约公元 7 世纪）的哲学基础是 lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha，即 "世界上人们普遍接受的常识"。这就提出了一个问题：坎德拉基尔提是接受一切 "常识"，还是在常识中对某些合理的信仰加以区分并给予特权。Tom J.F. Tillemans 认为，Candrakīrti 倡导的是一种 "最小公分母 "版本的 lokaprasiddhi，而不是一种 "至少在某些领域，更多的是对观点进行定性分级，从而由具有最佳资质和洞察力的个人进行批评 "的模式。这样，Candrakīrti 就被定性为一个 "典型的普拉萨学派"，主张 "民粹主义的 lokaprasiddha 和全球错误理论"，导致了 "相对主义的凄凉泥沼"，Candrakīrti 不得不不加批判地接受 "普通世人 "的观点。我的论点是，坎德拉基尔提采用的是一种将专家知识与普通人不谙世事的观念区分开来的 lokaprasiddhi。这一论点基于对 Candrakīrti 两次引用的 āgama 的新解释，以及 Candrakīrti 对 lokaprasiddhi / -prasiddha、loka- / laukikavyavahāra、saṃvṛti 和 saṃvṛtisatya 以及 laukika paramārtha 等术语的用法。我的结论是，坎德拉基尔提以确定世俗事务（laukikārthaviniścayanipuṇa）的专家自居，其中最重要的是 "世俗终极"（laukika paramārtha），即佛陀关于解脱之道的教导。坎德拉基尔提为那些遵循 "胜者的推理之路"（jinasya yuktipathānuyāyin）的人阐明了这一点。他的哲学以世俗（laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā）的立场为基础，但在世间常识（lokaprasiddhi）的范围内，这一立场是可以合理证明的。

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JOURNAL OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Multiple-

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期刊介绍： The Journal of Indian Philosophy publishes articles on various aspects of Indian thought, classical and modern. Articles range from close analysis of individual philosophical texts to detailed annotated translations of texts. The journal also publishes more speculative discussions of philosophical issues based on a close reading of primary sources.