Epistemic Partiality and the Nature of Friendship

IF 1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI:10.1007/s10677-024-10440-5

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The debate around epistemic partiality in friendship presents us with several tough philosophical puzzles. One of these has been articulated in two objections to the view that friendship can require epistemic partiality on the grounds it is incompatible with the nature of friendship. The first, owed to Crawford, argues that you should not treat your friends with epistemic partiality because your beliefs about your friends should be responsive to the facts about them, and epistemic partiality is incompatible with this demand. The second, owed to Mason, draws on a Murdochian account of love to argue that loving relationships—such as friendship—are ‘epistemically rich states’, which means that they are constituted by a drive towards ever greater and more intimate knowledge of our loved ones. In this paper, I shall argue that epistemic partiality may indeed limit what we know about our friends, but not in ways that diminish the quality of our love for them, and certainly not in ways that block us from being friends with them.

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认识偏差与友谊的本质

摘要围绕友谊中的认识偏向性展开的争论给我们提出了几个棘手的哲学难题。其中一个难题是，有两种观点反对友谊需要认识论上的偏袒，理由是这不符合友谊的本质。第一种反对意见来自克劳福德，他认为你不应该以认识论上的偏袒对待你的朋友，因为你对朋友的信念应该是对关于他们的事实的回应，而认识论上的偏袒与这一要求是不相容的。第二种观点归功于梅森，他从默多克的爱情观出发，认为爱情关系--如友谊--是 "认识论上的丰富状态"，这意味着它们是由对我们所爱的人的更多和更亲密的了解所构成的。在本文中，我将论证认识论上的偏颇确实可能会限制我们对朋友的了解，但不会降低我们对朋友的爱的质量，更不会阻碍我们与朋友成为朋友。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy. The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.

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