Ethical Theory and Moral Practice最新文献

Moral progress is often modeled as an increase in moral knowledge and understanding, with achievements in moral reasoning seen as key drivers of progressive moral change. Contemporary discussion recognizes two (rival) accounts: knowledge-based and understanding-based theories of moral progress, with the latter recently contended as superior (Severini 2021). In this article, we challenge the alleged superiority of understanding-based accounts by conducting a comparative analysis of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. We assess them based on their potential to meet the following criteria: (i) moral progress must be possible despite evolutionary and epistemic constraints on moral reasoning; (ii) it should be epistemically achievable to ordinary moral agents; and (iii) it should be explainable via doxastic change. Our analysis suggests that both accounts are roughly equally plausible, but knowledge-based accounts are slightly less demanding and more effective at explaining doxastic change. Therefore, contrary to the prevailing view, we find knowledge-based accounts of moral progress more promising.

An important question regarding the use of neurointerventions in criminal justice systems relates to the ethics of offering neurointerventions in exchange for a sentence reduction or as a condition of parole – what has been termed the neurocorrective offer. In this paper, we suggest that neurocorrective offers may sometimes involve manipulative pressure. That is, in some cases these offers will involve a pressure to comply with the manipulators’ (i.e., the state’s) bidding that does not rise to the level of coercion, but which cannot be considered an instance of persuasion. We then suggest that offenders may fall victim to this pressure due to general facts about human psychology and their situational vulnerability. We end the paper by identifying three reasons for thinking it prima facie morally wrong for the state to make neurocorrective offers involving manipulative pressure even if such offers do not undermine offenders’ consent to the offer. Specifically, we suggest that such offers are plausibly pro tanto harmful to some offenders and that they sometimes disrespect their autonomy and rationality.

Advances in science and technology have added to our insights into the vulnerabilities of human agency as well as to the methods of exploiting them. This has raised the stakes for efforts to clarify the concept and ethics of manipulation. Among these efforts, Robert Noggle’s influencer-centered account of manipulation has been most significant. He defines manipulative acts as those whereby an agent intentionally influences a recipient’s attitudes so that they do not conform as closely as they otherwise would to the pertinent norms and ideals endorsed by the influencer. This provides a relatively simple and in many ways clear definition of manipulation. It sidesteps thorny debates about autonomy, freedom, or practical rationality. It also promises to reveal a conceptual parallel between manipulating and lying, and thus to explain why manipulation is pro tanto wrong. In one respect, however, the account remains ambiguous: It remains unclear whether, and to what extent, it requires that influencers’ beliefs about what is ideal for their recipients to be grounded in some effort on the part of the influencer to identify with or take on the role of her recipient. This paper explains this ambiguity. It argues that influencer-centrism cannot remain indifferent to the validity of an agent’s beliefs about the ideal state of the recipient and provide an identification requirement that would render the whole account plausible and sufficiently determinate.

The article outlines the distributive demands of relational equality in the form of a dynamic corridor of legitimate distributive inequality. It does so by complementing the already widely accepted sufficientarian floor with a limitarian ceiling, leading, in a first step, to a "corridor" of limited distributive inequality as a necessary condition for relational equality. This corridor alone, however, only provides necessary distributive conditions for relational equality and still allows for degrees of distributive inequality that would risk undermining egalitarian relations. Thus, in a second step, intra-corridor distributive inequalities must be regulated by two further constraints: a (context- dependent) ratio between the best- and worst-off, and a demand for equality of opportunity so that inequalities result from people’s responsible choices. This set of demands spells out the distributive conditions that are not only necessary, but sufficient to provide a sound distributive basis for relational equality. After presenting this view, the article defends it against several objections.

Instrumentalism about need suggests that the normative significance of an agent’s need for x depends on the end for which x is needed. Instrumental accounts have, however, been vague about the transfer or transmission of normative significance supposed to be occurring from ends to needs. How should such transmission be understood, and how can we assess the amount or degree of significance being transmitted in particular cases? The Relational Account (RA) combines work on normative transmission principles and the strength of reasons in order to clarify these issues. RA, it is argued, both (1) improves the instrumental view on need and (2) can be used to analyze and assess a large range of needs and arguments from need – including ‘basic needs’, which some argue require non-instrumental explanation. While the paper develops an instrumental view, the analysis of the normativity of the needs-end relation will also be helpful for clarifying instrumental relations between different kinds of need in non-instrumentalist theories – such as relations between ‘absolute’ and intermediate needs.

Johann Frick has claimed that morality requires that we (in many cases) should give in to the demands of rational agents who attempt to extort us by threatening to harm themselves (self-threatening extortionists). He has further argued that since contractualism implies that there is no such moral requirement, such cases represent a problem for this brand of moral theory. In this paper, we argue that things are quite the other way around: Morality does not require that we give in to the demands of self-threatening extortionists. Such cases, therefore, represent a problem for (act) utilitarianism, rather than contractualism. Our argument appeals to a particular understanding of the idea that rational agents have a special responsibility to take care of their own interests or welfare.

The ethics of blame includes conditions determining whether an instance of blame is permissible. One generally recognised condition is that blame should be proportionate. If it is not proportionate, that speaks against its permissibility. All the same, what exactly amounts to proportionate blame is currently under-theorised. In this paper, we aim to amend this. More precisely, we distinguish between private and overt blame and highlight some of their differences – e.g., that they aggregate differently. Then, we develop an account of proportional blame and draw out some practical implications of our account.

Hypocrisy is generally treated as particularly repugnant, perhaps the “only unforgivable sin.” I argue that this attitude is misplaced. Hypocrisy—especially quotidian hypocrisy by the average citizen—plays an essential role in maintaining and promoting a good society. Hypocrisy facilitates the establishment and maintenance of beneficial social norms, and can secure better social outcomes when full compliance with a norm is suboptimal. The hypocrite then, is sometimes playing a crucial role in society, and in such cases doesn’t deserve the full measure of the reprobation we usually reserve for them. Instead of focusing our reactions on their hypocrisy, we should instead target our attitudes on the misbehavior itself.

The call for a planned phase-out is at the forefront of the political debate about animal experimentation. While authorities like the European Commission start taking a strategic approach to regulatory animal testing, they refuse to develop specific roadmaps for the phase-out of animal research. I articulate the central argument that is advanced against phase-out planning in animal research, the argument from avoidable harms: By restricting research, we may incur avoidable future harms and thus, while we may regret having to use animals in ways that harm them, for the sake of avoiding future harms we must not phase out animal research. The discussion of this argument yields two Conclusions: First, it applies only to ban-based phase-out plans, but not to plans consisting of a range of other interventions known from the literature on transformative governance. Second, the premises of the argument construe animal research as a necessary evil, thus as a conflict of unequal duties. But we have a duty not just to avoid avoidable harms, but also to avoid avoidable moral conflicts. This we can only do by taking a strategic approach. Thus, what initially looks like an argument against phase-out planning is in truth an argument for ban-free phase-out planning. This finding is important for practice because it shows that while government authorities’ reluctance to issue bans may be justified, their refusal to undertake strategic planning for the phase-out of animal research is not.

The United States carceral system, as currently designed and implemented, is widely considered to be an immoral and inhumane system of criminal punishment. There are a number of pressing issues related to this topic, but in this essay, I will focus upon the problem of prison violence. Inadequate supervision has resulted in unsafe prison conditions where inmates are regularly threatened with rape, assault, and other forms of physical violence. Such callous disregard and exposure to unreasonable risk constitutes a severe violation of the rights of prisoners by the state. While there have been numerous legal, political, and activist efforts to draw attention to this issue—with the goal of reforming and making prisons safer—my goal is different. I argue that inmates who are victims of prison violence should have their sentences automatically reduced. Two distinct arguments are advanced in support of this claim. First, I argue that acts of prison violence are a sort of state-mediated harm which can thus be appropriately described as punishment-constituting. Second, and more straightforwardly, I argue that the compensation owed to prisoners who are victims of prison violence may naturally take the form of a reduced sentence.