{"title":"Can attentional nudges improve efficiency of bilateral multi-attribute negotiations?","authors":"Karine Lamiraud , Julien Patris , Radu Vranceanu","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102205","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper reports the results from a lab experiment to simulate negotiation on innovative therapy commercialization. Using a between-subject design, we analyzed the consequences of two light choice interventions: (1) guiding negotiations towards early wins, and (2) inviting negotiators to share information about their priority goals. In both treatments, the total value created exceeded the control value by approximately 9 % of the maximal value that can be created in this experiment. However, it was essentially the buyer who captured the additional value. We found that, conditional on the success of the negotiation, the total value created increased with the time spent negotiating. Negotiator gender had an impact on the negotiation outcome, with women underperforming compared to men.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"110 ","pages":"Article 102205"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000430/pdfft?md5=061afdd6d80b18c50add363f55cf2cbe&pid=1-s2.0-S2214804324000430-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000430","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper reports the results from a lab experiment to simulate negotiation on innovative therapy commercialization. Using a between-subject design, we analyzed the consequences of two light choice interventions: (1) guiding negotiations towards early wins, and (2) inviting negotiators to share information about their priority goals. In both treatments, the total value created exceeded the control value by approximately 9 % of the maximal value that can be created in this experiment. However, it was essentially the buyer who captured the additional value. We found that, conditional on the success of the negotiation, the total value created increased with the time spent negotiating. Negotiator gender had an impact on the negotiation outcome, with women underperforming compared to men.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.
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