Are Private Firms More Aggressive Tax Planners?

Jeffrey L. Hoopes, Patrick T. Langetieg, Edward L. Maydew, Michele S. Mullaney
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Abstract

Drawing on confidential Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, we examine whether privately held corporations are more aggressive tax planners than their publicly held peers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no consistent evidence that private firms are more aggressive tax planners. We then examine whether private firms’ tax planning differs from that of public firms more generally. We find that private firms engage in more conforming tax planning (planning that also reduces pretax accounting income). However, tests of nonconforming tax planning reveal that private firms generally engage in the same or less planning relative to their public peers. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the belief that private firms are generally more aggressive tax planners than are public firms, but confirm that they engage in more of some forms of general (i.e., conforming) planning. Data Availability: The IRS provided confidential tax information to Michele S. Mullaney pursuant to an Intragovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 (IPA) agreement through the Statistics of Income (SOI) Joint Statistical Research Program (JSRP). JEL Classifications: H25; H26; K34; M41.
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私人公司是否更积极地进行税务筹划?
利用美国国税局(IRS)的机密数据,我们研究了私营企业是否比上市公司更积极地进行税务筹划。与传统观点相反,我们没有发现一致的证据表明私营企业是更激进的税务筹划者。然后,我们研究了私营企业的税收筹划是否与一般上市公司有所不同。我们发现,私营企业从事更多符合规定的税务筹划(同时减少税前会计收入的筹划)。然而,对不符合规定的税务筹划进行的测试表明,私营企业与上市企业相比,通常会进行相同或更少的税务筹划。总体而言,我们的研究结果对私营企业普遍比上市公司更积极进行税务筹划的观点表示怀疑,但证实了私营企业更多参与某些形式的一般性(即符合要求的)筹划。数据可用性:根据《1970 年政府间人事法案》(IPA)协议,国税局通过收入统计(SOI)联合统计研究计划(JSRP)向 Michele S. Mullaney 提供了机密税务信息。JEL Classifications:H25; H26; K34; M41.
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