Zhaoxiang Liu, Kejun Chen, Dean Sullivan, Orlando Arias, R. Dutta, Yier Jin, Xiaolong Guo
{"title":"Microscope: Causality Inference Crossing the Hardware and Software Boundary from Hardware Perspective","authors":"Zhaoxiang Liu, Kejun Chen, Dean Sullivan, Orlando Arias, R. Dutta, Yier Jin, Xiaolong Guo","doi":"10.1109/ASP-DAC58780.2024.10473793","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The increasing complexity of System-on-Chip (SoC) designs and the rise of third-party vendors in the semiconductor industry have led to unprecedented security concerns. Traditional formal methods struggle to address software-exploited hardware bugs, and existing solutions for hardware-software co-verification often fall short. This paper presents Microscope, a novel framework for inferring software instruction patterns that can trigger hardware vulnerabilities in SoC designs. Microscope enhances the Structural Causal Model (SCM) with hardware features, creating a scalable Hardware Structural Causal Model (HW-SCM). A domain-specific language (DSL) in SMT-LIB represents the HW-SCM and predefined security properties, with incremental SMT solving deducing possible instructions. Microscope identifies causality to determine whether a hardware threat could result from any software events, providing a valuable resource for patching hardware bugs and generating test input. Extensive experimentation demonstrates Microscope’s capability to infer the causality of a wide range of vulnerabilities and bugs located in SoC-level benchmarks.","PeriodicalId":518586,"journal":{"name":"2024 29th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC)","volume":"288 16-17","pages":"933-938"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2024 29th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ASP-DAC58780.2024.10473793","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The increasing complexity of System-on-Chip (SoC) designs and the rise of third-party vendors in the semiconductor industry have led to unprecedented security concerns. Traditional formal methods struggle to address software-exploited hardware bugs, and existing solutions for hardware-software co-verification often fall short. This paper presents Microscope, a novel framework for inferring software instruction patterns that can trigger hardware vulnerabilities in SoC designs. Microscope enhances the Structural Causal Model (SCM) with hardware features, creating a scalable Hardware Structural Causal Model (HW-SCM). A domain-specific language (DSL) in SMT-LIB represents the HW-SCM and predefined security properties, with incremental SMT solving deducing possible instructions. Microscope identifies causality to determine whether a hardware threat could result from any software events, providing a valuable resource for patching hardware bugs and generating test input. Extensive experimentation demonstrates Microscope’s capability to infer the causality of a wide range of vulnerabilities and bugs located in SoC-level benchmarks.