Information flows and memory in games

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-04-03 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.018
Pierpaolo Battigalli , Nicolò Generoso
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Abstract

The standard extensive-form partitional representation of information in sequential games fails to distinguish the description of the rules of interaction from the description of players' personal traits. Indeed, this representation does not model how the information given to players as per the rules of the game blends with players' cognitive abilities. We propose a representation of sequential games that explicitly describes the flow of information accruing to players rather than the stock of information retained by players encoded in information partitions. Then, we add a game-independent description of players' mnemonic abilities. If players have perfect memory, our flow representation gives rise to information partitions satisfying the perfect recall property, but different combinations of information flows and players' mnemonic abilities may induce the same information partitions. We show how to use our framework to explicitly model a wide array of cognitive limitations and embed them in the representation of game situations.

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游戏中的信息流和记忆
顺序游戏中信息的标准广义形式分区表示法未能区分对互动规则的描述和对游戏者个人特征的描述。事实上,这种表示法并没有模拟按照游戏规则给予玩家的信息是如何与玩家的认知能力相融合的。我们提出的顺序博弈表征明确描述了博弈者获得的信息流,而不是博弈者保留在信息分区中的信息存量。然后,我们对棋手的记忆能力添加了与博弈无关的描述。如果棋手拥有完美的记忆力,我们的信息流表示法就会产生满足完美回忆特性的信息分区,但信息流和棋手记忆能力的不同组合可能会产生相同的信息分区。我们展示了如何利用我们的框架来明确模拟各种认知限制,并将其嵌入游戏情境的表示中。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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