{"title":"Information flows and memory in games","authors":"Pierpaolo Battigalli , Nicolò Generoso","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.018","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The standard extensive-form partitional representation of information in sequential games fails to distinguish the description of the rules of interaction from the description of players' personal traits. Indeed, this representation does not model how the information given to players as per the rules of the game blends with players' cognitive abilities. We propose a representation of sequential games that explicitly describes the flow of information accruing to players rather than the stock of information retained by players encoded in information partitions. Then, we add a game-independent description of players' mnemonic abilities. If players have perfect memory, our flow representation gives rise to information partitions satisfying the perfect recall property, but different combinations of information flows and players' mnemonic abilities may induce the same information partitions. We show how to use our framework to explicitly model a wide array of cognitive limitations and embed them in the representation of game situations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"145 ","pages":"Pages 356-376"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624000496","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The standard extensive-form partitional representation of information in sequential games fails to distinguish the description of the rules of interaction from the description of players' personal traits. Indeed, this representation does not model how the information given to players as per the rules of the game blends with players' cognitive abilities. We propose a representation of sequential games that explicitly describes the flow of information accruing to players rather than the stock of information retained by players encoded in information partitions. Then, we add a game-independent description of players' mnemonic abilities. If players have perfect memory, our flow representation gives rise to information partitions satisfying the perfect recall property, but different combinations of information flows and players' mnemonic abilities may induce the same information partitions. We show how to use our framework to explicitly model a wide array of cognitive limitations and embed them in the representation of game situations.
期刊介绍:
Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology