Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.007
Andy Brownback , Nathaniel Burke , Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch
People often attempt to present a positive image by overstating virtuous behaviors when responding to unincentivized “polls.” We examine whether others account for this “socially desirable responding” (SDR) when drawing inferences from such unincentivized responses. In an experiment, we incentivize “predictors” to guess others' choice behaviors across actions with varying social desirability. Predictors observe random subsamples of either (i) incentivized choices or (ii) hypothetical claims. The hypothetical claims exhibit systematic SDR and predictors are reasonably skeptical of them. However, their skepticism is not tailored to the direction or magnitude of SDR. This under-correction occurs even though subjects' stated sentiment toward the actions can predict SDR.
{"title":"Inference from biased polls","authors":"Andy Brownback , Nathaniel Burke , Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>People often attempt to present a positive image by overstating virtuous behaviors when responding to unincentivized “polls.” We examine whether others account for this “socially desirable responding” (SDR) when drawing inferences from such unincentivized responses. In an experiment, we incentivize “predictors” to guess others' choice behaviors across actions with varying social desirability. Predictors observe random subsamples of either (i) incentivized choices or (ii) hypothetical claims. The hypothetical claims exhibit systematic SDR and predictors are reasonably skeptical of them. However, their skepticism is not tailored to the direction or magnitude of SDR. This under-correction occurs even though subjects' stated sentiment toward the actions can predict SDR.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 449-486"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142663035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.008
Inácio Bó , Li Chen , Rustamdjan Hakimov
We consider situations in which consumers are aware that a statistical model determines the price of a product based on their observed behavior. Using a novel experiment varying the context similarity between participant data and a product, we find that participants manipulate their responses to a survey regarding personal characteristics, and manipulation is more successful when the contexts are similar. Moreover, participants demand less privacy, and make less optimal privacy choices when the contexts are less similar. Our findings highlight the importance of data privacy policies in the age of big data, in which behavior in apparently unrelated contexts might affect prices.
{"title":"Strategic responses to personalized pricing and demand for privacy: An experiment","authors":"Inácio Bó , Li Chen , Rustamdjan Hakimov","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider situations in which consumers are aware that a statistical model determines the price of a product based on their observed behavior. Using a novel experiment varying the context similarity between participant data and a product, we find that participants manipulate their responses to a survey regarding personal characteristics, and manipulation is more successful when the contexts are similar. Moreover, participants demand less privacy, and make less optimal privacy choices when the contexts are less similar. Our findings highlight the importance of data privacy policies in the age of big data, in which behavior in apparently unrelated contexts might affect prices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 487-516"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142663036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.005
Camilo J. Sirguiado, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
In two-sided one-to-one matching markets, each side of the market has a single stable mechanism that is strategy-proof for its members (Alcalde and Barberà, 1994). When agents may not declare potential partners inadmissible, this uniqueness result only holds for the short side, if there is one. Furthermore, among the stable mechanisms that are strategy-proof for the long side of the market, there is one that is less manipulable by coalitions of its members than the long-side optimal deferred acceptance mechanism. In general, Alcalde and Barberà's uniqueness result holds for one side of the market if and only if either at most one of its members may not declare inadmissibilities or there are fewer agents on that side than individuals without outside options on the other side of the market.
{"title":"Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options","authors":"Camilo J. Sirguiado, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In two-sided one-to-one matching markets, each side of the market has a single stable mechanism that is strategy-proof for its members (<span><span>Alcalde and Barberà, 1994</span></span>). When agents may not declare potential partners inadmissible, this uniqueness result only holds for the short side, if there is one. Furthermore, among the stable mechanisms that are strategy-proof for the long side of the market, there is one that is less manipulable by coalitions of its members than the long-side optimal deferred acceptance mechanism. In general, Alcalde and Barberà's uniqueness result holds for one side of the market if and only if either at most one of its members may not declare inadmissibilities or there are fewer agents on that side than individuals without outside options on the other side of the market.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 385-397"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142552182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.009
Yukun Cheng , Xiaotie Deng , Yuhao Li , Xiang Yan
The BitTorrent network, a well-known Internet-scale P2P system, applies the proportional response protocol to exchange resource, where each participant contributes resource to neighbors in proportion to the amount it received in the previous round. The dynamics of this protocol is known to converge to a market equilibrium. However, an agent may manipulate this protocol by a Sybil attack to create fictitious identities and control them to gain more benefit. We apply the concept of incentive ratio, the percentage of the new utility after a Sybil attack over the benchmark, to measure the incentive of a strategic agent to play a Sybil attack, proving a tight bound of two over general networks. This finding completes the theoretical picture for incentive analysis on Sybil attacks facing the legendary tit-for-tat protocol for Internet bandwidth sharing and other applications.
{"title":"Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks","authors":"Yukun Cheng , Xiaotie Deng , Yuhao Li , Xiang Yan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The BitTorrent network, a well-known Internet-scale P2P system, applies the proportional response protocol to exchange resource, where each participant contributes resource to neighbors in proportion to the amount it received in the previous round. The dynamics of this protocol is known to converge to a market equilibrium. However, an agent may manipulate this protocol by a Sybil attack to create fictitious identities and control them to gain more benefit. We apply the concept of <em>incentive ratio</em>, the percentage of the new utility after a Sybil attack over the benchmark, to measure the incentive of a strategic agent to play a Sybil attack, proving a tight bound of two over general networks. This finding completes the theoretical picture for incentive analysis on Sybil attacks facing the legendary tit-for-tat protocol for Internet bandwidth sharing and other applications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 566-610"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142663086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.002
Ronen Gradwohl , Artyom Jelnov
We study a repeated credence goods market in which experts provide treatment to customers. We assume that the history of transactions is recorded on a review platform that contains information only about treatments, and not about non-treatments. We also introduce the notion of a partial credence good, where treated customers receive a noisy, ex post signal about the necessity of treatment. Absent such signals, there is a breakdown of the market. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the signals that guarantees the existence of any non-trivial equilibrium, as well as an efficient one.
{"title":"Partial credence goods on review platforms","authors":"Ronen Gradwohl , Artyom Jelnov","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study a repeated credence goods market in which experts provide treatment to customers. We assume that the history of transactions is recorded on a review platform that contains information only about treatments, and not about non-treatments. We also introduce the notion of a partial credence good, where treated customers receive a noisy, ex post signal about the necessity of treatment. Absent such signals, there is a breakdown of the market. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the signals that guarantees the existence of any non-trivial equilibrium, as well as an efficient one.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 517-534"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142663037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.013
Andreas Haupt, Aroon Narayanan
Many economic decision-makers today rely on learning algorithms for important decisions. This paper shows that a widely used learning algorithm—ε-Greedy—exhibits emergent risk aversion, favoring actions with lower payoff variance. When presented with actions of the same expectated payoff, under a wide range of conditions, ε-Greedy chooses the lower-variance action with probability approaching one. This emergent preference can have wide-ranging consequences, from inequity to homogenization, and holds transiently even when the higher-variance action has a strictly higher expected payoff. We discuss two methods to restore risk neutrality. The first method reweights data as a function of how likely an action is chosen. The second method employs optimistic payoff estimates for actions that have not been taken often.
{"title":"Risk preferences of learning algorithms","authors":"Andreas Haupt, Aroon Narayanan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.013","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.013","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Many economic decision-makers today rely on learning algorithms for important decisions. This paper shows that a widely used learning algorithm—<em>ε</em>-Greedy—exhibits emergent risk aversion, favoring actions with lower payoff variance. When presented with actions of the same expectated payoff, under a wide range of conditions, <em>ε</em>-Greedy chooses the lower-variance action with probability approaching one. This emergent preference can have wide-ranging consequences, from inequity to homogenization, and holds transiently even when the higher-variance action has a strictly higher expected payoff. We discuss two methods to restore risk neutrality. The first method reweights data as a function of how likely an action is chosen. The second method employs optimistic payoff estimates for actions that have not been taken often.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 415-426"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142587092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.006
Nicodemo De Vito
Hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999) play a central role for the epistemic analysis of solution concepts in sequential games. They are modelled by type structures, which allow the analyst to represent the players' hierarchies without specifying an infinite sequence of conditional beliefs. Here, we study type structures that satisfy a “richness” property, called completeness. Friedenberg (2010) shows that, under specific conditions, a complete type structure with ordinary beliefs represents all hierarchies. This paper shows that Friedenberg's result can be extended to type structures with conditional beliefs. As an ancillary result of independent interest, we provide a construction of the “canonical” space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs which generalizes the one in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999).
{"title":"Complete conditional type structures","authors":"Nicodemo De Vito","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Hierarchies of conditional beliefs (<span><span>Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999</span></span>) play a central role for the epistemic analysis of solution concepts in sequential games. They are modelled by type structures, which allow the analyst to represent the players' hierarchies without specifying an infinite sequence of conditional beliefs. Here, we study type structures that satisfy a “richness” property, called <em>completeness</em>. <span><span>Friedenberg (2010)</span></span> shows that, under specific conditions, a complete type structure with ordinary beliefs represents all hierarchies. This paper shows that Friedenberg's result can be extended to type structures with conditional beliefs. As an ancillary result of independent interest, we provide a construction of the “canonical” space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs which generalizes the one in <span><span>Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999)</span></span>.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 427-448"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142663034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.001
Arash Abizadeh , Adrian Vetta
The classical measures of voting power are based on players' decisiveness or full causal efficacy in vote configurations or divisions. We design an alternative, recursive measure departing from this classical approach. We motivate the measure via an axiomatic characterisation based on reasonable axioms and by offering two complementary interpretations of its meaning: first, we interpret the measure to represent, not the player's probability of being decisive in a voting structure, but its expected probability of being decisive in a uniform random walk from a vote configuration in the subset lattice (through which we represent the voting structure); and, second, we interpret it as representing a player's expected efficacy, thereby incorporating the notion of partial and not just full causal efficacy. We shore up our measure by demonstrating that it satisfies a set of postulates any reasonable voting measure should satisfy, namely, the iso-invariance, dummy, dominance, donation, minimum-power bloc, and quarrel postulates.
{"title":"A recursive measure of voting power that satisfies reasonable postulates","authors":"Arash Abizadeh , Adrian Vetta","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The classical measures of voting power are based on players' decisiveness or full causal efficacy in vote configurations or divisions. We design an alternative, recursive measure departing from this classical approach. We motivate the measure via an axiomatic characterisation based on reasonable axioms and by offering two complementary interpretations of its meaning: first, we interpret the measure to represent, not the player's probability of being decisive in a voting structure, but its expected probability of being decisive in a uniform random walk from a vote configuration in the subset lattice (through which we represent the voting structure); and, second, we interpret it as representing a player's expected efficacy, thereby incorporating the notion of partial and not just full causal efficacy. We shore up our measure by demonstrating that it satisfies a set of postulates any reasonable voting measure should satisfy, namely, the iso-invariance, dummy, dominance, donation, minimum-power bloc, and quarrel postulates.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 535-565"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142663087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-01DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.003
Kirill Borissov , Mikhail Pakhnin , Ronald Wendner
We address time-inconsistent decision making by studying two types of intrapersonal cooperation in the Ramsey model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. First, we consider temporal selves following the Golden Rule principle (do unto others as you would have them do unto you). Second, we consider temporal selves following Kant's categorical imperative (act as you would want all others to act towards all others). We introduce the corresponding cooperative policies and characterize them for economies with respectively log-utility and Cobb–Douglas technology, and isoelastic utility and linear technology. We compare cooperative behavior with non-cooperative (naive and sophisticated) behavior in terms of saving rates, and show that intrapersonal cooperation improves welfare according to all commonly used welfare criteria.
{"title":"Cooperating with yourself","authors":"Kirill Borissov , Mikhail Pakhnin , Ronald Wendner","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We address time-inconsistent decision making by studying two types of intrapersonal cooperation in the Ramsey model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. First, we consider temporal selves following the Golden Rule principle (<em>do unto others as you would have them do unto you</em>). Second, we consider temporal selves following Kant's categorical imperative (<em>act as you would want all others to act towards all others</em>). We introduce the corresponding cooperative policies and characterize them for economies with respectively log-utility and Cobb–Douglas technology, and isoelastic utility and linear technology. We compare cooperative behavior with non-cooperative (naive and sophisticated) behavior in terms of saving rates, and show that intrapersonal cooperation improves welfare according to all commonly used welfare criteria.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 398-414"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142587091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-18DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002
Assaf Romm , Alvin E. Roth , Ran I. Shorrer
Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.
{"title":"Stability vs. no justified envy","authors":"Assaf Romm , Alvin E. Roth , Ran I. Shorrer","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 357-366"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142531182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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