Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Status quo bias with choice overload 选择过多的现状偏见

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.012

Jiaqi Yang

This paper proposes a model that parsimoniously captures evidence on status quo bias, the reference effect and choice overload. Choice overload is behaviorally defined as an increase in intensity of status quo bias when the menu enlarges. Our decision maker follows a two-step procedure by first limiting consideration to the alternatives that weakly dominate the status quo according to a menu-dependent list of attributes, and then maximizing preference over this subset with tie breaking in favor of the status quo. Choice overload is generated by the key feature that the list of attributes is increasing in menu size. An axiomatic characterization and three applications are provided. In particular, a policy maker has to nudge the agent through a series of small changes in her choice problems. An incumbent firm can deter entry by exploiting choice overload, while an entrant firm can introduce new product more efficiently using information on attention.

本文提出了一个模型，该模型可以简洁地捕获关于现状偏差、参考效应和选择过载的证据。选择过载在行为上被定义为当菜单扩大时，对现状的偏见强度增加。我们的决策者遵循两步程序，首先根据菜单依赖的属性列表限制对弱支配现状的替代方案的考虑，然后在这个子集上最大化偏好，并打破对现状的支持。选择过载是由属性列表在菜单大小中增加这一关键特性产生的。给出了一种公理化性质和三种应用。特别是，政策制定者必须推动代理人通过她的选择问题中的一系列小变化。现有企业可以利用选择过载来阻止进入，而进入企业可以利用注意力信息更有效地推出新产品。

引用次数: 0

School choice with farsighted students 有远见的学生选择学校

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010

Ata Atay , Ana Mauleon , Vincent Vannetelbosch

We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justified envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students.

我们考虑有远见的学生优先选择学校的问题。我们证明了由Top Trading Cycles （TTC）机制得到的匹配组成的单例集是一个有远见的稳定集。然而，从延迟接受（DA）机制获得的匹配可能不属于任何前视稳定集。因此，TTC机制提供的分配不仅是帕累托效率，而且是长远稳定的。此外，展望未来三步已经足以稳定从TTC获得的匹配。此外，我们表明，在没有正当嫉妒的情况下，TTC的变化是稳定的，但可能需要学生更有远见。

引用次数: 0

Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles 公理讨价还价理论：旧瓶装新酒

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009

Dominik Karos , Shiran Rachmilevitch

Five classical and uncontroversial axioms—symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity—characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the n-th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.

五个经典且无争议的公理--对称性、弱帕累托最优性、受限单调性、中点支配和超累加性--是讨价还价方案的特征。它将每个参与者的中点，即他们乌托邦点的第 n 个份额分配给他们，并平分剩余的部分。

引用次数: 0

Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function 无策略社会选择函数范围的有界性

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013

Shigehiro Serizawa , John A. Weymark

For the provision of

m \geq 1

divisible public goods, relatively weak restrictions on the domain of a strategy-proof social choice function are identified that ensure that its range is bounded. Domain restrictions are also identified for which strategy-proofness implies that the range and the option sets of a social choice function are compact. To illustrate the usefulness of these results, it is shown how a theorem about generalized median voter schemes due to Barberà, Massó, and Serizawa can be established without their assumption that the range of a social choice function is compact provided that the tops of the preferences are not restricted to be finite.

对于m≥1个可分公共品的供给，确定了对防策略社会选择函数域的相对弱的限制，确保其范围是有界的。还确定了域限制，其中策略证明性意味着社会选择函数的范围和选项集是紧凑的。为了说明这些结果的有用性，展示了如何在没有假设社会选择函数的范围是紧凑的前提下，建立由barber， Massó和Serizawa提出的关于广义中位选民方案的定理，只要偏好的顶部不受限制是有限的。

引用次数: 0

Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games 广泛形式博弈中针对承诺的最优私人报酬操纵

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008

Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li

Stackelberg equilibrium describes the optimal strategies of a player, when she (the leader) first credibly commits to a strategy. Her opponent (the follower) will best respond to her commitment. To compute the optimal commitment, a leader must learn enough follower's payoff information. The follower can then potentially provide fake information, to induce a different final game outcome that benefits him more than when he truthfully behaves.

We study such follower's manipulation in extensive-form games. For all four settings considered, we characterize all the inducible game outcomes. We show the polynomial-time tractability of finding the optimal payoff function to misreport. We compare the follower's optimal attainable utilities among different settings, with the true game fixed. In particular, one comparison shows that the follower gets no less when the leader's strategy space expands from pure strategies to behavioral strategies. Our work completely resolves this follower's optimal manipulation problem on extensive-form game trees.

斯塔克尔伯格均衡描述了棋手（领导者）首次可信地承诺采取某种策略时的最优策略。她的对手（追随者）将对她的承诺做出最佳回应。要计算出最优承诺，领导者必须了解足够多的追随者的收益信息。追随者有可能提供虚假信息，从而诱导出不同的最终博弈结果，使自己获得比真实行为更多的利益。对于所考虑的所有四种情况，我们都描述了所有可诱导博弈结果的特征。我们展示了找到误报的最优报酬函数的多项式时间可操作性。在真实博弈固定不变的情况下，我们比较了跟随者在不同情况下的最优效用。其中一项比较显示，当领导者的策略空间从纯粹策略扩展到行为策略时，追随者的收益并没有减少。我们的研究完全解决了广泛形式博弈树上的追随者最优操纵问题。

引用次数: 0

Understanding dynamic interactions 了解动态互动

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.010

Konrad Grabiszewski , Alex Horenstein

Dealing with a problem consists of understanding and solving. While there is vast literature analyzing problem solving, this article focuses on understanding. The problems subjects deal with are finite dynamic games with complete and perfect information. Understanding involves comprehending the relationships between choices and their consequences. The same backward-induction problem is presented using two distinct representations: tree and non-tree. The crucial difference between them is that the relevant connections between choices and consequences are directly provided in a tree but must be identified in a non-tree. Our study comprises 27 pairs of tree/non-tree interactions with a varying depth. We measure and analyze understanding by looking at success in understanding and the effort it involves. Our subjects struggle with understanding, even more so than solving. Greater depth increases the cognitive effort of understanding and, simultaneously, lowers the success rate in understanding.

处理问题包括理解和解决问题。虽然有大量文献分析了问题的解决，但本文的重点在于理解。研究对象处理的问题是具有完整和完美信息的有限动态博弈。理解包括理解选择及其后果之间的关系。同样的后向归纳问题有两种不同的表现形式：树型和非树型。它们之间的关键区别在于，树型表示法直接提供了选择与后果之间的相关联系，而非树型表示法则必须确定选择与后果之间的相关联系。我们的研究包括 27 对不同深度的树/非树互动。我们通过观察理解的成功率及其所付出的努力来衡量和分析理解。我们的研究对象在理解方面非常吃力，甚至比解决问题还要吃力。深度越大，理解的认知努力就越大，同时，理解的成功率就越低。

引用次数: 0

Local public good equilibrium 地方公益均衡

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.007

Nathan W. Chan , Anne van den Nouweland

We extend ratio equilibrium to local public good economies by defining Local Public Good Equilibrium (LPGE). We employ “share functions” for individual agents that allow easy comparisons of consumption utility, both across consumption bundles and across jurisdiction memberships. Share functions furthermore aggregate for parsimonious calculation of equilibrium public good provision within each potential jurisdiction, allowing us to establish a link with hedonic games and deploy results from that literature. We demonstrate in examples how this enables us to show LPGE existence for a far wider class of economies than prior work seeking to extend ratio equilibrium to local public good economies. In particular, we demonstrate LPGE existence with heterogeneous agents, a finite number of agents and jurisdictions, endogenous jurisdictional revenues and expenditures, and robustness against coalitional deviations. LPGE admits wide-ranging jurisdiction structures, and we demonstrate how it can generate results on sorting that have attracted interest in the extant literature.

我们通过定义地方公益均衡（LPGE），将比率均衡扩展到地方公益经济。我们采用了个人代理的 "份额函数"，便于比较不同消费组合和不同管辖区成员的消费效用。份额函数还能进一步汇总计算每个潜在管辖区内的公共物品均衡供给，使我们能够与享乐博弈建立联系，并运用该文献中的结果。我们将举例说明，与之前试图将比率均衡扩展到地方公益经济的研究相比，这如何使我们能够为更广泛的经济类型展示 LPGE 的存在。特别是，我们证明了 LPGE 存在于异质代理、有限数量的代理和管辖区、内生的管辖区收入和支出，以及对联盟偏差的稳健性。LPGE 允许广泛的管辖权结构，我们证明了它如何产生排序结果，这些结果在现有文献中备受关注。

引用次数: 0

The economics of excuses: Job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests 借口经济学就业市场上的 "职前测试 "廉价言论

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.006

Ran Weksler , Boaz Zik

In the job market, managers typically use pre-employment tests to evaluate a candidate's value. Candidates often respond by claiming, in a non-verifiable way, that circumstances not related to their value impair their ability to perform well in the test and, thus, render the test an unreliable source of information. We term such cheap-talk claims excuses. We show that if the candidate's expected performance in the test sufficiently depends on skills orthogonal to the candidate's value, the candidate may credibly use excuses despite the candidate's transparent motives. In equilibrium, excuses lead to a low prior belief about the candidate's value that is later accompanied by a lenient update process of the test's outcomes.

在就业市场上，管理者通常使用就业前测试来评估应聘者的价值。应聘者通常会以一种无法证实的方式来回应，声称与自身价值无关的情况损害了他们在测试中取得好成绩的能力，从而使测试成为一种不可靠的信息来源。我们把这种低俗的说法称为借口。我们的研究表明，如果候选人在测试中的预期表现充分依赖于与候选人价值正交的技能，那么尽管候选人的动机是透明的，但他仍可以可信地使用借口。在均衡状态下，借口会导致对候选人价值的低先验信念，随后伴随着对测试结果的宽松更新过程。

引用次数: 0

Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games 有限博弈中的正规化贝叶斯最佳响应学习

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.005

Sayan Mukherjee , Souvik Roy

We introduce the notion of regularized Bayesian best response (RBBR) learning dynamic in heterogeneous population games. We obtain such a dynamic via perturbation by an arbitrary lower semicontinuous, strongly convex regularizer in Bayesian population games with finitely many strategies. We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of rest points of the RBBR learning dynamic, and hence the existence of regularized Bayesian equilibrium in Bayesian population games. These equilibria are shown to approximate the Bayesian equilibria of the game for vanishingly small regularizations. We also explore the fundamental properties of the RBBR learning dynamic, which includes the existence of unique solutions from arbitrary initial conditions, as well as the continuity of the solution trajectories thus obtained with respect to the initial conditions. Finally, as applications to the above theory, we introduce the notions of Bayesian potential and Bayesian negative semidefinite games and provide convergence results for such games.

我们引入了异质群体博弈中的正则化贝叶斯最佳响应（RBBR）学习动态概念。我们通过在具有有限多个策略的贝叶斯人口博弈中使用任意下半连续强凸正则扰动来获得这种动态。我们为 RBBR 学习动态的休止点的存在提供了充分条件，因此也为贝叶斯人口博弈中正则化贝叶斯均衡的存在提供了充分条件。这些均衡被证明近似于贝叶斯博弈中的贝叶斯均衡，其正则化程度非常小。我们还探讨了 RBBR 学习动态的基本特性，包括从任意初始条件出发的唯一解的存在性，以及由此获得的解的轨迹相对于初始条件的连续性。最后，作为上述理论的应用，我们引入了贝叶斯势博弈和贝叶斯负半有限博弈的概念，并提供了这类博弈的收敛结果。

引用次数: 0

Seemingly baseless discrimination 看似毫无根据的歧视

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2024-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.003

Maciej Dudek

We show that rational profit maximizing firms can find it optimal to wage discriminate against females even though females and males are identical in all respects. Specifically, we argue that a pay gap can emerge naturally as discrimination against females, in the first place, can endogenously affect the elasticity of labor supply and can make the supply of labor of males less elastic and the supply of labor of females more elastic. Furthermore, we note that once this endogenous change in elasticity emerges it in fact makes discrimination optimal and allows discrimination to materialize in equilibrium. Moreover, we show that discrimination against females is detrimental to the overall welfare and in addition it negatively affects wages of males. Consequently, we argue that an equal pay mandate would benefit both genders as in our model there is no tension between females and males, but there is an endogenous extraction of surplus from workers by employers. The key mechanism described in the paper extends naturally to the product markets and can serve as rationalization of the prevalent pink-tax.

我们的研究表明，即使女性和男性在所有方面都完全相同，理性的利润最大化企业也会发现对女性进行工资歧视是最优选择。具体来说，我们认为，薪酬差距可以自然产生，因为对女性的歧视首先会内生地影响劳动力供给的弹性，使男性劳动力供给的弹性降低，女性劳动力供给的弹性提高。此外，我们还注意到，一旦这种弹性的内生性变化出现，事实上就会使歧视成为最优选择，并使歧视在均衡中得以实现。此外，我们还表明，对女性的歧视不利于整体福利，而且还会对男性的工资产生负面影响。因此，我们认为，同工同酬的规定对两性都有利，因为在我们的模型中，女性和男性之间并不存在紧张关系，但存在雇主从工人身上榨取剩余的内生现象。本文所描述的关键机制自然而然地延伸到了产品市场，可以作为流行的粉红税的合理化。

引用次数: 0

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