Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Risk-taking in financial networks 金融网络中的冒险行为

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.006

Mohamed Belhaj , Renaud Bourlès , Frédéric Deroïan

We analyze risk-taking behaviors of financial institutions linked through cross-shareholding relationships. We endogenize risk exposure accounting for default risk by modeling Value-at-Risk-based risk-management – that is targeted default probabilities – in the presence of extreme risk on asset return. We relate risk-taking behaviors to a centrality measure that captures the propagation of losses within the network, and show that network integration increases risk-taking levels and expected return. However, we show that network integration also results in larger expected shortfall, indicating greater exposure to losses for creditors. We explore the impact of the cross-shareholding network on the implementation of regulation, particularly through capital requirements, and identify key institutions, those with the highest influence on aggregate investments in risky assets.

我们分析了通过交叉持股关系关联的金融机构的风险承担行为。在资产回报存在极端风险的情况下，我们通过建模基于风险价值的风险管理（即目标违约概率），将违约风险的风险暴露会计内化。我们将冒险行为与捕获网络内损失传播的中心性度量联系起来，并表明网络整合增加了冒险水平和预期回报。然而，我们表明网络整合也会导致更大的预期缺口，表明债权人面临更大的损失。我们探讨了交叉持股网络对监管实施的影响，特别是通过资本要求，并确定了对风险资产总投资影响最大的关键机构。

引用次数: 0

A note on the non-coincidence of the core and the bargaining set in many-to-one assignment markets 多对一分配市场中核心与议价集的不重合问题

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.011

Ata Atay , Marina Núñez , Tamás Solymosi

This paper analyzes the extent to which well-known results on the relationship between the bargaining set, the core, and the kernel in one-to-one assignment games generalize to many-to-one assignment markets, and by extension, many-to-many markets. Using a minimal counterexample, we show that the bargaining set does not necessarily coincide with the core and that the kernel may not be contained within the core. We would like to highlight that the failure of the coincidence between the core and the bargaining set, as observed in the many-to-one assignment game, is quite notable. This is especially true when compared to various other highly structured games, many of which emerge from combinatorial optimization problems, such as the one underlying many-to-one assignment games.

本文分析了关于一对一分配对策中交易集、核心和核之间关系的已知结果在多大程度上推广到多对一分配市场，并推广到多对多市场。使用最小反例，我们证明了议价集不一定与核心一致，并且核心可能不包含在核心中。我们想要强调的是，正如在多对一分配博弈中观察到的那样，核心和议价集之间的一致性失败是非常值得注意的。当与其他各种高度结构化的游戏相比时尤其如此，其中许多游戏都来自组合优化问题，例如潜在的多对一分配游戏。

引用次数: 0

Choice and welfare under social constraints 社会约束下的选择与福利

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.010

Mauricio Ribeiro

Economists often rely on people’ s choices to infer their preferences. However, inferring preferences from choices becomes problematic when people face unobserved constraints. In this paper, I study how to (cautiously) infer preferences from choices when the choices of the members of a social group are subject to a constraint that we only imperfectly know. When this happens, heterogeneity in the group’ s choices, along with more information about the constraint, helps recover the preferences of group members, whereas homogeneity in choices hinders it. I further argue that standard approaches to choice-based welfare analysis can lead to misleading inferences about welfare when there are unobserved social constraints.

经济学家经常依靠人们的选择来推断他们的偏好。然而，当人们面对未观察到的约束时，从选择中推断偏好就会出现问题。在这篇论文中，我研究了当一个社会群体的成员的选择受制于我们不完全知道的约束时，如何（谨慎地）从选择中推断出偏好。当这种情况发生时，群体选择的异质性，以及更多关于约束的信息，有助于恢复群体成员的偏好，而选择的同质性则会阻碍这种偏好。我进一步认为，当存在未观察到的社会约束时，基于选择的福利分析的标准方法可能导致对福利的误导性推论。

引用次数: 0

Provoking the opposition 激怒反对派

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.009

Korhan Kocak

Parties in primary elections often choose between candidates who appeal to their base and those who appeal to the broader electorate. I present a model of primaries where incumbents can exploit this trade-off the opposition faces between ideological congruence and electability. In the model, incumbents reduce their appeal to the median voter by moving away from the center. In doing so, they provoke the opposition into nominating extremists, improving their reelection prospects. This mechanism generates elite polarization as politicians leapfrog voters — not despite electoral concerns, but because of them. The analysis fits the observation that incumbents sometimes move away from the center near the end of their term. Provoking the opposition relies on two conditions: divergence of primary and general electorates and a limited set of potential nominees. I argue that partisan sorting and changes in nomination procedures over the last decades made this strategy viable.

在初选中，各政党通常会在支持本党选民的候选人和支持广大选民的候选人之间做出选择。我提出了一个初选模型，在任者可以利用反对派在意识形态一致性和可选性之间面临的这种权衡。在这个模型中，现任者通过远离中间而降低了他们对中间选民的吸引力。在这样做的过程中，他们刺激反对派提名极端分子，提高了他们连任的前景。这种机制产生了精英阶层的两极分化，因为政客们超越了选民——不是不顾选举的担忧，而是因为选民的担忧。这一分析与观察相符，即现任总统有时会在任期快结束时离开中间立场。激起反对需要两个条件：初选和普选的分歧，以及有限的潜在候选人。我认为，过去几十年的党派分类和提名程序的变化使这种策略变得可行。

引用次数: 0

Exact Nash-like solutions of blockchain gap games b区块链间隙游戏的精确纳什式解决方案

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.008

Mitsunori Noguchi

This note challenges the belief that mining processes are too complex for traditional game-theoretic analysis. We provide Nash-like equilibrium solutions for two-player gap games, focusing on the strategic delay of mining rig activation in Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work (PoW) system. By delaying activation, miners can optimize profits, particularly as transaction fees become a more significant portion of their revenues (Carlsten et al., 2016). Building on the game-theoretic model of Tsabary and Eyal (2018), we offer a rigorous, proof-based analysis of this behavior, highlighting the importance of verifying simulation results through precise mathematical methods. The primary technical contribution of this note is a novel method for deriving closed-form equilibrium solutions for potentially non-differentiable ex-ante expected payoff functions U_i, defined as integrals in which the integrands—representing profit at time t—depend discontinuously on miners’ rig start times s.

这篇文章挑战了传统博弈论分析认为采矿过程过于复杂的观点。我们为两人博弈提供了类似纳什的均衡解决方案，重点关注比特币工作量证明（PoW）系统中矿机激活的战略延迟。通过延迟激活，矿工可以优化利润，特别是当交易费用成为其收入中更重要的一部分时（Carlsten et al., 2016）。在Tsabary和Eyal（2018）的博弈论模型的基础上，我们对这种行为进行了严格的、基于证据的分析，强调了通过精确的数学方法验证模拟结果的重要性。本文的主要技术贡献是一种新方法，用于推导潜在不可微的预先预期收益函数Ui的封闭形式均衡解，该函数定义为积分，其中表示时间t的利润的积分不连续地依赖于矿工的钻机启动时间s。

引用次数: 0

Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices 在（最低）均衡价格下的不可操纵的房屋交换

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.004

Lars-Gunnar Svensson , Tommy Andersson , Lars Ehlers

We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and monetary transfers. Each house is initially occupied by one agent and each agent demands exactly one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. On the one hand, for price eq1uilibrium mechanisms, we show that the only non-manipulable mechanism is one with a minimum equilibrium price vector. The result is not true on the classic or the quasi-linear domains, but on reduced domains of preference profiles containing “almost all” profiles in the classic or the quasi-linear domain, respectively. On the other hand, while minimum price equilibrium mechanisms are not necessarily efficient (as prices are not zero), we show that no non-manipulable mechanism Pareto dominates a minimum price equilibrium mechanism, making them constrained efficient in the class of non-manipulable mechanisms.

我们考虑一个市场，它有不可分割的物体，称为房子，和货币转移。每栋房子最初由一个代理占有，每个代理只需要一幢房子。问题是确定一套完整的直接分配机制，可以用来在代理之间重新分配房屋。一方面，对于价格均衡机制，我们证明了具有最小均衡价格向量的机制是唯一不可操纵的机制。这一结果在经典和准线性域上不成立，但在分别包含经典和准线性域“几乎所有”偏好谱的简化域上成立。另一方面，虽然最小价格均衡机制不一定是有效的（因为价格不是零），但我们表明，没有一个不可操纵的机制帕累托支配最小价格均衡机制，使它们在不可操纵的机制类别中具有约束效率。

引用次数: 0

Corrigendum to “Values for environments with externalities – the average approach” [Games Econ. Behav. 108 (2018) 49–64.] 《具有外部性的环境价值——平均方法》的勘误[游戏经济学]。行为学报，108(2018)49-64。

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.002

Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Theorem 1 in Macho-Stadler et al. (2018) is incorrect. In this note, we correct the theorem by introducing a new axiom, the non-negative payoffs axiom, and adjusting the proof accordingly. We also discuss the implications of this correction for other results presented in the paper.

Macho-Stadler et al.（2018）中的定理1是不正确的。在这篇笔记中，我们通过引入一个新的公理——非负收益公理来修正定理，并相应地调整证明。我们还讨论了这一修正对论文中提出的其他结果的影响。

引用次数: 0

Preconvex games Preconvex游戏

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.001

Eric Bahel , Christian Trudeau , Haoyu Wang

We introduce the notion of preconvexity, which extends the familiar concept of convexity found in cooperative games with transferable utility. In a convex game, the larger the group joined by an agent, the larger the marginal value brought to the group by that agent. By contrast, in strictly preconvex games, an agent’s marginal contribution is initially decreasing (when joining small groups), and it eventually becomes increasing at (and above) some critical group size. As a consequence, the core of a preconvex game may be empty. Defining the property of semicohesiveness (related to marginal contributions at this critical group size), we prove that it is sufficient to guarantee a nonempty core. We also propose a new solution for the set of preconvex games; and we characterize this solution by combining three axioms which are natural in our framework. A stronger cohesiveness property (guaranteeing that our solution falls in the core) is also studied. Some additional results are provided for the special case of anticonvex games, for which marginal contributions are always non-increasing.

我们引入了前凸性的概念，它扩展了在具有可转移效用的合作博弈中发现的熟悉的凸性概念。在凸博弈中，一个主体加入的群体越大，该主体给群体带来的边际价值就越大。相比之下，在严格的前凸博弈中，代理的边际贡献最初是减少的（当加入小群体时），并最终在某个临界群体规模上增加。因此，前凸游戏的核心可能是空的。定义了半内聚性（与临界群大小下的边际贡献有关）的性质，证明了它足以保证非空核。我们还提出了一种关于预凸对策集的新解；我们通过结合三个在我们的框架中很自然的公理来描述这个解。还研究了更强的内聚性（保证我们的解落在核心）。对于边际贡献总是不增加的反凸对策的特殊情况，给出了一些额外的结果。

引用次数: 0

Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned 当所有权被分割时，离散资源的群体激励相容分配

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.003

Wataru Ishida , Changwoo Park

We introduce the problem of allocating objects when society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a number of objects equal to its size. We propose a new axiom, called “within-group endowments lower bounds”, which requires that each agent find his assignment at least as desirable as his least preferred object among those owned by the group to which he belongs. We identify and characterize a family of rules satisfying this axiom in addition to efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and group-wise neutrality. We also consider two core notions, the “standard core” and the “exclusion core” (Balbuzanov and Kotowski, 2019). Our finding is that they are independent notions, unlike in traditional ownership structures (e.g., collective, private, and mixed ownership), and that our proposed rules always recommend allocations in their intersection.

当社会被划分为多个主体群体时，我们引入了分配对象的问题，每个主体集体拥有与其大小相等的一些对象。我们提出了一个新的公理，称为“群内禀赋下界”，它要求每个agent在他所属的群体中发现他的分配至少与他最不喜欢的对象一样理想。除了效率、群体策略证明性和群体明智中立性之外，我们还确定并描述了满足这一公理的一系列规则。我们还考虑了两个核心概念，“标准核心”和“排除核心”（Balbuzanov和Kotowski， 2019）。我们的发现是，它们是独立的概念，不像传统的所有权结构（例如，集体、私人和混合所有权），并且我们提出的规则总是建议在它们的交叉点分配。

引用次数: 0

Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result 金融系统的合并-分裂抗扰性：一个表征结果

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-11-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011

Pedro Calleja , Francesc Llerena

In this paper, we explore the issue of manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: merging-proofness and splitting-proofness. Not surprisingly, splitting-proofness conflicts with basic requirements such as the priority of debt over equity and the limited liability of equity. Remarkably, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the class of bankruptcy rules that gives rise to financial rules that satisfy merging-proofness.

本文通过考虑两种弱免疫形式：合并抗扰性和分裂抗扰性，探讨了金融系统环境下的可操纵性问题。不出所料，抗分裂性与债务优先于股权和股权有限责任等基本要求相冲突。值得注意的是，我们提供了一类破产规则的综合特征，这些规则产生了满足合并证明性的财务规则。

引用次数: 0

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