Pub Date : 2025-12-25DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.004
Marco Mantovani , Antonio Filippin
In prediction markets, prices can be interpreted as the average belief of the traders under restrictive theoretical assumptions, i.e. specific risk preferences and the Prior Information Equilibrium. The validity of these assumptions depends on the specific market institution and on the composition of the market in terms of risk preferences. In this paper we test in a laboratory experiment the main elements that should affect the distance between prices and average beliefs, manipulating the market institution and the market composition. We do not find that risk preferences significantly affect prices. We find instead that in the double auction– where at least partial information aggregation is expected – prices are closer to the average belief than in the call auction – where, instead, belief aggregation is expected. We show that traders update beliefs in the direction of observed prices, rather than of the true state.
{"title":"When do prediction markets return average beliefs? Experimental evidence","authors":"Marco Mantovani , Antonio Filippin","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.004","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.004","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In prediction markets, prices can be interpreted as the average belief of the traders under restrictive theoretical assumptions, i.e. specific risk preferences and the Prior Information Equilibrium. The validity of these assumptions depends on the specific market institution and on the composition of the market in terms of risk preferences. In this paper we test in a laboratory experiment the main elements that should affect the distance between prices and average beliefs, manipulating the market institution and the market composition. We do not find that risk preferences significantly affect prices. We find instead that in the double auction– where at least partial information aggregation is expected – prices are closer to the average belief than in the call auction – where, instead, belief aggregation is expected. We show that traders update beliefs in the direction of observed prices, rather than of the true state.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"156 ","pages":"Pages 135-148"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-24DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.005
Bernardo García-Pola , Nagore Iriberri
Compared with more sophisticated equilibrium theory, naive, non-equilibrium behavioral rules often better describe individuals’ initial play in games. In addition, in repeated play in games, when individuals have the opportunity to learn about their opponents’ past behavior, learning models of different sophistication levels are successful in explaining how individuals modify their behavior in response to the provided information. How do subjects who follow different behavioral rules in initial play modify their behavior after they learn about past behavior? This study links initial and repeated play in two different types of games (11–20 and 3 × 3 normal-form games) using a within-subject laboratory design. We classify individuals as following different behavioral rules in initial and repeated play and test whether and/or how strategic naivete and sophistication in initial play correlate with naivete and sophistication in repeated play. We find no evidence of a positive correlation between naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play.
{"title":"Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games","authors":"Bernardo García-Pola , Nagore Iriberri","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.005","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.005","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Compared with more sophisticated equilibrium theory, naive, non-equilibrium behavioral rules often better describe individuals’ initial play in games. In addition, in repeated play in games, when individuals have the opportunity to learn about their opponents’ past behavior, learning models of different sophistication levels are successful in explaining how individuals modify their behavior in response to the provided information. How do subjects who follow different behavioral rules in initial play modify their behavior after they learn about past behavior? This study links initial and repeated play in two different types of games (11–20 and 3 × 3 normal-form games) using a within-subject laboratory design. We classify individuals as following different behavioral rules in initial and repeated play and test whether and/or how strategic naivete and sophistication in initial play correlate with naivete and sophistication in repeated play. We find no evidence of a positive correlation between naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"156 ","pages":"Pages 149-163"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-16DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.007
Stéphane Le Roux , Valentin Goranko
This paper proposes and studies a mechanism modelling the emergence of cooperation in non-cooperative multi-player extensive form games. We consider such games enriched with additional “stage bidding actions”, where at each decision node of the game tree, before the player controlling that node makes a decision every other player may make a committed offer (‘bid’) to pay an explicitly proposed amount of utility to the controlling player if she makes the choice explicitly indicated in the bid. In this work we assume that the bids are made simultaneously by all players. The controlling player then considers all these bids and then decides on its move. The effect of each bid associated with that choice is that it modifies the payoffs in the respective subgame according to the bid by transferring the proposed amounts of utility from the bidder to the controlling player who made the choice; all other bids made at that stage become irrelevant. Thus, these stage bids serve as an incentives-based mechanism that enables reaching a mutually beneficial cooperation in extensive form games.
We study the resulting multi-player extensive form games with incentive bidding, which we call incentive bidding games (IB games), and analyze the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) in these games. We show constructively that all IB games have (possibly many) SPE, and that the SPE outcomes (i.e. payoff tuples) form a polytope in the space of all outcomes. In the case of 2-player games, we also prove for an arbitrary game tree that all the SPE are sum-maximizing and have the same outcome, thereby defining a unique “value” of the game. These results contrast some well-known drawbacks of SPE in standard extensive form games and provide a further strong motivation for studying extensive form games with incentive bidding.
We also study the notion of strong SPE in the sense of Aumann for IB games. First, we show that each of these strong SPE maximizes the sum of the payoffs (thus achieving a socially optimal solution). Second, if the game tree is binary, the strong SPE outcomes form a convex polytope. Third, games with only two leaves have such strong SPE, and we conjecture that all games with binary decision trees and with the same controlling player at all decision nodes have, indeed, such strong SPE.
{"title":"Extensive form games with incentive stage-bidding: An emergence of non-cooperative cooperation","authors":"Stéphane Le Roux , Valentin Goranko","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper proposes and studies a mechanism modelling the emergence of cooperation in non-cooperative multi-player extensive form games. We consider such games enriched with additional “stage bidding actions”, where at each decision node of the game tree, before the player controlling that node makes a decision every other player may make a committed offer (‘bid’) to pay an explicitly proposed amount of utility to the controlling player if she makes the choice explicitly indicated in the bid. In this work we assume that the bids are made simultaneously by all players. The controlling player then considers all these bids and then decides on its move. The effect of each bid associated with that choice is that it modifies the payoffs in the respective subgame according to the bid by transferring the proposed amounts of utility from the bidder to the controlling player who made the choice; all other bids made at that stage become irrelevant. Thus, these stage bids serve as an incentives-based mechanism that enables reaching a mutually beneficial cooperation in extensive form games.</div><div>We study the resulting multi-player extensive form games with incentive bidding, which we call <em>incentive bidding games</em> (IB games), and analyze the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) in these games. We show constructively that all IB games have (possibly many) SPE, and that the SPE outcomes (i.e. payoff tuples) form a polytope in the space of all outcomes. In the case of 2-player games, we also prove for an arbitrary game tree that all the SPE are sum-maximizing and have the same outcome, thereby defining a unique “value” of the game. These results contrast some well-known drawbacks of SPE in standard extensive form games and provide a further strong motivation for studying extensive form games with incentive bidding.</div><div>We also study the notion of strong SPE in the sense of Aumann for IB games. First, we show that each of these strong SPE maximizes the sum of the payoffs (thus achieving a socially optimal solution). Second, if the game tree is binary, the strong SPE outcomes form a convex polytope. Third, games with only two leaves have such strong SPE, and we conjecture that all games with binary decision trees and with the same controlling player at all decision nodes have, indeed, such strong SPE.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"156 ","pages":"Pages 109-134"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-15DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.002
Ashwin Kambhampati
Equilibrium predictions in games of incomplete information are sensitive to the assumed information structure. Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) define topological notions of proximity for common prior information structures such that two information structures are close if and only if (approximate) equilibrium payoffs are close. However, Monderer and Samet (1996) fix a common prior and define their topology on profiles of partitions over a state space, whereas Kajii and Morris (1998) define their topology on common priors over the product of a state space and a type space. We prove the open conjecture that two partition profiles are close in the Monderer and Samet (1996) topology if and only if there exists a labeling of types such that the associated common priors are close in the Kajii and Morris (1998) topology.
{"title":"Payoff continuity in games of incomplete information across models of knowledge","authors":"Ashwin Kambhampati","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.002","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Equilibrium predictions in games of incomplete information are sensitive to the assumed information structure. Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) define topological notions of proximity for common prior information structures such that two information structures are close if and only if (approximate) equilibrium payoffs are close. However, <span><span>Monderer and Samet (1996)</span></span> fix a common prior and define their topology on profiles of partitions over a state space, whereas <span><span>Kajii and Morris (1998)</span></span> define their topology on common priors over the product of a state space and a type space. We prove the open conjecture that two partition profiles are close in the <span><span>Monderer and Samet (1996)</span></span> topology if and only if there exists a labeling of types such that the associated common priors are close in the <span><span>Kajii and Morris (1998)</span></span> topology.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"156 ","pages":"Pages 98-108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-13DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.003
Hyunjun Cho , Jin Yeub Kim , Jaeok Park
We examine the attainability of marginal contributions in two models of one-sided matching and assignment. For the one-sided matching problem, where agents in a single group are matched with each other, the core may be empty, and even when nonempty, some agents may fail to attain their marginal contributions in the core. By allowing fractional matchings, however, we guarantee the non-emptiness of the core and show that every agent’s marginal contribution is attainable in the core. This implies that all the agents can receive their marginal contributions at the same time if and only if the core is a singleton. For the one-sided assignment problem, where agents are matched to objects they own, we obtain analogous results even without introducing fractional assignments. Finally, extending to linear production games, which encompass both models, we show that the attainability property may fail but is guaranteed under sufficiently many replications.
{"title":"Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment","authors":"Hyunjun Cho , Jin Yeub Kim , Jaeok Park","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.003","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the attainability of marginal contributions in two models of one-sided matching and assignment. For the one-sided matching problem, where agents in a single group are matched with each other, the core may be empty, and even when nonempty, some agents may fail to attain their marginal contributions in the core. By allowing fractional matchings, however, we guarantee the non-emptiness of the core and show that every agent’s marginal contribution is attainable in the core. This implies that all the agents can receive their marginal contributions at the same time if and only if the core is a singleton. For the one-sided assignment problem, where agents are matched to objects they own, we obtain analogous results even without introducing fractional assignments. Finally, extending to linear production games, which encompass both models, we show that the attainability property may fail but is guaranteed under sufficiently many replications.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"156 ","pages":"Pages 82-97"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-11DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.001
Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan , Umut Dur , A. Arda Gitmez , Özgür Yılmaz
In school choice problems, the pursuit of student welfare (efficiency) is constrained by the requirement to respect schools’ priorities (fairness). Among fair matchings, even the welfare maximizing one, the Student-Optimal Stable Matching (SOSM), is inefficient. Moreover, any mechanism that yields welfare gains over the SOSM is manipulable by students. This paper investigates the fairness and incentive properties of efficient mechanisms. We compare matchings using the notion that one matching is less unfair than another if it generates a smaller set of students whose priorities are violated, and we define minimal unfairness accordingly. We show that the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) mechanism is minimally unfair within the class of Pareto efficient mechanisms satisfying a simple incentive requirement, top-manipulation-proofness. Moreover, the EADA satisfies a stronger property, upper-manipulation-proofness. Upper-manipulation-proofness is a broad incentive property one can maintain while improving upon the SOSM. Together, these results highlight a sharp frontier in school choice: when the objective is efficiency and improving student welfare over the SOSM, the EADA emerges as a compelling mechanism in both fairness and incentive terms.
{"title":"Improving the deferred acceptance with minimal compromise","authors":"Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan , Umut Dur , A. Arda Gitmez , Özgür Yılmaz","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.001","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In school choice problems, the pursuit of student welfare (efficiency) is constrained by the requirement to respect schools’ priorities (fairness). Among fair matchings, even the welfare maximizing one, the Student-Optimal Stable Matching (<em>SOSM</em>), is inefficient. Moreover, any mechanism that yields welfare gains over the <em>SOSM</em> is manipulable by students. This paper investigates the fairness and incentive properties of efficient mechanisms. We compare matchings using the notion that one matching is <em>less unfair</em> than another if it generates a smaller set of students whose priorities are violated, and we define <em>minimal unfairness</em> accordingly. We show that the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (<em>EADA</em>) mechanism is minimally unfair within the class of Pareto efficient mechanisms satisfying a simple incentive requirement, <em>top-manipulation-proofness</em>. Moreover, the <em>EADA</em> satisfies a stronger property, <em>upper-manipulation-proofness</em>. Upper-manipulation-proofness is a broad incentive property one can maintain while improving upon the <em>SOSM</em>. Together, these results highlight a sharp frontier in school choice: when the objective is efficiency and improving student welfare over the <em>SOSM</em>, the <em>EADA</em> emerges as a compelling mechanism in both fairness and incentive terms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"156 ","pages":"Pages 64-81"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145840873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-04DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.012
Álvaro Cartea , Patrick Chang , José Penalva , Harrison Waldon
We prove a Folk theorem when players with bounded rationality learn as they play a repeated potential game. We use a dynamic generalization of smooth fictitious play with bounded m-recall strategies to model learning with bounded rationality that is consistent with learning by algorithms. In a repeated potential game with perfect monitoring, we use this learning model to show that for any feasible and individually rational payoff profile, if players have sufficient recall, are sufficiently patient, and best respond with sufficiently few mistakes, then the players have a non-zero probability of learning an m-recall strategy profile that achieves an average payoff close to the specified payoff profile for an appropriate continuation game. Moreover, the strategy profile learned is an m-recall ϵ-subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. This finding demonstrates that competition authorities are correct in their concern about algorithmic collusion.
{"title":"Algorithmic collusion and a folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality","authors":"Álvaro Cartea , Patrick Chang , José Penalva , Harrison Waldon","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We prove a Folk theorem when players with bounded rationality learn as they play a repeated potential game. We use a dynamic generalization of smooth fictitious play with bounded <em>m</em>-recall strategies to model learning with bounded rationality that is consistent with learning by algorithms. In a repeated potential game with perfect monitoring, we use this learning model to show that for any feasible and individually rational payoff profile, if players have sufficient recall, are sufficiently patient, and best respond with sufficiently few mistakes, then the players have a non-zero probability of learning an <em>m</em>-recall strategy profile that achieves an average payoff close to the specified payoff profile for an appropriate continuation game. Moreover, the strategy profile learned is an <em>m</em>-recall ϵ-subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. This finding demonstrates that competition authorities are correct in their concern about algorithmic collusion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145950324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.011
Ata Atay , Marina Núñez , Tamás Solymosi
This paper analyzes the extent to which well-known results on the relationship between the bargaining set, the core, and the kernel in one-to-one assignment games generalize to many-to-one assignment markets, and by extension, many-to-many markets. Using a minimal counterexample, we show that the bargaining set does not necessarily coincide with the core and that the kernel may not be contained within the core. We would like to highlight that the failure of the coincidence between the core and the bargaining set, as observed in the many-to-one assignment game, is quite notable. This is especially true when compared to various other highly structured games, many of which emerge from combinatorial optimization problems, such as the one underlying many-to-one assignment games.
{"title":"A note on the non-coincidence of the core and the bargaining set in many-to-one assignment markets","authors":"Ata Atay , Marina Núñez , Tamás Solymosi","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.011","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyzes the extent to which well-known results on the relationship between the bargaining set, the core, and the kernel in one-to-one assignment games generalize to many-to-one assignment markets, and by extension, many-to-many markets. Using a minimal counterexample, we show that the bargaining set does not necessarily coincide with the core and that the kernel may not be contained within the core. We would like to highlight that the failure of the coincidence between the core and the bargaining set, as observed in the many-to-one assignment game, is quite notable. This is especially true when compared to various other highly structured games, many of which emerge from combinatorial optimization problems, such as the one underlying many-to-one assignment games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"156 ","pages":"Pages 58-63"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145750259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze risk-taking behaviors of financial institutions linked through cross-shareholding relationships. We endogenize risk exposure accounting for default risk by modeling Value-at-Risk-based risk-management – that is targeted default probabilities – in the presence of extreme risk on asset return. We relate risk-taking behaviors to a centrality measure that captures the propagation of losses within the network, and show that network integration increases risk-taking levels and expected return. However, we show that network integration also results in larger expected shortfall, indicating greater exposure to losses for creditors. We explore the impact of the cross-shareholding network on the implementation of regulation, particularly through capital requirements, and identify key institutions, those with the highest influence on aggregate investments in risky assets.
{"title":"Risk-taking in financial networks","authors":"Mohamed Belhaj , Renaud Bourlès , Frédéric Deroïan","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze risk-taking behaviors of financial institutions linked through cross-shareholding relationships. We endogenize risk exposure accounting for default risk by modeling Value-at-Risk-based risk-management – that is targeted default probabilities – in the presence of extreme risk on asset return. We relate risk-taking behaviors to a centrality measure that captures the propagation of losses within the network, and show that network integration increases risk-taking levels and expected return. However, we show that network integration also results in larger expected shortfall, indicating greater exposure to losses for creditors. We explore the impact of the cross-shareholding network on the implementation of regulation, particularly through capital requirements, and identify key institutions, those with the highest influence on aggregate investments in risky assets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"156 ","pages":"Pages 35-57"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145694293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-29DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.010
Mauricio Ribeiro
Economists often rely on people’ s choices to infer their preferences. However, inferring preferences from choices becomes problematic when people face unobserved constraints. In this paper, I study how to (cautiously) infer preferences from choices when the choices of the members of a social group are subject to a constraint that we only imperfectly know. When this happens, heterogeneity in the group’ s choices, along with more information about the constraint, helps recover the preferences of group members, whereas homogeneity in choices hinders it. I further argue that standard approaches to choice-based welfare analysis can lead to misleading inferences about welfare when there are unobserved social constraints.
{"title":"Choice and welfare under social constraints","authors":"Mauricio Ribeiro","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.010","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Economists often rely on people’ s choices to infer their preferences. However, inferring preferences from choices becomes problematic when people face unobserved constraints. In this paper, I study how to (cautiously) infer preferences from choices when the choices of the members of a social group are subject to a constraint that we only imperfectly know. When this happens, heterogeneity in the group’ s choices, along with more information about the constraint, helps recover the preferences of group members, whereas homogeneity in choices hinders it. I further argue that standard approaches to choice-based welfare analysis can lead to misleading inferences about welfare when there are unobserved social constraints.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"156 ","pages":"Pages 1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145659081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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