Games and Economic Behavior最新文献

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Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries 信息披露的时代性与偏度：基于信息结构与复合彩票的证据

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.005

Enrico Diecidue , Thomas Langer , Sven Nolte , Sebastian Riedmiller , Judith C. Schneider

In a series of three experiments, we investigate intrinsic preferences for timing and skewness of information resolution in a “compound lottery” (CL) and “information structure” (IS) environment. In the first experiment, we rule out predeterminedness of the outcome, i.e., realization before making the decision, as a driver of different timing preferences between the environments. In the second experiment, we show that skewness preferences in a two-outcome setting differ between the two environments. In the third comprehensive experiment, we integrate all three dimensions (timing, skewness, and environment) into a three-outcome setting, which allows a rigorous treatment of skewness. With respect to timing, participants prefer to receive information early in both environments. In case of a gradual resolution, participants strictly prefer positively skewed information in the IS environment, but symmetric information in the CL environment. Our results show that skewness and environment must be jointly taken into account when studying preferences for information resolution.

在一系列的三个实验中，我们研究了“复合彩票”（CL）和“信息结构”（IS）环境下信息解决的时间和偏度的内在偏好。在第一个实验中，我们排除了结果的预见性，即在做出决策之前实现，作为不同环境之间不同时间偏好的驱动因素。在第二个实验中，我们展示了两种环境中双结果设置下的偏度偏好是不同的。在第三个综合实验中，我们将所有三个维度（时间、偏度和环境）整合到一个三结果设置中，这允许对偏度进行严格的处理。在时间方面，在这两种环境中，参与者都倾向于更早地接收信息。在渐进解决的情况下，参与者在IS环境中严格倾向于正偏斜的信息，而在CL环境中则倾向于对称的信息。我们的研究结果表明，在研究信息分辨率偏好时，必须共同考虑偏度和环境。

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引用次数: 0

Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching 基于优先级匹配的合理嫉妒最小有效机制

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.003

Hyukjun Kwon , Ran I. Shorrer

We study priority-based matching markets. We propose a novel partial order for comparing matching mechanisms in terms of their “fairness.” Using this order, we show that efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) is justified-envy minimal in the class of efficient mechanisms, while top trading cycles (TTC) and other popular mechanisms are not. Our findings highlight EADA as an interesting alternative to TTC in the context of transplantation-organ markets. Restricting attention to strategyproof mechanisms, we show that TTC is justified-envy minimal, providing robustness to the result of Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2020).

我们研究基于优先级的匹配市场。我们提出了一种新的偏序来比较匹配机制的“公平性”。使用这个顺序，我们证明了效率调整延迟接受（EADA）在有效机制类别中是合理嫉妒最小的，而顶部交易周期（TTC）和其他流行的机制则不是。我们的研究结果强调，在移植器官市场中，EADA是TTC的一个有趣的替代方案。将注意力限制在策略证明机制上，我们表明TTC是合理嫉妒最小的，为Abdulkadiroğlu等人（2020）的结果提供了鲁棒性。

引用次数: 0

Outcome destabilization 结果不稳定

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.004

Francesc Dilmé

In a game in extensive form, we say that a sequence of trembles destabilizes an outcome if there is no corresponding sequence of payoff perturbations and Nash outcomes converging to the outcome. We use equilibrium destabilization to characterize sequential equilibria and sequentially stable outcomes, and to reinterpret standard selection criteria in signaling games as a means of ruling out implausible equilibria by identifying destabilizing tremble sequences. We show that the existence of a maximally destabilizing sequence of trembles (destabilizing all outcomes but one) significantly simplifies studying strategically stable behavior in complex games such as finitely repeated games.

在广泛形式的博弈中，我们说，如果没有相应的收益扰动序列和纳什结果收敛于结果，则震荡序列会破坏结果的稳定性。我们使用平衡不稳定性来描述顺序平衡和顺序稳定的结果，并重新解释信号博弈中的标准选择标准，通过识别不稳定的颤抖序列来排除不合理的平衡。我们证明了最大不稳定震荡序列（不稳定除一个结果外的所有结果）的存在显著简化了有限重复博弈等复杂博弈中策略稳定行为的研究。

引用次数: 0

Duality in financial networks 金融网络的二元性

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.002

Martijn W. Ketelaars, Peter Borm, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

This article introduces the concept of duality in financial networks, which entails the division of losses versus gains. In bankruptcy problems, in which a bankrupt entity divides its non-negative assets among a group of claimants, duality is well understood. Financial networks generalize bankruptcy problems by allowing for multiple agents with individual assets interconnected by mutual claims. We argue that allowing for negative assets is imperative to adequately formulate duality for financial networks. We show that there is a linear relationship between transfer schemes based on claims rules in a financial network and transfer schemes based on the dual of those claims rules in the dual financial network. Moreover, dual financial networks enable us to define dual transfer rules and dual allocation rules. We show that both self-dual transfer rules and self-dual allocation rules have to be based on self-dual claims rules. On the other hand, we demonstrate that transfer rules based on self-dual claims rules need not be self-dual, whereas allocation rules based on self-dual claims rules are always self-dual.

本文介绍了金融网络中的对偶概念，即损失与收益的划分。在破产问题中，破产实体将其非负资产分配给一组索赔人，对偶性是很好的理解。金融网络通过允许多个代理通过相互索赔将个人资产相互连接来概括破产问题。我们认为，允许负资产是必要的，以充分制定金融网络的二元性。我们证明了在金融网络中基于索赔规则的转移方案与在对偶金融网络中基于索赔规则对偶的转移方案之间存在线性关系。此外，双重金融网络使我们能够定义双重转移规则和双重分配规则。我们证明了自对偶转移规则和自对偶分配规则都必须基于自对偶索赔规则。另一方面，我们证明了基于自对偶声明规则的转移规则不一定是自对偶的，而基于自对偶声明规则的分配规则总是自对偶的。

引用次数: 0

Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences 令人反感的交易：代理的作用和严重后果

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.001

Hande Erkut , Dorothea Kübler

Repugnance constrains market design because inacceptable or repugnant transactions must be avoided. To better understand what makes a transaction repugnant, we study two potential causes: limited agency, e.g., one party being forced to accept an offer, and severe consequences of the transaction. In a laboratory experiment, we find that spectators prohibit transactions with limited agency more frequently than with full agency, especially when the consequences are severe rather than mild. The main findings of the experiment are corroborated by a vignette study on the acceptability of kidney sales. The results point to policies that can mitigate repugnance.

由于必须避免不可接受或令人反感的交易，因此厌恶性限制了市场设计。为了更好地理解是什么让交易令人反感，我们研究了两个潜在的原因：有限的代理，例如，一方被迫接受要约，以及交易的严重后果。在一项实验室实验中，我们发现旁观者比完全代理更频繁地禁止有限代理的交易，特别是当后果严重而不是轻微时。该实验的主要发现被一项关于肾脏销售可接受性的小研究证实。研究结果指出了可以减轻反感的政策。

引用次数: 0

Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs 随机抽取收益的大型游戏中的惯例

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2026-01-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.006

Jonathan Newton , Ryoji Sawa

By showing that a one-shot deviation property holds for almost all large games with i.i.d. randomly drawn payoffs in which a convention (in the sense of Young, 1993a) exists, long-run outcomes under behavioral rules are characterized by social choice rules.

通过证明一次偏差属性适用于几乎所有随机抽取收益的大型游戏，行为规则下的长期结果以社会选择规则为特征。

引用次数: 0

When do prediction markets return average beliefs? Experimental evidence 预测市场什么时候会回归平均信念？实验证据

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.004

Marco Mantovani , Antonio Filippin

In prediction markets, prices can be interpreted as the average belief of the traders under restrictive theoretical assumptions, i.e. specific risk preferences and the Prior Information Equilibrium. The validity of these assumptions depends on the specific market institution and on the composition of the market in terms of risk preferences. In this paper we test in a laboratory experiment the main elements that should affect the distance between prices and average beliefs, manipulating the market institution and the market composition. We do not find that risk preferences significantly affect prices. We find instead that in the double auction– where at least partial information aggregation is expected – prices are closer to the average belief than in the call auction – where, instead, belief aggregation is expected. We show that traders update beliefs in the direction of observed prices, rather than of the true state.

在预测市场中，价格可以被解释为交易者在限制性理论假设下的平均信念，即特定风险偏好和先验信息均衡。这些假设的有效性取决于具体的市场制度和风险偏好方面的市场构成。在本文中，我们在实验室实验中测试了影响价格与平均信念之间距离的主要因素，操纵市场制度和市场构成。我们没有发现风险偏好显著影响价格。相反，我们发现，在双重拍卖中——至少部分信息聚集是预期的——价格更接近平均信念，而在看涨拍卖中——相反，信念聚集是预期的。我们表明交易者在观察到的价格方向上更新信念，而不是真实状态。

引用次数: 0

Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games 在游戏的开始和重复中表现出的天真和老练

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.005

Bernardo García-Pola , Nagore Iriberri

Compared with more sophisticated equilibrium theory, naive, non-equilibrium behavioral rules often better describe individuals’ initial play in games. In addition, in repeated play in games, when individuals have the opportunity to learn about their opponents’ past behavior, learning models of different sophistication levels are successful in explaining how individuals modify their behavior in response to the provided information. How do subjects who follow different behavioral rules in initial play modify their behavior after they learn about past behavior? This study links initial and repeated play in two different types of games (11–20 and 3 × 3 normal-form games) using a within-subject laboratory design. We classify individuals as following different behavioral rules in initial and repeated play and test whether and/or how strategic naivete and sophistication in initial play correlate with naivete and sophistication in repeated play. We find no evidence of a positive correlation between naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play.

与更复杂的均衡理论相比，幼稚的、非均衡的行为规则往往能更好地描述个体在博弈中的初始行为。此外，在重复游戏中，当个体有机会了解对手过去的行为时，不同复杂程度的学习模型成功地解释了个体如何根据提供的信息调整自己的行为。在最初的游戏中遵循不同行为规则的受试者在了解过去的行为后如何改变他们的行为？本研究将两种不同类型的游戏（11-20和3个 × 3个正常形式的游戏）中的初始和重复游戏联系起来，使用主题内实验室设计。我们将个体划分为在初始和重复游戏中遵循不同行为规则的个体，并测试初始游戏中的策略幼稚和成熟是否与重复游戏中的幼稚和成熟之间存在关联。我们没有发现在初始和重复游戏中幼稚和成熟之间存在正相关的证据。

引用次数: 0

Extensive form games with incentive stage-bidding: An emergence of non-cooperative cooperation 具有激励阶段竞价的广泛形式博弈：非合作合作的出现

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.007

Stéphane Le Roux , Valentin Goranko

This paper proposes and studies a mechanism modelling the emergence of cooperation in non-cooperative multi-player extensive form games. We consider such games enriched with additional “stage bidding actions”, where at each decision node of the game tree, before the player controlling that node makes a decision every other player may make a committed offer (‘bid’) to pay an explicitly proposed amount of utility to the controlling player if she makes the choice explicitly indicated in the bid. In this work we assume that the bids are made simultaneously by all players. The controlling player then considers all these bids and then decides on its move. The effect of each bid associated with that choice is that it modifies the payoffs in the respective subgame according to the bid by transferring the proposed amounts of utility from the bidder to the controlling player who made the choice; all other bids made at that stage become irrelevant. Thus, these stage bids serve as an incentives-based mechanism that enables reaching a mutually beneficial cooperation in extensive form games.

We study the resulting multi-player extensive form games with incentive bidding, which we call incentive bidding games (IB games), and analyze the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) in these games. We show constructively that all IB games have (possibly many) SPE, and that the SPE outcomes (i.e. payoff tuples) form a polytope in the space of all outcomes. In the case of 2-player games, we also prove for an arbitrary game tree that all the SPE are sum-maximizing and have the same outcome, thereby defining a unique “value” of the game. These results contrast some well-known drawbacks of SPE in standard extensive form games and provide a further strong motivation for studying extensive form games with incentive bidding.

We also study the notion of strong SPE in the sense of Aumann for IB games. First, we show that each of these strong SPE maximizes the sum of the payoffs (thus achieving a socially optimal solution). Second, if the game tree is binary, the strong SPE outcomes form a convex polytope. Third, games with only two leaves have such strong SPE, and we conjecture that all games with binary decision trees and with the same controlling player at all decision nodes have, indeed, such strong SPE.

本文提出并研究了非合作多参与者广泛形式博弈中合作产生的机制。我们认为这样的游戏充满了额外的“阶段竞价行动”，即在游戏树的每个决策节点上，在控制该节点的玩家做出决策之前，如果控制者做出了在竞价中明确指出的选择，那么其他玩家可能会做出承诺，向控制者支付明确提议的效用量。在这项工作中，我们假设所有参与者同时进行出价。控制玩家然后考虑所有这些出价，然后决定自己的移动。与该选择相关的每个出价的影响是，通过将提议的效用量从出价者转移到做出选择的控制者，它根据出价修改了各自子博弈中的收益；在此阶段的所有其他出价都变得无关紧要。因此，这些阶段投标作为一种基于激励的机制，能够在广泛形式的博弈中实现互利合作。本文研究了具有激励竞价的多参与者广泛形式博弈，我们称之为激励竞价博弈（IB博弈），并分析了这些博弈中的子博弈完全均衡（SPE）。我们建设性地表明，所有IB博弈都有（可能有许多）SPE，并且SPE结果（即收益元组）在所有结果的空间中形成一个多向体。在2人博弈的情况下，我们还证明了任意博弈树的所有SPE都是和最大化的，并且具有相同的结果，从而定义了博弈的唯一“值”。这些结果对比了SPE在标准广泛形式博弈中的一些众所周知的缺陷，为研究具有激励竞价的广泛形式博弈提供了进一步的强大动机。我们还研究了在Aumann意义上的强SPE的概念。首先，我们展示了这些强SPE中的每一个都最大化了收益的总和（从而实现了社会最优解决方案）。其次，如果博弈树是二叉的，强SPE结果形成凸多面体。第三，只有两个叶子的博弈具有如此强的SPE，我们推测所有具有二叉决策树且在所有决策节点上具有相同控制玩家的博弈确实具有如此强的SPE。

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引用次数: 0

Payoff continuity in games of incomplete information across models of knowledge 跨知识模型的不完全信息博弈的收益连续性

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior

Pub Date : 2025-12-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.002

Ashwin Kambhampati

Equilibrium predictions in games of incomplete information are sensitive to the assumed information structure. Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) define topological notions of proximity for common prior information structures such that two information structures are close if and only if (approximate) equilibrium payoffs are close. However, Monderer and Samet (1996) fix a common prior and define their topology on profiles of partitions over a state space, whereas Kajii and Morris (1998) define their topology on common priors over the product of a state space and a type space. We prove the open conjecture that two partition profiles are close in the Monderer and Samet (1996) topology if and only if there exists a labeling of types such that the associated common priors are close in the Kajii and Morris (1998) topology.

不完全信息博弈中的均衡预测对假设的信息结构很敏感。Monderer和Samet（1996）以及Kajii和Morris（1998）为共同的先验信息结构定义了接近的拓扑概念，这样两个信息结构当且仅当（近似）均衡收益接近时是接近的。然而，Monderer和Samet（1996）修复了一个公共先验，并在状态空间上的分区概要上定义了它们的拓扑结构，而Kajii和Morris（1998）在状态空间和类型空间的乘积上定义了它们的拓扑结构。我们证明了两个分区轮廓在Monderer和Samet（1996）拓扑中是接近的开放猜想，当且仅当存在类型标记使得相关的公共先验在Kajii和Morris（1998）拓扑中是接近的。

引用次数: 0

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Games and Economic Behavior

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