{"title":"EXPRESS: Group or Individual Sales Incentives? What Is Best for Brand-Managed Retail Sales Operations?","authors":"Wenshu Zhang, Jia Li, Subramanian Balachander","doi":"10.1177/00222429241249424","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This research studies sales force incentive compensation in Brand-Managed Retail (BMR) operations, which are particularly prevalent in high-end department stores and vertically integrated retailers. In particular, the research explores how a brand’s strength may affect the relative benefit to a brand from using individual versus group incentives for motivating its salespeople in BMR settings. The authors investigate this issue using a theoretical principal-agent model consisting of a risk-neutral firm employing multiple risk-averse salespeople. Interestingly, they find that a group incentive is more beneficial to a weaker brand than to a stronger one. Furthermore, the authors find empirical support for their theoretical findings from an analysis of sales compensation data from BMR operations in two different settings. The research findings suggest that managers should factor in the brand’s strength when deciding on the optimal salesperson compensation structure in BMR settings.","PeriodicalId":16152,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Marketing","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":11.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Marketing","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00222429241249424","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This research studies sales force incentive compensation in Brand-Managed Retail (BMR) operations, which are particularly prevalent in high-end department stores and vertically integrated retailers. In particular, the research explores how a brand’s strength may affect the relative benefit to a brand from using individual versus group incentives for motivating its salespeople in BMR settings. The authors investigate this issue using a theoretical principal-agent model consisting of a risk-neutral firm employing multiple risk-averse salespeople. Interestingly, they find that a group incentive is more beneficial to a weaker brand than to a stronger one. Furthermore, the authors find empirical support for their theoretical findings from an analysis of sales compensation data from BMR operations in two different settings. The research findings suggest that managers should factor in the brand’s strength when deciding on the optimal salesperson compensation structure in BMR settings.
期刊介绍:
Founded in 1936,the Journal of Marketing (JM) serves as a premier outlet for substantive research in marketing. JM is dedicated to developing and disseminating knowledge about real-world marketing questions, catering to scholars, educators, managers, policy makers, consumers, and other global societal stakeholders. Over the years,JM has played a crucial role in shaping the content and boundaries of the marketing discipline.