Moral Gratitude

Abstract

There are many examples of persons who appear to be grateful to other people's benefactors. In at least some of these examples, such third‐party gratitude also seems fitting. However, these observations conflict with a widespread assumption in the philosophical literature about gratitude: that only beneficiaries can be fittingly grateful to benefactors. In this article, I argue that third‐party gratitude exists and can be fitting, and that the assumption is therefore mistaken. More specifically, I defend two claims: (i) that there exists a kind of gratitude to benefactors that is experienced by third parties in their capacities as moral agents (‘moral gratitude’); and (ii) that what makes this kind of gratitude fitting is the fact that, in benefitting the beneficiaries, the benefactors are responding to values that we, as moral agents, each have reason to care about and to want to see promoted.