This article explores the relationship between romantic love and polyamory. Our central question is whether traditional norms of monogamy can be excised from romantic love so as to harmonize with polyamory's ethical dimensions (as we construe them). How one answers this question bears on another: whether ‘polyamory’ should principally be understood in terms of romantic love or instead some alternative conception(s). Our efforts to address these questions begin by briefly motivating our favored approach to romantic love, a ‘narratival’ one inspired by 1930s cultural theorist Denis de Rougemont, wherein such love is exclusive, supernatural or promising transcendence, painful, impeded, and, ultimately, fatal. We maintain that, even once exclusivity is removed as an official component, tensions with polyamory's ethical dimensions remain: romantic love's other elements rationalize acting and feeling in ways that privilege a singular beloved above others. A tempting solution is to further revise romantic love. However, we are skeptical that this leaves space for distinctively romantic love. Our tentative proposal, then, is that polyamory's ethical dimensions favor rejecting romantic love as ultimately desirable.
本文探讨了浪漫爱情与多角恋之间的关系。我们的核心问题是，能否从浪漫爱情中剔除一夫一妻制的传统规范，从而与多角恋的伦理维度（正如我们所理解的那样）相协调。如何回答这个问题关系到另一个问题："多角恋 "是否应该主要从浪漫爱情的角度来理解，还是应该从其他概念的角度来理解。为了解决这些问题，我们首先简要介绍了我们所推崇的浪漫爱情方法，即受 1930 年代文化理论家丹尼斯-德-鲁格蒙特（Denis de Rougemont）启发的 "叙事性 "方法，在这种方法中，爱情是排他性的、超自然的或有望超越的、痛苦的、受阻的，并最终是致命的。我们认为，即使取消了排他性这一正式要素，多角恋在伦理层面上的矛盾依然存在：浪漫爱情的其他要素使行为和情感合理化，从而使单一的爱人优先于其他人。一个诱人的解决方案是进一步修改浪漫爱情。然而，我们怀疑这是否会为独特的浪漫爱情留下空间。因此，我们的初步建议是，多角恋的伦理维度倾向于拒绝浪漫爱情，将其视为最终的理想。
{"title":"The Story of Romantic Love and Polyamory","authors":"Michael Milona, Lauren Weindling","doi":"10.1111/japp.12764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12764","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the relationship between romantic love and polyamory. Our central question is whether traditional norms of monogamy can be excised from romantic love so as to harmonize with polyamory's ethical dimensions (as we construe them). How one answers this question bears on another: whether ‘polyamory’ should principally be understood in terms of romantic love or instead some alternative conception(s). Our efforts to address these questions begin by briefly motivating our favored approach to romantic love, a ‘narratival’ one inspired by 1930s cultural theorist Denis de Rougemont, wherein such love is exclusive, supernatural or promising transcendence, painful, impeded, and, ultimately, fatal. We maintain that, even once exclusivity is removed as an official component, tensions with polyamory's ethical dimensions remain: romantic love's other elements rationalize acting and feeling in ways that privilege a singular beloved above others. A tempting solution is to further revise romantic love. However, we are skeptical that this leaves space for distinctively romantic love. Our tentative proposal, then, is that polyamory's ethical dimensions favor rejecting romantic love as ultimately desirable.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142267067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The income gap between women and men expands with age, culminating in a gender pension gap in old age that is much larger than pay gaps earlier in life. In this article, I question two attempts to justify gender pension gaps. One insists that lower financial contribution justifies women's lower overall pensions. The second states that women must receive less monthly because they live longer. I argue that neither of these reasons is fair in a gender‐unjust world. Rather than justifying pension gaps, female longevity is an opportunity to promote gender justice: by subsidizing longer lives, old‐age redistribution attenuates lifetime gender inequality. In the case of retirement pensions, the use of age to promote gender equality may be preferable to explicit gender differentiation. There is, then, a feminist case for old‐age redistribution.
{"title":"Is the Gender Pension Gap Fair?","authors":"Manuel Sá Valente","doi":"10.1111/japp.12762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12762","url":null,"abstract":"The income gap between women and men expands with age, culminating in a gender pension gap in old age that is much larger than pay gaps earlier in life. In this article, I question two attempts to justify gender pension gaps. One insists that lower financial contribution justifies women's lower overall pensions. The second states that women must receive less monthly because they live longer. I argue that neither of these reasons is fair in a gender‐unjust world. Rather than justifying pension gaps, female longevity is an opportunity to promote gender justice: by subsidizing longer lives, old‐age redistribution attenuates lifetime gender inequality. In the case of retirement pensions, the use of age to promote gender equality may be preferable to explicit gender differentiation. There is, then, a feminist case for old‐age redistribution.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142267068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The best‐performing AI systems, such as deep neural networks, tend to be the ones that are most difficult to control and understand. For this reason, scholars worry that the use of AI would lead to so‐called responsibility gaps, that is, situations in which no one is morally responsible for the harm caused by AI, because no one satisfies the so‐called control condition and epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In this article, I acknowledge that there is a significant challenge around responsibility and AI. Yet I don't think that this challenge is best captured in terms of a responsibility gap. Instead, I argue for the opposite view, namely that there is responsibility abundance, that is, a situation in which numerous agents are responsible for the harm caused by AI, and that the challenge comes from the difficulties of dealing with such abundance in practice. I conclude by arguing that reframing the challenge in this way offers distinct dialectic and theoretical advantages, promising to help overcome some obstacles in the current debate surrounding ‘responsibility gaps’.
{"title":"AI and Responsibility: No Gap, but Abundance","authors":"Maximilian Kiener","doi":"10.1111/japp.12765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12765","url":null,"abstract":"The best‐performing AI systems, such as deep neural networks, tend to be the ones that are most difficult to control and understand. For this reason, scholars worry that the use of AI would lead to so‐called <jats:italic>responsibility gaps</jats:italic>, that is, situations in which no one is morally responsible for the harm caused by AI, because no one satisfies the so‐called control condition and epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In this article, I acknowledge that there is a significant challenge around responsibility and AI. Yet I don't think that this challenge is best captured in terms of a responsibility <jats:italic>gap</jats:italic>. Instead, I argue for the opposite view, namely that there is responsibility <jats:italic>abundance</jats:italic>, that is, a situation in which <jats:italic>numerous</jats:italic> agents are responsible for the harm caused by AI, and that the challenge comes from the difficulties of dealing with such abundance in practice. I conclude by arguing that reframing the challenge in this way offers distinct dialectic and theoretical advantages, promising to help overcome some obstacles in the current debate surrounding ‘responsibility gaps’.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142267069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent work in philosophy of technology has come to bear on the question of responsibility gaps. Some authors argue that the increase in the autonomous capabilities of decision‐making systems makes it impossible to properly attribute responsibility for AI‐based outcomes. In this article we argue that one important, and often neglected, feature of recent debates on responsibility gaps is how this debate maps on to old debates in responsibility theory. More specifically, we suggest that one of the key questions that is still at issue is the significance of the reactive attitudes, and how these ought to feature in our theorizing about responsibility. We will therefore provide a new descriptive categorization of different perspectives with respect to responsibility gaps. Such reflection can provide analytical clarity about what is at stake between the various interlocutors in this debate. The main upshot of our account is the articulation of a way to frame this ‘new’ debate by drawing on the rich intellectual history of ‘old’ concepts. By regarding the question of responsibility gaps as being concerned with questions of metaphysical priority, we see that the problem of these gaps lies not in any advanced technology, but rather in how we think about responsibility.
{"title":"Responsibility Gaps and Technology: Old Wine in New Bottles?","authors":"Ann‐Katrien Oimann, Fabio Tollon","doi":"10.1111/japp.12763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12763","url":null,"abstract":"Recent work in philosophy of technology has come to bear on the question of responsibility gaps. Some authors argue that the increase in the autonomous capabilities of decision‐making systems makes it impossible to properly attribute responsibility for AI‐based outcomes. In this article we argue that one important, and often neglected, feature of recent debates on responsibility gaps is how this debate maps on to old debates in responsibility theory. More specifically, we suggest that one of the key questions that is <jats:italic>still</jats:italic> at issue is the <jats:italic>significance</jats:italic> of the reactive attitudes, and how these ought to feature in our theorizing about responsibility. We will therefore provide a new descriptive categorization of different perspectives with respect to responsibility gaps. Such reflection can provide analytical clarity about what is at stake between the various interlocutors in this debate. The main upshot of our account is the articulation of a way to frame this ‘new’ debate by drawing on the rich intellectual history of ‘old’ concepts. By regarding the question of responsibility gaps as being concerned with questions of metaphysical priority, we see that the problem of these gaps lies not in any advanced technology, but rather in how we think about responsibility.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is widely known that criminal punishment, especially imprisonment, has negative effects for innocent persons, most notably the families of prisoners. This is an issue attracting increasing attention from penal theorists and philosophers. Adding to this literature, this article examines the extent to which incarceration of a parent is consistent with fundamental rights that are often ascribed to children. In particular, we focus on children's rights against being separated from their parents. To this end, we begin with a discussion of the philosophical basis for children's rights against being separated from their parents against their will. Drawing from recent work by Kimberley Brownlee and Matthew Liao, we argue that children have such a right and that it is grounded in children's welfare interest and the importance of parent–child relationships for children to develop adequately into autonomous agents. We then examine three arguments why imprisoning a parent is justified despite the fact that children have a right against being separated from their parents. For each of these arguments, we argue that while they may show the imprisonment of a particular parent to be sometimes compatible with respecting the right against parent–child separation, an extensive use of imprisonment as punishment of the sort that persists in many states is not.
{"title":"Parental Imprisonment and Children's Right Not to be Separated from Their Parents","authors":"William Bülow, Lars Lindblom","doi":"10.1111/japp.12757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12757","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely known that criminal punishment, especially imprisonment, has negative effects for innocent persons, most notably the families of prisoners. This is an issue attracting increasing attention from penal theorists and philosophers. Adding to this literature, this article examines the extent to which incarceration of a parent is consistent with fundamental rights that are often ascribed to children. In particular, we focus on children's rights against being separated from their parents. To this end, we begin with a discussion of the philosophical basis for children's rights against being separated from their parents against their will. Drawing from recent work by Kimberley Brownlee and Matthew Liao, we argue that children have such a right and that it is grounded in children's welfare interest and the importance of parent–child relationships for children to develop adequately into autonomous agents. We then examine three arguments why imprisoning a parent is justified despite the fact that children have a right against being separated from their parents. For each of these arguments, we argue that while they may show the imprisonment of a particular parent to be sometimes compatible with respecting the right against parent–child separation, an extensive use of imprisonment as punishment of the sort that persists in many states is not.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Revolutionary Care: Commitment and Ethos. M.Hamington, 2024. New York and London, Routledge. xiii +223 pp, $144.00 (hb) $39.99 (pb)","authors":"Shaun Respess","doi":"10.1111/japp.12760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12760","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When devising a plan of remedial action to address an ongoing injustice, it is desirable to possess an understanding of the key contributing factors and mechanisms that produce and sustain it. This is the domain of etiology of injustice. Etiology of injustice involves practices of causal selection that give explanatory priority to the operative causation of the injustice at issue. Operative causation refers to those processes and conditions that might be changed for the injustice to cease and to be sufficiently prevented in the future. This article uses causal selection criteria to theorize the ways in which a remedial orientation toward the explanandum of injustice determines the parameters of explanatory relevance.
{"title":"Explaining Injustice: Causation through a Remedial Lens","authors":"Susan Erck","doi":"10.1111/japp.12753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12753","url":null,"abstract":"When devising a plan of remedial action to address an ongoing injustice, it is desirable to possess an understanding of the key contributing factors and mechanisms that produce and sustain it. This is the domain of etiology of injustice. Etiology of injustice involves practices of causal selection that give explanatory priority to the operative causation of the injustice at issue. Operative causation refers to those processes and conditions that might be changed for the injustice to cease and to be sufficiently prevented in the future. This article uses causal selection criteria to theorize the ways in which a remedial orientation toward the explanandum of injustice determines the parameters of explanatory relevance.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Synthetic content, which has been produced by generative artificial intelligence, is beginning to spread through the public sphere. Increasingly, we find ourselves exposed to convincing ‘deepfakes’ and powerful chatbots in our online environments. How should we mitigate the emerging risks to individuals and society? This article argues that labelling synthetic content in public forums is an essential first step. While calls for labelling have already been growing in volume, no principled argument has yet been offered to justify this measure (which inevitably comes with some additional costs). Rectifying that deficit, I conduct a close examination of our epistemic and expressive interests in identifying synthetic content as such. In so doing, I develop a cumulative case for social media platforms to enforce a labelling duty. I argue that this represents an important element of good platform governance, helping to shore up the integrity of our contemporary public discourse, which takes place increasingly online.
{"title":"Something AI Should Tell You – The Case for Labelling Synthetic Content","authors":"Sarah A. Fisher","doi":"10.1111/japp.12758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12758","url":null,"abstract":"Synthetic content, which has been produced by generative artificial intelligence, is beginning to spread through the public sphere. Increasingly, we find ourselves exposed to convincing ‘deepfakes’ and powerful chatbots in our online environments. How should we mitigate the emerging risks to individuals and society? This article argues that labelling synthetic content in public forums is an essential first step. While calls for labelling have already been growing in volume, no principled argument has yet been offered to justify this measure (which inevitably comes with some additional costs). Rectifying that deficit, I conduct a close examination of our epistemic and expressive interests in identifying synthetic content as such. In so doing, I develop a cumulative case for social media platforms to enforce a labelling duty. I argue that this represents an important element of good platform governance, helping to shore up the integrity of our contemporary public discourse, which takes place increasingly online.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Having a child is one of the highest‐carbon decisions made by affluent individuals. Does this uncomfortable fact mean they should limit biological family size? This salient question also forces attention to two key issues. One is just how demanding individual climate justice duties are. The other is the danger of ‘ivory tower’ reasoning by privileged philosophers. On some topics, it is imperative carefully to integrate philosophical discussion with sociological and psychological research. Assuming individual climate justice duties include cutting one's carbon impact, the discussion goes as follows. Should affluent couples and individuals have no biological children, because of the carbon cost? Not unless emissions‐cutting duties are extremely demanding, or we make dangerous, generalised socio‐psychological assumptions. Is there any individual duty to consider carbon impact when determining family size? Yes, because individual emissions‐cutting duties are more than trivially demanding. Should all duty‐bearers ‘stop at’ some fixed maximum number of biological kids? Not unless that number is one and we are prepared to accept very demanding individual emissions‐cutting duties and make problematic sociological assumptions. Finally, the article outlines three further individual duties following from the ‘uncomfortable fact’: to raise good climate citizens, become activists, and cut the family carbon footprint.
{"title":"Why it Can Be Permissible to Have Kids in the Climate Emergency","authors":"Elizabeth Cripps","doi":"10.1111/japp.12756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12756","url":null,"abstract":"Having a child is one of the highest‐carbon decisions made by affluent individuals. Does this uncomfortable fact mean they should limit biological family size? This salient question also forces attention to two key issues. One is just <jats:italic>how</jats:italic> demanding individual climate justice duties are. The other is the danger of ‘ivory tower’ reasoning by privileged philosophers. On some topics, it is imperative carefully to integrate philosophical discussion with sociological and psychological research. Assuming individual climate justice duties include cutting one's carbon impact, the discussion goes as follows. Should affluent couples and individuals have no biological children, because of the carbon cost? Not unless emissions‐cutting duties are extremely demanding, or we make dangerous, generalised socio‐psychological assumptions. Is there any individual duty to consider carbon impact when determining family size? Yes, because individual emissions‐cutting duties are more than trivially demanding. Should all duty‐bearers ‘stop at’ some fixed maximum number of biological kids? Not unless that number is one and we are prepared to accept very demanding individual emissions‐cutting duties <jats:italic>and</jats:italic> make problematic sociological assumptions. Finally, the article outlines three further individual duties following from the ‘uncomfortable fact’: to raise good climate citizens, become activists, and cut the family carbon footprint.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142188671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The notion of uncommandability has been central to how we perceive our emotional lives, and particularly romantic love. According to this notion, while we can control how we treat people, we have little control over how we feel about them. The argument from uncommandability is often evoked as a way of sidestepping moral obligations regarding our romantic emotions. One challenge to uncommandability is the potential to manipulate our emotions through psychopharmaceuticals. Much of the debate on so‐called ‘love drugs’ has concerned the permissibility and worth of these interventions. By comparison, there has been less exploration of their implications for moral obligation and responsibility. How might the emergence of these interventions change what can be emotionally demanded of us? We ultimately suggest that it is necessary to view the complex morality of our emotional lives through different evaluative paradigms: one concerning moral duty and obligation, where we have no claim to each other's romantic love irrespective of its commandability, and the other concerning the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes, where we are at times justified in feeling morally injured by another person on account of their failure to love us, regardless of whether they had control in the matter.
{"title":"Entitled to Love: Relationships, Commandability, and Obligation","authors":"Anna Hartford, Dan J. Stein","doi":"10.1111/japp.12752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12752","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of uncommandability has been central to how we perceive our emotional lives, and particularly romantic love. According to this notion, while we can control how we treat people, we have little control over how we <jats:italic>feel</jats:italic> about them. The argument from uncommandability is often evoked as a way of sidestepping moral obligations regarding our romantic emotions. One challenge to uncommandability is the potential to manipulate our emotions through psychopharmaceuticals. Much of the debate on so‐called ‘love drugs’ has concerned the permissibility and worth of these interventions. By comparison, there has been less exploration of their implications for moral obligation and responsibility. How might the emergence of these interventions change what can be emotionally demanded of us? We ultimately suggest that it is necessary to view the complex morality of our emotional lives through different evaluative paradigms: one concerning moral duty and obligation, where we have no claim to each other's romantic love irrespective of its commandability, and the other concerning the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes, where we are at times justified in feeling morally injured by another person on account of their failure to love us, regardless of whether they had control in the matter.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：