{"title":"Bayesian persuasion in lawyer–client communication","authors":"Mehdi Ayouni , Tim Friehe , Yannick Gabuthy","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2024.106196","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>When considering whether to bring a lawsuit, a plaintiff may delegate the decision to her lawyer- better informed about the case’s merits- or consult with her lawyer and decide for herself. Focusing on the latter, we assess how a lawyer communicates with his client about the case’s merits if the client relies on the lawyer’s information to decide whether to bring suit. In some circumstances, the lawyer only partially reveals the case’s merits to <em>persuade</em> the client to bring a suit. In addition, in anticipation of the lawyer’s <em>strategic</em> communication, the plaintiff sometimes adjusts her questions to the lawyer about the case’s merits. Focusing on the communication between lawyers and clients, our paper explores a new consequence of misaligned incentives between the two parties.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"78 ","pages":"Article 106196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818824000164/pdfft?md5=a047e43c3cda9ecdabf9156ee27a2985&pid=1-s2.0-S0144818824000164-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Law and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818824000164","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
When considering whether to bring a lawsuit, a plaintiff may delegate the decision to her lawyer- better informed about the case’s merits- or consult with her lawyer and decide for herself. Focusing on the latter, we assess how a lawyer communicates with his client about the case’s merits if the client relies on the lawyer’s information to decide whether to bring suit. In some circumstances, the lawyer only partially reveals the case’s merits to persuade the client to bring a suit. In addition, in anticipation of the lawyer’s strategic communication, the plaintiff sometimes adjusts her questions to the lawyer about the case’s merits. Focusing on the communication between lawyers and clients, our paper explores a new consequence of misaligned incentives between the two parties.
期刊介绍：
The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.
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