Pub Date : 2026-01-14DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2026.106322
Ken Yahagi
This study examines optimal evidence rules when self-interested law enforcers may strategically distort evidence to increase conviction rates. Although law enforcers can strategically distort evidence, the analysis demonstrates that appropriate evidentiary thresholds can induce truthful reporting, thereby extracting useful information and reducing expected legal error costs from wrongful convictions and erroneous acquittals. This is particularly important when the defendant’s guilt is uncertain. The analysis extends to judicial discretion in sentencing. We show that allowing courts to impose lighter sanctions can minimize legal error costs when such sanctions reduce error costs and guilt is uncertain. This provides a justification for judicial discretion under self-interested law enforcement.
{"title":"Legal errors and evidence rules with biased law enforcers","authors":"Ken Yahagi","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2026.106322","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2026.106322","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines optimal evidence rules when self-interested law enforcers may strategically distort evidence to increase conviction rates. Although law enforcers can strategically distort evidence, the analysis demonstrates that appropriate evidentiary thresholds can induce truthful reporting, thereby extracting useful information and reducing expected legal error costs from wrongful convictions and erroneous acquittals. This is particularly important when the defendant’s guilt is uncertain. The analysis extends to judicial discretion in sentencing. We show that allowing courts to impose lighter sanctions can minimize legal error costs when such sanctions reduce error costs and guilt is uncertain. This provides a justification for judicial discretion under self-interested law enforcement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 106322"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145977110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-08DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2026.106321
Christoph Engel, Lars Freund
Under common law, the standard remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages. Under continental law, the standard is specific performance. The common law solution is ex post efficient. But is it also ex ante efficient? We use experimental methods to test whether knowing that non-fulfilment will only give a right to damages deters mutually beneficial trade. The design excludes aversion against others willfully breaking their promises, and fairness concerns. We find that there is indeed less trade if specific performance is not guaranteed, provided the preference for the traded commodity is sufficiently pronounced.
{"title":"Behaviorally efficient remedies: An experiment","authors":"Christoph Engel, Lars Freund","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2026.106321","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2026.106321","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Under common law, the standard remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages. Under continental law, the standard is specific performance. The common law solution is ex post efficient. But is it also ex ante efficient? We use experimental methods to test whether knowing that non-fulfilment will only give a right to damages deters mutually beneficial trade. The design excludes aversion against others willfully breaking their promises, and fairness concerns. We find that there is indeed less trade if specific performance is not guaranteed, provided the preference for the traded commodity is sufficiently pronounced.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 106321"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145977109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-31DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106320
Timothy C.G. Fisher , Jocelyn Martel , Lorenzo Naranjo
This study examines the roles of institutional investors in corporate restructuring decisions. We expand the existing empirical literature by using a multinomial logit model with instrumental variables to evaluate the three-way choice of distressed firms between exchange offers, ‘freefall’ Chapter 11, and ‘prenegotiated’ Chapter 11. In addition, we consider a comprehensive list of institutional investors and assess the impact of their equity and debt holdings on restructuring outcomes. Using a unique sample of 74 Chapter 11 freefall cases, 57 prenegotiated Chapter 11 cases, and 138 exchange offers from 2000 to 2018, we find that equity holdings by government, individual, investment advisors and pension funds are positively related to exchange offers and negatively to freefall plans. In contrast, bond holdings by bank, hedge fund, and VC/PE investors are negatively related to exchange offers and positively to freefall or prenegotiated plans while the inverse holds for insurance companies. In addition, assets to liabilities and interest coverage ratios are strongly associated with exchange offers, while higher short-term debt and EBIT margins correlate with freefall and prenegotiated plans. Our results underscore the critical role of investor type in shaping corporate restructuring strategies.
{"title":"Exchange offer, prenegotiated, or freefall restructuring","authors":"Timothy C.G. Fisher , Jocelyn Martel , Lorenzo Naranjo","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106320","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106320","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the roles of institutional investors in corporate restructuring decisions. We expand the existing empirical literature by using a multinomial logit model with instrumental variables to evaluate the three-way choice of distressed firms between exchange offers, ‘freefall’ Chapter 11, and ‘prenegotiated’ Chapter 11. In addition, we consider a comprehensive list of institutional investors and assess the impact of their equity and debt holdings on restructuring outcomes. Using a unique sample of 74 Chapter 11 freefall cases, 57 prenegotiated Chapter 11 cases, and 138 exchange offers from 2000 to 2018, we find that equity holdings by government, individual, investment advisors and pension funds are positively related to exchange offers and negatively to freefall plans. In contrast, bond holdings by bank, hedge fund, and VC/PE investors are negatively related to exchange offers and positively to freefall or prenegotiated plans while the inverse holds for insurance companies. In addition, assets to liabilities and interest coverage ratios are strongly associated with exchange offers, while higher short-term debt and EBIT margins correlate with freefall and prenegotiated plans. Our results underscore the critical role of investor type in shaping corporate restructuring strategies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 106320"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145925131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-29DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106319
Diogo Requena , Frans van Dijk , Wolter Hassink , Remme Verkerk
In the Netherlands, the number of commercial court cases has been declining since the end of the 2008 financial crisis. A similar decline is observed in other countries. The reasons for this decline are not well understood. Therefore, we investigate to what extent this decline is related to the business cycle and to what extent it is related to structural factors. To address this question, we use administrative data provided by the Dutch judiciary that enables us to separate cases by type of dispute. This disaggregation makes it possible to differentiate a type of case that is closely linked to the business cycle (debt collection) from a type that is not (tort). We perform regressions on the volume of these different types of cases while controlling for firms’ fixed effects. Our results indicate that, while the decline is the result of a combination of business cycle and structural factors, structural factors dominate in contentious litigation. The interviews with experts indicate that the structural decline is due to both the expansion of new technologies that increased information availability and the increased centralization of firms.
{"title":"Structural or cyclical decline: Commercial court cases in the Netherlands","authors":"Diogo Requena , Frans van Dijk , Wolter Hassink , Remme Verkerk","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106319","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106319","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the Netherlands, the number of commercial court cases has been declining since the end of the 2008 financial crisis. A similar decline is observed in other countries. The reasons for this decline are not well understood. Therefore, we investigate to what extent this decline is related to the business cycle and to what extent it is related to structural factors. To address this question, we use administrative data provided by the Dutch judiciary that enables us to separate cases by type of dispute. This disaggregation makes it possible to differentiate a type of case that is closely linked to the business cycle (debt collection) from a type that is not (tort). We perform regressions on the volume of these different types of cases while controlling for firms’ fixed effects. Our results indicate that, while the decline is the result of a combination of business cycle and structural factors, structural factors dominate in contentious litigation. The interviews with experts indicate that the structural decline is due to both the expansion of new technologies that increased information availability and the increased centralization of firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 106319"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145924918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-19DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106309
Claude Ménard
Building mainly on Coase (but also Arrow, Barnard, Simon, and many others), Williamson played a central role in the establishment and academic recognition of the economics of organizations and more generally the economics of institutions. Over numerous contributions, he introduced and/or enriched a set of interdependent concepts regarding transactions, rights, and contracts, defining the “golden triangle” of New Institutional Economics. The resulting framework provides solid theoretical ground to the analysis of the many alternative ways to organize the transfer/allocation of rights through transactions and delivered what became a key explanation to the trade-off among alternative organizational solutions faced by decision-makers. In doing so Williamson pointed out the need for an in-depth revision of traditional micro-economics and opened room for the analysis of the governance of these different structures, at the junction of economics, management, and sociology. It also led Williamson to consider the institutional embeddedness of all these micro-institutions, contributing to bridge the gap with the “macro-variant” of NIE personified by Douglass North. Williamson explored this connection mainly through the case of regulation, thus establishing links between economics and the law. In all these aspects his legacy has been and remains a source of lasting influence.
{"title":"Williamson’s legacy: A lasting influence","authors":"Claude Ménard","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106309","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106309","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Building mainly on Coase (but also Arrow, Barnard, Simon, and many others), Williamson played a central role in the establishment and academic recognition of the economics of organizations and more generally the economics of institutions. Over numerous contributions, he introduced and/or enriched a set of interdependent concepts regarding transactions, rights, and contracts, defining the “golden triangle” of New Institutional Economics. The resulting framework provides solid theoretical ground to the analysis of the many alternative ways to organize the transfer/allocation of rights through transactions and delivered what became a key explanation to the trade-off among alternative organizational solutions faced by decision-makers. In doing so Williamson pointed out the need for an in-depth revision of traditional micro-economics and opened room for the analysis of the governance of these different structures, at the junction of economics, management, and sociology. It also led Williamson to consider the institutional embeddedness of all these micro-institutions, contributing to bridge the gap with the “macro-variant” of NIE personified by Douglass North. Williamson explored this connection mainly through the case of regulation, thus establishing links between economics and the law. In all these aspects his legacy has been and remains a source of lasting influence.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 106309"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145616222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-19DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106308
Eshien Chong , Michael Klien , Stéphane Saussier
This study examines the impact of the EU Remedies Directive on the prevalence of direct awards in public procurement. Strengthening bid protest mechanisms should, in theory, curb the use of direct awards by increasing the likelihood that aggrieved bidders challenge such decisions. Using a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the staggered implementation of the directive across EU countries, we test this hypothesis using a large database of public procurement contracts. We find a strong deterrent effect for public buyers with a high initial propensity to use direct awards. For this group, the directive led to a reduction in direct awards exceeding 50 percentage points within two years of implementation. These results highlight the effectiveness of private enforcement mechanisms in shaping procurement behavior, yet indicate that such measures may also discourage the justified use of direct awards.
{"title":"Private enforcement of procurement rules: The heterogeneous effect of the EU remedies directive","authors":"Eshien Chong , Michael Klien , Stéphane Saussier","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106308","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106308","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the impact of the EU Remedies Directive on the prevalence of direct awards in public procurement. Strengthening bid protest mechanisms should, in theory, curb the use of direct awards by increasing the likelihood that aggrieved bidders challenge such decisions. Using a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the staggered implementation of the directive across EU countries, we test this hypothesis using a large database of public procurement contracts. We find a strong deterrent effect for public buyers with a high initial propensity to use direct awards. For this group, the directive led to a reduction in direct awards exceeding 50 percentage points within two years of implementation. These results highlight the effectiveness of private enforcement mechanisms in shaping procurement behavior, yet indicate that such measures may also discourage the justified use of direct awards.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 106308"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145571154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-18DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106310
Luigi Alberto Franzoni
This paper examines how insurance considerations should influence the design of liability rules, based on the realistic assumptions that individuals are risk-averse and that private insurance is costly. Empirical evidence indicates that insurance contracts often carry substantial loading factors—ranging from 30% to 40%—and that individuals display marked risk aversion when exposed to uncertain losses. These features have important normative implications for tort law. Under a negligence regime, risk aversion and costly insurance justify raising the standard of care. Under strict liability, the victim’s limited access to affordable insurance supports higher damage awards. The analysis advances the argument that courts should not evaluate precautionary behavior solely based on its expected harm reduction, but rather on its insurance value—namely, its capacity to protect risk-averse parties from uncertain losses.
{"title":"Efficient liability law with costly insurance","authors":"Luigi Alberto Franzoni","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106310","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106310","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines how insurance considerations should influence the design of liability rules, based on the realistic assumptions that individuals are risk-averse and that private insurance is costly. Empirical evidence indicates that insurance contracts often carry substantial loading factors—ranging from 30% to 40%—and that individuals display marked risk aversion when exposed to uncertain losses. These features have important normative implications for tort law. Under a negligence regime, risk aversion and costly insurance justify raising the standard of care. Under strict liability, the victim’s limited access to affordable insurance supports higher damage awards. The analysis advances the argument that courts should not evaluate precautionary behavior solely based on its expected harm reduction, but rather on its insurance value—namely, its capacity to protect risk-averse parties from uncertain losses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 106310"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145537118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-11-10DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106307
Peter Grajzl , Jaka Cepec , Barbara Mörec
We examine the effectiveness of court-annexed mediation (CAM) in facilitating case disposition, drawing on nearly 380,000 civil and commercial disputes adjudicated in Slovenian first-instance courts between 2009 and 2023. To address CAM’s endogeneity, we leverage a rich set of covariates and combine propensity score estimation with matching and parametric analysis. Conducting CAM, on average, reduces case duration by 12 % (42 days based on sample mean) and raises the likelihood of settlement by 25–32 percentage points (60–176 % of mean settlement probability, depending on the definition). CAM’s effect, however, varies considerably across different cases. CAM significantly reduces duration in commercial, intellectual property, damages, and enforcement lawsuits, as well as in cases filed during backlog periods and in courts that adopted CAM early. By contrast, we find no effect of CAM on duration in disputes involving five or more parties. CAM improves settlement prospects across all examined case groups—especially in small-value claims, commercial and enforcement lawsuits, and disputes in which neither party is represented by an attorney. Notably, the key determinant of whether CAM is offered and conducted is the identity of the presiding judge, underscoring the critical role judges play in driving CAM’s adoption.
{"title":"Does court-annexed mediation facilitate case disposition? Evidence from civil and commercial lawsuits","authors":"Peter Grajzl , Jaka Cepec , Barbara Mörec","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106307","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106307","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the effectiveness of court-annexed mediation (CAM) in facilitating case disposition, drawing on nearly 380,000 civil and commercial disputes adjudicated in Slovenian first-instance courts between 2009 and 2023. To address CAM’s endogeneity, we leverage a rich set of covariates and combine propensity score estimation with matching and parametric analysis. Conducting CAM, on average, reduces case duration by 12 % (42 days based on sample mean) and raises the likelihood of settlement by 25–32 percentage points (60–176 % of mean settlement probability, depending on the definition). CAM’s effect, however, varies considerably across different cases. CAM significantly reduces duration in commercial, intellectual property, damages, and enforcement lawsuits, as well as in cases filed during backlog periods and in courts that adopted CAM early. By contrast, we find no effect of CAM on duration in disputes involving five or more parties. CAM improves settlement prospects across all examined case groups—especially in small-value claims, commercial and enforcement lawsuits, and disputes in which neither party is represented by an attorney. Notably, the key determinant of whether CAM is offered and conducted is the identity of the presiding judge, underscoring the critical role judges play in driving CAM’s adoption.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 106307"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145616224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-17DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106306
Francesco Parisi
The International Review of Law & Economics is publishing these notes in memory and celebration of Robert D. Cooter—its Editor from 1988 to 2004—offering brief reflections on him as teacher, scholar, and exemplar. A giant of law and economics, Robert D. Cooter combined breadth with creative insight: he helped build a systematic economic understanding of torts, contracts, and property, a novel approach to public law and Constitutional design, and opened new frontiers on the interaction between law and social norms and on the expressive power of law. His humanity and scholarly ethos—curiosity, humor, and intellectual honesty—left a lasting mark on all who had the privilege to learn from him as students, colleagues, co-authors, and friends.
{"title":"In Memoriam: Robert D. Cooter","authors":"Francesco Parisi","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106306","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106306","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The <em>International Review of Law & Economics</em> is publishing these notes in memory and celebration of Robert D. Cooter—its Editor from 1988 to 2004—offering brief reflections on him as teacher, scholar, and exemplar. A giant of law and economics, Robert D. Cooter combined breadth with creative insight: he helped build a systematic economic understanding of torts, contracts, and property, a novel approach to public law and Constitutional design, and opened new frontiers on the interaction between law and social norms and on the expressive power of law. His humanity and scholarly ethos—curiosity, humor, and intellectual honesty—left a lasting mark on all who had the privilege to learn from him as students, colleagues, co-authors, and friends.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"84 ","pages":"Article 106306"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145415765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-14DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106305
Fabio Padovano , Youssoufa Sy
The Political Legislation Cycles theory predicts peaks of legislative production before elections, as incumbents adopt vote-maximizing strategies to secure reelection. Like for budget cycles, legislative cycles can be interpreted as quantitative evidence of a dynamic inefficiency in the agency relationship between voters and politicians. This paper presents the first panel test of PLC theory, to identify which institutional features generate this inefficiency, exploiting a newly assembled dataset of the legislative activity of twenty electoral democracies, mainly from 1975 to 2010s. The estimates show that the total number of laws decreases at the beginning of a legislature and significantly increases near its end, generally 6 months before, with magnitudes of the cycles varying across countries. These cross-countries variations appear correlated with electoral systems (PR electoral systems generating cycles 67 % greater than majoritarian), government systems, with presidential democracies being characterized by larger cycles especially when governments are divided, and with the degree of fiscal decentralization, with highly decentralized countries showing a legislative cycles 64 % greater. Finally, the level of democracy affects PLC in a nonlinear way. These results provide a quantitative guidance to constitutional reforms aimed at increasing efficiency in the representation of voters’ preferences in democracies
{"title":"Conditional political legislation cycles","authors":"Fabio Padovano , Youssoufa Sy","doi":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106305","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.irle.2025.106305","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Political Legislation Cycles theory predicts peaks of legislative production before elections, as incumbents adopt vote-maximizing strategies to secure reelection. Like for budget cycles, legislative cycles can be interpreted as quantitative evidence of a dynamic inefficiency in the agency relationship between voters and politicians. This paper presents the first panel test of PLC theory, to identify which institutional features generate this inefficiency, exploiting a newly assembled dataset of the legislative activity of twenty electoral democracies, mainly from 1975 to 2010s. The estimates show that the total number of laws decreases at the beginning of a legislature and significantly increases near its end, generally 6 months before, with magnitudes of the cycles varying across countries. These cross-countries variations appear correlated with electoral systems (PR electoral systems generating cycles 67 % greater than majoritarian), government systems, with presidential democracies being characterized by larger cycles especially when governments are divided, and with the degree of fiscal decentralization, with highly decentralized countries showing a legislative cycles 64 % greater. Finally, the level of democracy affects PLC in a nonlinear way. These results provide a quantitative guidance to constitutional reforms aimed at increasing efficiency in the representation of voters’ preferences in democracies</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47202,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Law and Economics","volume":"85 ","pages":"Article 106305"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2025-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145616223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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