International Review of Law and Economics最新文献

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When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106248

Aylin Aydin-Cakir , Ebru İlter Akarçay

In recent decades, the world has witnessed various examples of elected governments verbally attacking the judiciary, accusing judges of bias, or claiming that court decisions are politically motivated. Despite the prevalence of such court-curbing practices, we know very little about when exactly governments decide to verbally attack the judiciary. Focusing on the effect of political corruption, the objective of this study is to understand 1) whether and, if so, how corruption affects governments’ attacks on the judiciary and 2) whether and, if so, how its effect changes across different political contexts. We argue that in countries with fully or partially independent media, verbal attacks on the judiciary would increase with the level of corruption. However, in regimes where the media is not independent, political corruption would not have a significant effect on attacks on the judiciary. We conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis across 165 countries (1991–2022) to test our hypotheses. The empirical results support our hypotheses. To better understand the causal mechanisms through which corruption and media independence together trigger governments’ verbal attacks on the judiciary, we compare the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela in the second part of the study.

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引用次数: 0

Allocating the common costs of a public service operator: An axiomatic approach

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106247

David Lowing , Léa Munich , Kevin Techer

Accurate cost allocation is a challenge for both public service operators and regulatory bodies, given the dual objectives of ensuring essential public service provision and maintaining fair competition. Operators have the obligation to provide essential public services for all individuals, which may incur additional costs. To compensate this, the operators receive state aids, which are determined by an assessment of the net cost associated with these obligations. However, these aids introduce the risk of distorting competition, as operators may employ them to subsidize competitive activities. To avoid this risk, a precise cost allocation method that adequately assess the net cost of these obligations becomes necessary. Such a method must satisfy specific properties that effectively prevent cross-subsidization. In this paper, we propose a method grounded in cooperative game theory that offers a solution for allocating common costs between activities and obligations in public service provision. We adopt a normative approach by introducing a set of desirable axioms that prevent cross-subsidization. We provide two characterizations of our proposed solution on the basis of these axioms. Furthermore, we present an illustration of our method to the allocation of common costs for a public service operator.

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引用次数: 0

Did recreational marijuana legalization increase crime in the long run?

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-01-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106246

Sunyoung Lee

This study comprehensively examines the long-term effects of state-level recreational marijuana legalization on crime rates by employing a difference-in-differences with multiple time periods methodology. The findings of this study do not yield conclusive evidence supporting a reduction in crime rates after legalizing recreational marijuana. Rather, they underscore notable positive associations with property crimes and suggest potential correlations with violent crimes, highlighting the critical need for continued research to help policymakers better understand the complex implications of cannbis policy and develop more nuanced, evidence-based approaches. Robustness checks, including synthetic control method and sensitivity analyses, confirm the reliability of these results.

引用次数: 0

Jury priors and observable defendant characteristics

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2025-01-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106245

Jesse Bull

Although prohibited, jurors sometimes condition, consciously or subconsciously, their belief that a defendant is guilty on the defendant’s race or ethnicity or other observable characteristics. This can be viewed as a juror forming a prior or pre-trial/evidence disclosure belief of guilt. In doing this, they rely on their perceptions of education, socio-economic status, religion, beliefs, networks, etc. for the defendant’s race (or other observable characteristic) and how they perceive those to influence the probability the defendant is guilty. This is consistent with aversive discrimination, which suggests that people want to be egalitarian and not condition on race but have a tendency to base decisions on factors that are discriminatory when race is not salient. When this prior or pre-trial/evidence disclosure belief of guilt overestimates the prior probability of guilt for those in the minority group, it underestimates the prior probability of guilt for those in the majority group. Prohibiting conditioning on observable defendant characteristics can be viewed as requiring the use of the population prior/pre-trial probability of guilt. Conditions for when such prohibition improves accuracy are provided. While it is difficult to effectively prohibit this, studies of aversive discrimination suggest that making race salient in a trial can reduce implicit bias on race. So these results may provide some guidance on when such activity should be permitted.

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引用次数: 0

An inspector calls: On the optimality of warning firms about ongoing inspections in antitrust policy

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2024-12-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106244

María C. Avramovich

This paper investigates the effects of disclosing information about the likelihood of an inspection on the sustainability of cartels. To this end, I develop a model in which the Antitrust Authority can credibly disclose this type of information before firms make strategic decisions. In this way, the Antitrust Authority can distort the optimal behavior of the cartel firms related to production and cartel activities between inspection periods and non-inspection periods. I show how this can destabilize some cartel agreements, but it can also create productive inefficiencies not considered in standard models of collusion, to the extent that it induces cartel firms to devote costly resources to cartel activities.

引用次数: 0

Norms as obligations 作为义务的规范

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106235

Leonard Hoeft , Michael Kurschilgen , Wladislaw Mill

Economists model legal compliance as the process of maximizing utility while weighing the consequences from norm violation against other (monetary and non-monetary) considerations. Legal philosophers, on the other hand, believe that the normative side of law is central. Citizens comply because they have an obligation to do so. Legal norms provide exclusionary reasons that prevent weighing up on other issues. We test and compare both models in a controlled online experiment. We conduct a modified dictator game with partially unknown yet ascertainable payoffs, and vary between treatments the presence and content of authoritative norms. Our experimental results show that – in the presence of a norm – participants follow norms without searching for information that they deem important in the absence of a norm. This pattern is independent of the specific content of the norm. Our results are consistent with the legal model of norm compliance.

经济学家将遵守法律视为效用最大化的过程，同时将违反规范的后果与其他（货币和非货币）考虑因素进行权衡。而法律哲学家则认为，法律的规范性是核心。公民遵守法律是因为他们有义务这样做。法律规范提供了排除性的理由，阻止了对其他问题的权衡。我们在一个受控在线实验中测试并比较了这两种模式。我们进行了一个改良的独裁者博弈，博弈中的报酬部分未知，但可以确定，并且在不同的处理中，权威性规范的存在和内容会有所不同。我们的实验结果表明，在有规范的情况下，参与者会遵守规范，而不会搜索他们在没有规范的情况下认为重要的信息。这种模式与规范的具体内容无关。我们的结果与遵守规范的法律模型是一致的。

引用次数: 0

Case law in European merger control 欧洲兼并控制判例法

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2024-11-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106236

Johan Callermo

This paper studies references to case law in merger control decisions by the EC Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) in 1990–2022. I use the full set of references to Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgments in DG COMP decisions to examine implementation, industry dynamics and effects of the 2004 merger control reform. New case law is shown to be immediately incorporated into the merger control practice without a learning period, subsequent citations correlate with industry-specific merger activity and the 2004 ECMR reform changed which judgments are frequently cited. European merger control should thus be viewed as a dynamic framework rather than constant in time and across industries. When controlling for quantifiable determinants of case law citations, the ceteris paribus relevance of case law is constant for 20–25 years, implying that judgments do not intrinsically lose relevance over time.

本文研究了 1990-2022 年欧盟竞争总司（DG COMP）在兼并控制决策中对判例法的引用。我利用竞争总司决策中对欧盟法院判决的全套引用来研究 2004 年兼并控制改革的实施、行业动态和效果。结果表明，新判例法无需学习期即可立即融入兼并控制实践，随后的引用与特定行业的兼并活动相关，而 2004 年的欧盟兼并控制改革改变了哪些判决被频繁引用。因此，欧洲兼并控制应被视为一个动态框架，而不是在时间上和行业间保持不变。在控制判例法引用的可量化决定因素时，判例法的比照相关性在 20-25 年间保持不变，这意味着判决并不会随着时间的推移而失去其固有的相关性。

引用次数: 0

Estimating the effect of concealed carry laws on murder: A response to Bondy, et al. 估计隐蔽携带枪支法对谋杀案的影响：对邦迪等人的回应

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106234

Carlisle Moody , John R. Lott

In 2021 we wrote a short paper noting that truncating the sample when estimating the effect of right to carry laws on crime could be biased by comparisons to states that already adopted the law, instead of states without the law. In 2023 Bondy et al. criticized our paper but inaccurately described what we did and provided selective and misleading results. More importantly, they completely missed the point of our analysis, namely that applying two-way fixed effects to a truncated sample, say 1991–2018, biases the resulting RTC coefficient by invalidly comparing newly treated states to 11 previously treated states. The bias is so large that even if the true coefficient on the right-to-carry dummy is negative, the estimated coefficient could be positive. These biased results can be corrected by using new DID estimators, that do not make invalid comparisons, and which are robust to time and state heterogeneity. Using these new estimators, we find that RTC laws do not significantly increase violent crime. We find evidence that RTC laws significantly reduce murder and that constitutional carry laws significantly reduce rape.

2021 年，我们撰写了一篇短文，指出在估算携带权法对犯罪的影响时，对样本进行截断，可能会因为与已通过该法律的州而非未通过该法律的州进行比较而产生偏差。2023 年，邦迪等人批评了我们的论文，但对我们所做工作的描述并不准确，并提供了选择性和误导性的结果。更重要的是，他们完全忽略了我们分析的重点，即对一个截断样本（如 1991-2018 年）应用双向固定效应，会使得出的 RTC 系数产生偏差，因为他们将新近接受治疗的州与之前接受治疗的 11 个州进行了无效比较。偏差如此之大，以至于即使携带权虚拟变量的真实系数为负，估计系数也可能为正。使用新的 DID 估计器可以纠正这些有偏差的结果，这种估计器不会进行无效比较，而且对时间和州异质性具有稳健性。利用这些新的估计方法，我们发现 RTC 法律并没有显著增加暴力犯罪。我们发现有证据表明，RTC 法律大大减少了谋杀案，而宪法规定的随身携带法律则大大减少了强奸案。

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引用次数: 0

The broken-windows theory of crime: A Bayesian approach 破窗犯罪理论：贝叶斯方法

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106233

Thomas J. Miceli, Kathleen Segerson

The broken-windows theory of crime is based on the idea that aggressive enforcement of petty crimes, like misdemeanors, will have a deterring effect on would-be perpetrators of more serious crimes. This paper develops a model of this theory that depends on three factors: (1) potential offenders make decisions about committing crimes based on their beliefs about the probability of apprehension; (2) those beliefs depend on prior observations or knowledge about the rate of petty crimes; and (3) there is a linkage across criminal categories (minor vs. serious crimes) as a component of actual enforcement policy. Our results show that even if these factors are all present, increased enforcement of low-harm crimes does not necessarily lead to fewer high-harm crimes.

犯罪 "破窗理论 "的理论基础是，对轻罪等轻微犯罪积极执法，会对可能犯下更严重罪行的人产生威慑作用。本文为这一理论建立了一个模型，该模型取决于三个因素：(1) 潜在罪犯根据他们对被捕概率的信念做出犯罪决定；(2) 这些信念取决于先前对轻罪犯罪率的观察或了解；(3) 作为实际执法政策的一部分，不同犯罪类别（轻罪与重罪）之间存在联系。我们的结果表明，即使这些因素都存在，加强对低危害性犯罪的执法也不一定会导致高危害性犯罪的减少。

引用次数: 0

Workload, legal doctrine, and judicial review in an authoritarian regime: A study of expropriation judgments in China 专制制度下的工作量、法律理论和司法审查：中国征用判决研究

IF 0.9 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

International Review of Law and Economics

Pub Date : 2024-10-26 DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2024.106232

Chaoqun Zhan , Shitong Qiao

This paper contributes one of the first systematic studies on how courts adjudicate expropriation disputes both in the absence of judicial independence and in the face of resource constraints, extends the study of judicial workload into an authoritarian context, and demonstrates the complicated and dynamic interactions between apolitical and political aspects of courts in authoritarian regimes. Our results demonstrate that legal doctrine can check the abuse of government power even in situations where it is least expected. Specifically, we examined how Chinese courts, faced with an explosive increase in workload caused by a legal reform in 2015, adjudicated expropriation disputes between the government and property rights holders. Employing a difference-in-differences method, we found that an increased judicial workload improved the chances of property rights holders winning their cases against the government. We discovered that judges’ use of hard-edged legal doctrine—administrative procedures, in particular—to save time constrained judicial discretion, which is prone to arbitrary political influence in authoritarian regimes.

本文首次系统研究了法院在缺乏司法独立和面临资源限制的情况下如何裁决征用纠纷，将对司法工作量的研究扩展到专制背景下，并展示了专制制度下法院的非政治性和政治性之间复杂而动态的相互作用。我们的研究结果表明，即使在人们最不期望的情况下，法律理论也能遏制政府权力的滥用。具体而言，我们研究了中国法院在 2015 年法律改革导致工作量爆炸性增长的情况下，如何裁决政府与产权持有人之间的征用纠纷。通过采用差分法，我们发现，司法工作量的增加提高了产权持有人起诉政府的胜诉几率。我们发现，法官为了节省时间而使用强硬的法律理论--尤其是行政程序--限制了司法自由裁量权，而在专制体制下，司法自由裁量权很容易受到任意的政治影响。

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