The role of asymmetric innovation’s sizes in technology licensing under partial vertical integration

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS Research in Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-17 DOI:10.1016/j.rie.2024.100958
M. Sánchez , A. Nerja
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this paper, we compare the scenarios of exclusive licenses and cross-licenses under the existence of partial vertical integration. To do this, a successive duopoly model is proposed, with two owners and two firms competing in a differentiated product market. Each technology owner has a share in one of the competing firms, so that competition is also extended to the upstream R&D sector. We propose a novel analysis where differences in the size of their innovation process are allowed, extending the results in Sánchez et al. (2021). We find that the cross-licensing scenario is preferred when the size of the innovation is small; this occurs regardless of the participation in the competing companies and how many innovate. If the innovation is very large, the owners may be better off with exclusive licenses.

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部分纵向一体化下非对称创新规模在技术许可中的作用
在本文中,我们对部分纵向一体化情况下的独占许可和交叉许可进行了比较。为此,我们提出了一个连续双头垄断模型,即两个所有者和两家公司在差异化产品市场上竞争。每个技术所有者都拥有其中一家竞争企业的股份,因此竞争也扩展到上游研发部门。我们提出了一种新颖的分析方法,允许创新过程的规模存在差异,从而扩展了 Sánchez 等人(2021 年)的研究结果。我们发现,当创新规模较小时,交叉许可方案更受青睐;无论竞争公司的参与程度如何,也无论有多少家公司进行创新,都会出现这种情况。如果创新规模非常大,所有者可能更倾向于独占许可。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
37
审稿时长
89 days
期刊介绍: Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.
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