Policy analysis on the promotion of new energy vehicles in China considering consumers’ car purchasing choices in the “post-subsidy era”: based on the study of a three-party evolutionary game

Abstract

Previous subsidy policies have helped tremendously in the development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China. However, with the removal of subsidies, how to continue to promote the development of China’s NEVs industry has become an important issue that needs to be addressed today. Existing research has only studied the behavior of consumers in purchasing NEVs, ignoring the strong substitution effect of conventional energy vehicles for NEVs. To fill this gap, this paper takes full account of the different utilities that conventional energy vehicles and NEVs bring to consumers, and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of automobile enterprises, consumers, and the Chinese government in the “post-subsidy era”. Through parameter assignment and simulation, this paper draws the following conclusions: (1) The support policy of the Chinese government for the NEVs industry in the “post-subsidy era” can effectively enhance the enthusiasm of automobile enterprises to develop NEVs and improve consumers’ willingness to purchase NEVs, but dynamic adjustments should be made according to the actual situation to avoid unnecessary cost burden. (2) The purchase cost of NEVs hurts consumers’ purchase willingness, and the higher purchase cost caused by the cancellation of subsidies will reduce consumers’ willingness to purchase NEVs in the “post-subsidy era”. (3) Consumers’ car purchase choice has a direct impact on the strategic choice direction of automobile enterprises. Therefore, cultivating consumers’ low-carbon awareness and enhancing their willingness to purchase NEVs can promote the enthusiasm of automobile enterprises to develop NEVs in the “post-subsidy era”.