{"title":"Emission regulation: Prices, quantities and hybrids with endogenous technology choice","authors":"Halvor Briseid Storrøsten","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102985","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the investment incentives of market-based regulation, focusing on the technology characteristics that different regulatory schemes tend to incentivize. The firms’ technology choice is socially optimal if and only if the aggregate emission allowance supply is completely inelastic. Furthermore, in the presence of uncertainty, elastic emission allowance supply, and strictly convex environmental damage, it is optimal to tax investments in technologies that induce a large variance in emissions. Lastly, price elastic supply of emission allowances may either increase or decrease the volatility in the product market, depending on the risk environment the firms face. The results indicate that introduction of permit price-stabilizing measures in an emission trading system will come at the cost of suboptimal technology investments, and may also lead to increased fluctuations in product prices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"125 ","pages":"Article 102985"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000597/pdfft?md5=5caedf640bd1b9930b0c27008b5c57a1&pid=1-s2.0-S0095069624000597-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624000597","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper examines the investment incentives of market-based regulation, focusing on the technology characteristics that different regulatory schemes tend to incentivize. The firms’ technology choice is socially optimal if and only if the aggregate emission allowance supply is completely inelastic. Furthermore, in the presence of uncertainty, elastic emission allowance supply, and strictly convex environmental damage, it is optimal to tax investments in technologies that induce a large variance in emissions. Lastly, price elastic supply of emission allowances may either increase or decrease the volatility in the product market, depending on the risk environment the firms face. The results indicate that introduction of permit price-stabilizing measures in an emission trading system will come at the cost of suboptimal technology investments, and may also lead to increased fluctuations in product prices.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.