{"title":"Simulations, Skepticisms, and Transcendental Arguments","authors":"Abraham Lim","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10065","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a previous article, I developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the <span style=\"font-variant: small-caps;\">sim</span>-style argument. In this article, I have four main aims. First, I employ the <span style=\"font-variant: small-caps;\">sim</span>-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the <span style=\"font-variant: small-caps;\">sim</span>-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson’s, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism.</p>","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10065","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In a previous article, I developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the sim-style argument. In this article, I have four main aims. First, I employ the sim-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam’s brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the sim-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson’s, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism.