{"title":"Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’ Treatment of Global Skepticism in Why We Doubt","authors":"Mark Walker","doi":"10.1163/22105700-bja10086","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Ángel Pinillos’ <em>Why We Doubt</em> offers an error theory for at least some versions of global skepticism: skeptical doubts are based on a faulty heuristic. Once this heuristic is replaced by a more apt principle inspired by Bayesian approaches to epistemology, the skeptical doubts are shown not to be motivated. I argue contra Pinillos that skeptical doubts may remain even if we grant the main line of Pinillos’ argument. Skeptical doubts might be generated by disagreement even when we accept Pinillos’ Bayesian inspired principle.</p>","PeriodicalId":41464,"journal":{"name":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal for the Study of Skepticism","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10086","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Ángel Pinillos’ Why We Doubt offers an error theory for at least some versions of global skepticism: skeptical doubts are based on a faulty heuristic. Once this heuristic is replaced by a more apt principle inspired by Bayesian approaches to epistemology, the skeptical doubts are shown not to be motivated. I argue contra Pinillos that skeptical doubts may remain even if we grant the main line of Pinillos’ argument. Skeptical doubts might be generated by disagreement even when we accept Pinillos’ Bayesian inspired principle.
安赫尔-皮尼略斯(Ángel Pinillos)的《我们为什么怀疑》(Why We Doubt)一书为至少某些版本的全球怀疑论提供了一种错误理论:怀疑论的怀疑是基于一种错误的启发式。一旦这一启发式被贝叶斯认识论方法所启发的更恰当的原则所取代,怀疑主义的怀疑就会被证明并非出于动机。与皮尼洛斯相反,我认为,即使我们同意皮尼洛斯论证的主线,怀疑性疑虑仍然可能存在。即使我们接受了皮尼洛斯的贝叶斯启发原则,也可能因分歧而产生怀疑。
期刊介绍:
As the first international journal entirely devoted to philosophical skepticism, the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism publishes high-quality articles and discussion notes on any field of research relevant to the study of skeptical thought. The journal also contains critical notices and reviews of major books on skepticism, and organizes book symposia on recent ground-breaking works. On occasion, it publishes special issues devoted to current lively debates on specific topics or authors. The wide range of areas covered includes the history and significance of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary skepticism as well as discussions of current specific skeptical problems and arguments in epistemology, metaethics, ontology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.