Confidence and Outcome Expectations in Bilateral Negotiations–A Dynamic Model

IF 3.6 4区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT Group Decision and Negotiation Pub Date : 2024-05-01 DOI:10.1007/s10726-024-09886-w
Rudolf Vetschera, Luis C. Dias
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Abstract

This work proposes and studies a dynamic model of two bargaining parties exchanging offers over time, considering their confidence about the share of the “pie” they obtain, which translates into expectations regarding the outcome of the bargaining process. The model predicts the sequence of offers as well as the final agreement for given confidence parameters. A mathematical analysis of the model shows the outcome is an Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution with exponents determined by the bargainers’ confidence. Moreover, a compensation effect can be found between confidence and risk aversion. This work also considers that confidence levels of bargainers might change during the negotiation, and we conduct a comprehensive simulation study to analyze the effect of such changes. Through Monte-Carlo simulation, we show that a bargainer is better off if its confidence increases, but the advantage is lost if the other party’s confidence increases in a similar way. In that case, concessions are smaller and negotiations last longer. Changing confidence parameters make the outcome harder to predict, as it will depend more on the final confidence than the initial one. The simulations also show that the average size of concessions, and therefore the final agreement, depend not only on whether confidence increases or decreases, but also on the change rate, with stronger effects observed when change accelerates towards the end of the process.

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双边谈判中的信心和结果预期--一个动态模型
这项研究提出并研究了一个动态模型,模型中讨价还价的双方会随着时间的推移交换出价,同时考虑到他们对自己获得的 "馅饼 "份额的信心,这种信心会转化为对讨价还价过程结果的预期。该模型可预测出价顺序以及给定信心参数下的最终协议。对模型的数学分析显示,结果是一个非对称纳什议价方案,其指数由议价者的信心决定。此外,还可以发现信心和风险规避之间存在补偿效应。本研究还考虑到谈判过程中谈判者的信心水平可能会发生变化,并对这种变化的影响进行了全面的模拟研究分析。通过蒙特卡洛模拟,我们发现,如果谈判方的信心增加,那么谈判方的优势就会更大,但如果对方的信心也以类似的方式增加,那么谈判方的优势就会丧失。在这种情况下,让步会更小,谈判持续的时间会更长。信心参数的变化使结果更难预测,因为它将更多地取决于最终信心而非初始信心。模拟结果还表明,让步的平均规模以及最终协议的达成不仅取决于信心的增加或减少,还取决于变化率,当变化率在进程末期加速变化时,会产生更强的影响。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
6.70%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: The idea underlying the journal, Group Decision and Negotiation, emerges from evolving, unifying approaches to group decision and negotiation processes. These processes are complex and self-organizing involving multiplayer, multicriteria, ill-structured, evolving, dynamic problems. Approaches include (1) computer group decision and negotiation support systems (GDNSS), (2) artificial intelligence and management science, (3) applied game theory, experiment and social choice, and (4) cognitive/behavioral sciences in group decision and negotiation. A number of research studies combine two or more of these fields. The journal provides a publication vehicle for theoretical and empirical research, and real-world applications and case studies. In defining the domain of group decision and negotiation, the term `group'' is interpreted to comprise all multiplayer contexts. Thus, organizational decision support systems providing organization-wide support are included. Group decision and negotiation refers to the whole process or flow of activities relevant to group decision and negotiation, not only to the final choice itself, e.g. scanning, communication and information sharing, problem definition (representation) and evolution, alternative generation and social-emotional interaction. Descriptive, normative and design viewpoints are of interest. Thus, Group Decision and Negotiation deals broadly with relation and coordination in group processes. Areas of application include intraorganizational coordination (as in operations management and integrated design, production, finance, marketing and distribution, e.g. as in new products and global coordination), computer supported collaborative work, labor-management negotiations, interorganizational negotiations, (business, government and nonprofits -- e.g. joint ventures), international (intercultural) negotiations, environmental negotiations, etc. The journal also covers developments of software f or group decision and negotiation.
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