Ex ante transparency and corruption by networks

IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Economica Pub Date : 2024-05-02 DOI:10.1111/ecca.12526
Mehmet Bac
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper explains the structure of corruption networks as response to ex ante transparency, defined as visibility of authorities whose cooperation clients may need, in due course, to execute corrupt transactions. It also characterizes the optimal transparency policy given the network response, as a function of connection costs, sanctions, the corruption surplus and the detection probability (hence the anti-corruption budget and ex post transparency). Corruption chains may emerge in equilibrium if authority is expected to be shared by multiple offices, where the office with higher solo assignment probability becomes the intermediary. Otherwise, clients penetrate the bureaucracy by inducing the star network, or contend with single connection. I show that the optimal policy always assigns one office, sometimes alone, sometimes jointly with others. It is often possible to deter corruption networks through an ex ante transparent policy that parcels out authority to multiple offices with probability 1—a common feature of many US bureaucracies. Decomposing transparency into its components reveals nuances in the transparency–corruption relationship, suggesting that ex ante transparency is instrumental except in environments in which anti-corruption enforcement is extremely effective or extremely ineffective.

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事前透明度和网络腐败
本文解释了腐败网络结构对事前透明度的反应,事前透明度被定义为当局的能见度,在适当的时候,客户可能需要当局的合作来执行腐败交易。本文还描述了网络响应下的最优透明度政策,它是连接成本、制裁、腐败盈余和侦查概率(即反腐败预算和事后透明度)的函数。如果预期多个部门共享权力,那么在均衡情况下可能会出现腐败链,其中独任概率较高的部门会成为中间人。否则,客户会通过诱导星形网络渗透到官僚机构中,或与单个连接竞争。我的研究表明,最优政策总是指派一个办公室,有时是单独指派,有时是与其他办公室共同指派。通常可以通过事先透明的政策来阻止腐败网络,这种政策将权力以概率 1 的方式分配给多个办公室--这是美国许多官僚机构的共同特点。将透明度分解为各个组成部分可以揭示透明度与腐败关系中的细微差别,这表明,除非在反腐败执法极其有效或极其无效的环境下,事前透明度才会起到作用。
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来源期刊
Economica
Economica ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
49
审稿时长
5 weeks
期刊介绍: Economica is an international journal devoted to research in all branches of economics. Theoretical and empirical articles are welcome from all parts of the international research community. Economica is a leading economics journal, appearing high in the published citation rankings. In addition to the main papers which make up each issue, there is an extensive review section, covering a wide range of recently published titles at all levels.
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