{"title":"Ex ante transparency and corruption by networks","authors":"Mehmet Bac","doi":"10.1111/ecca.12526","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper explains the structure of corruption networks as response to <i>ex ante</i> transparency, defined as visibility of authorities whose cooperation clients may need, in due course, to execute corrupt transactions. It also characterizes the optimal transparency policy given the network response, as a function of connection costs, sanctions, the corruption surplus and the detection probability (hence the anti-corruption budget and <i>ex post</i> transparency). Corruption chains may emerge in equilibrium if authority is expected to be shared by multiple offices, where the office with higher solo assignment probability becomes the intermediary. Otherwise, clients penetrate the bureaucracy by inducing the star network, or contend with single connection. I show that the optimal policy always assigns one office, sometimes alone, sometimes jointly with others. It is often possible to deter corruption networks through an <i>ex ante</i> transparent policy that parcels out authority to multiple offices with probability 1—a common feature of many US bureaucracies. Decomposing transparency into its components reveals nuances in the transparency–corruption relationship, suggesting that <i>ex ante</i> transparency is instrumental except in environments in which anti-corruption enforcement is extremely effective or extremely ineffective.</p>","PeriodicalId":48040,"journal":{"name":"Economica","volume":"91 363","pages":"1023-1046"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economica","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecca.12526","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper explains the structure of corruption networks as response to ex ante transparency, defined as visibility of authorities whose cooperation clients may need, in due course, to execute corrupt transactions. It also characterizes the optimal transparency policy given the network response, as a function of connection costs, sanctions, the corruption surplus and the detection probability (hence the anti-corruption budget and ex post transparency). Corruption chains may emerge in equilibrium if authority is expected to be shared by multiple offices, where the office with higher solo assignment probability becomes the intermediary. Otherwise, clients penetrate the bureaucracy by inducing the star network, or contend with single connection. I show that the optimal policy always assigns one office, sometimes alone, sometimes jointly with others. It is often possible to deter corruption networks through an ex ante transparent policy that parcels out authority to multiple offices with probability 1—a common feature of many US bureaucracies. Decomposing transparency into its components reveals nuances in the transparency–corruption relationship, suggesting that ex ante transparency is instrumental except in environments in which anti-corruption enforcement is extremely effective or extremely ineffective.
期刊介绍:
Economica is an international journal devoted to research in all branches of economics. Theoretical and empirical articles are welcome from all parts of the international research community. Economica is a leading economics journal, appearing high in the published citation rankings. In addition to the main papers which make up each issue, there is an extensive review section, covering a wide range of recently published titles at all levels.