Lottocracy and class-specific political institutions: A plebeian constitutionalist defense

Abstract

Skepticism about the democratic nature of elections-based institutional systems is a growing sentiment among political theorists. There are many reasons explaining such skepticism, but one prominent concern is that these systems make representatives susceptible to capture by economic elites, in other words, oligarchic capture. Champions of electoral democracy commonly claim that oligarchic capture can be fought through legally-based, formal mechanisms of regulation, such as campaign finance and anti-money-in-politics legislation. But others think that elections, as such, are an important factor contributing to this problem. Authors have thus claimed that we should either fully replace (e.g., Guerrero, 2014; Van Reybrouck, 2016) or complement (e.g., Abizadeh, 2020; Arlen, 2019; Arlen & Rossi, 2020; Gastil & Wright, 2019; Landemore, 2020; McCormick, 2011) election-based political systems with empowered “lottocratic” political institutions (henceforth LPIs), wherein representatives are selected randomly from a relevant demographic and then frequently rotated.ⁱ This, some argue, would help solving the oligarchical tendencies of electoral democracy and better realize its normative aspirations.

This article has two distinct aims: First, to suggest that we should reconsider our optimism regarding the anti-oligarchic strength of LPIs. Second, to show how we can amend the design of LPIs to resist oligarchic capture, particularly by making them class-specific so that they are more explicitly oriented to the satisfaction of the interests of nonwealthy citizens. The reason for my moderate pessimism is that LPIs might suffer from similar oligarchic ills as those plaguing electoral systems. Under nonideal conditions, where there is significant wealth inequality and a power imbalance between, on the one hand, influential organized elites and, on the other, widely economically self-interested and politically unorganized citizens, many representatives in LPIs would still have strong incentives to neglect the pursuit of responsive and democratic outcomes—despite the presence of legal mechanisms of regulation. Call this the problem of incentives-based capture (henceforth PIC). Thus, my argument is that we must think beyond formal, legally based measures of regulation, and focus on informal mechanisms, particularly on how the prevalence of class-based solidarity among lottocratic representatives could counteract PIC. Drawing on recent “plebeian” approaches in democratic constitutional theory, I shall defend the claim that introducing class-specific criteria in institutional design can help to buttress a reluctance among representatives to follow wealth-generated incentives. Plebeian constitutionalists usually argue that selecting members only with that class-specific profile makes it more likely for them to develop bonds of solidarity. However, the role of class solidarity and the prioritization of plebeian interests in making a compelling case for anti-oligarchic LPIs has not been adequately explored in the current literature. Additionally, the normative implications of this perspective have not been sufficiently addressed. I expand on these points by discussing, on the one hand, the conceptual characteristics of class specificity and solidarity and how the former would reasonably maximize the latter. On the other hand, I argue that such an explanation entails a partisan vision of LPIs, in contrast to the centrality of impartial deliberation typically championed by lottocrats. The result is a stronger case for the anti-oligarchic potential and democratic justification of LPIs.

This article is structured as follows: Section 1 situates the argument in the context of the oligarchic tendencies of electoral-representative government, explaining the main benefits of sortition, and why LPIs may still be vulnerable to PIC. Section 2 defends and expands on plebeian constitutionalist approaches, emphasizing the significance of class-specificity in constructing anti-oligarchic LPIs. I then address the normative conflict between their explicitly partisan nature and the democratic value of impartial deliberation. Section 3 concludes by summarizing the argument and discussing several important limitations and challenges.

My view is that we must reply to the aforementioned question in the affirmative, and that it is worthy to explore how. Essentially, I believe that not only it is the case that the anti-oligarchic benefits of LPIs are significant (e.g., in eliminating many relevant sources of instrumental capture) but, importantly also that formal mechanisms of regulation are not the only means to counteract or reduce the influence of pro-wealth incentives. This section explores one such alternative, namely, the implementation of informal mechanisms of anti-oligarchic regulation within LPIs. Such mechanisms do not rely on legally enforceable measures, but rather on how representatives' behavior may be “internally” regulated, such as by adherence to organically developed anti-oligarchic norms or ethical codes. Expanding on “plebeian constitutionalist” contributions (e.g., Arlen, 2019; Arlen & Rossi, 2020; Hamilton, 2014; McCormick, 2011; Mulvad & Stahl, 2019), I argue more concretely that modeling LPIs along class-specific criteria can help create and strengthen such mechanisms, particularly through fostering forms of class solidarity among representatives. Let me start by briefly explaining the plebeian constitutionalist rationale for class-specific LPIs.

This article argued that, if we seek to meaningfully correct the oligarchic tendencies of representative government through the employment of LPIs, we should give more attention to the question of how to ground informal mechanisms of regulation within their inner workings. In particular, I claimed that class-specific random selection is likely to represent an attractive way of producing bonds of solidarity among representatives which, in turn, would make them reluctant to follow pro-wealth incentives. Expanding on the meaning and workings of class-based solidarity, I also claimed that such an account involves a partisan vision of LPIs which, despite clashing with the value of impartial deliberation, is worth pursuing.

I would like to finish by addressing certain observations regarding the practical and ethical constraints of my argument, as well as provide some insights on their relevance within an institutional framework for promoting egalitarian social change. Regarding empirical issues, there is no denying that this account is based on several controversial claims. For example, leaving aside the potential concern that the whole picture of widespread oligarchization presented is overly dramatic, some might want to contest the pessimism that I exposed regarding the ability of formal mechanisms of regulation to avoid capture, or the actual ability of class-specificity to enhance class-based solidarity. I have also bracketed important issues of institutional design, such as how to deal with the possibility that representatives selected on a random basis may be too “incompetent” to produce good policy—although there is important empirical evidence indicating the opposite (e.g., Pek, 2021, p. 202). Again, the problem is that these issues can only be addressed through experimentation (Guerrero, 2014, p. 178). My suggestion is that, given the longstanding failure of formal mechanisms of regulation to succeed in counteracting oligarchization, we have a strong presumptive case for trying alternatives such as the one presented here.

It is also true that my account is normatively incomplete. Among other things, some authors have leveled important general charges against LPIs—for example, Lafont's (2020) arguments that these institutions involve unjustified forms of blind deference over political decisions, because citizens who are not randomly selected would have few mechanisms to control the content of their decisions. I have also not addressed important targeted objections to class-specific LPIs—such as the idea that all defensible conceptions of democracy must secure formal political equality always, regardless of the outcomes that they could produce (e.g., Urbinati, 2011; Vergara, 2020).^xviii Such objections are important and legitimate, and a better democratic case for class-specific LPIs should address them at length. But, in this context, I will limit myself to saying that the very option of a complementary road to constitutionalizing these institutions serves as a preliminary reply—since it retains, within the political system, other institutions which fare better in materializing the values that generate these objections and work as a check on LPIs. On the one hand, this is the case because, although LPIs (class-specific or not) might entail problems of blind deference, we must remember that they can be made compatible with formal mechanisms of regulation and accountability, such as “…recall processes, oaths of office, training, disclosure requirements, and penalties for bribery” (Pek, 2021, p. 202). Again, the point has never been that such mechanisms are useless, but rather that they have shown to be insufficient on their own. On the other hand, and more importantly, under the complementary road, LPIs would be checked by other institutions, either electoral or judicial, and so on (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 92). Furthermore, class-specific LPIs can coexist with other electoral institutions based on universal enfranchisement, which might mitigate liberal anxieties about formal political equality. Again, while incomplete, there are promising routes for a more comprehensive defense of these institutions.

Finally, there are also important questions about what we should expect from—and how to implement—this plebeian constitutionalist proposal within the framework of existing political systems. While I have already clarified that I do not think there is sufficient reason to completely replace electoral systems, and that the successful application and design of LPIs depends on several contextual and practical issues, it is also fundamental to reaffirm, as many plebeian constitutionalists do, that they are surely not sufficient to curb oligarchic influence or correct all the challenges confronting contemporary democracies (Arlen & Rossi, 2020, p. 18). Rather, doing so would undoubtedly necessitate a “…radical redistribution of social and economic power” (Bagg, 2018, p. 902) which can only realistically arise from poor-led activism and grassroots social movements (Deveaux, 2021) in conjunction with progressive political parties gaining power (Gastil & Wright, 2019, p. 32; Wright, 2019, p. 43). Along similar lines, there are very good reasons to doubt that current political elites would implement LPIs without the pressure of other strong political agents pushing them to do so (Mulvad & Popp-Madsen, 2021, p. 87). But this seems to suggest that LPIs are functionally redundant since their materialization relies on a politically empowered plebeian, a unified political subject. Why then bother designing institutions politically empowering them if they are already empowered? My view is that, while this objection certainly applies to those who disentangle the achievement of progressive ends through institutional innovation from the struggle of the popular masses, it does not for those who unite them—and that is the perspective defended here. Popular movements supported by political parties are essential, but so are institutional channels for ordinary people to effectively resist organized oligarchic power sustainably (Mulvad & Stahl, 2019, p. 603).^xix Egalitarian democrats interested in realizing their aspirations should emphasize the importance of both elements, not only one.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).