{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12575","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12575","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Subsidiarity, Federalism, and Beyond","authors":"Erika Arban","doi":"10.1111/josp.70012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"369-377"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145296971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Jewish Roots of Subsidiarity and Its Consequences for Modern Political Theory","authors":"Pablo Ortúzar-Madrid","doi":"10.1111/josp.70008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"437-446"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145296978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Subsidiarity frustrates. Emerging from Catholic roots to become an explicit part of EU law,<sup>1</sup> the principle admits of clear articulation as an ideal (‘vest authority as close as feasible to those most affected’) but then invites conflicting interpretations and elaborations.</p><p>As a workable principle, subsidiarity founders seemingly when we need it most: when we ask what, precisely, that principle regulates. Andreas Føllesdal has shown that distinct interpretations of subsidiarity have strikingly incongruous political implications, with any “apparent consensus … gained only by obfuscation” (Føllesdal <span>1998</span>, 190). And as a moral precept, subsidiarity promises a politics sensitive to diverse needs and responsive to local knowledge; yet in practice, any implementation of the ideal pulls us back toward an authoritative center to regulate disputes and coordinate all of this local wisdom. Jenna Bednar describes subsidiarity as “the soul of federalism” (Bednar <span>2014</span>, 231) and she has in mind two complementary rationales: ensuring that political power is close to the people affected, while also finding efficient ways to satisfy diverse preferences. Of particular interest in Bednar's account is the epistemic role for subsidiarity in bringing a wider range of perspectives to bear on judging new policies than might otherwise be the case in a more centralized system. Here, then, the justification of subsidiarity appeals to efficiency and accountability, not simply for any given snapshot of needs, interests, and associated policies, but also (and more critically) to the constitutional and administrative system as a whole.<sup>2</sup> Still, these epistemic hopes for subsidiarity seem to assume, as Jacob Levy puts it, “a fantastic level of competence, knowledge, and disinterestedness on the part of the body that allocates decision-making authority in each case—itself usually one of the contenders for the authority at stake” (Levy <span>2007</span>, 462).</p><p>I love subsidiarity for these frustrations and ambiguities. In this respect, it is the perfect moral maxim for the real worlds of political institutions and practices, where most of us, most of the time, muddle through the messy day-to-day complexities of living together, while leaving space for dissent and resistance.</p><p>Levy argues that subsidiarity “fails as an institutional decision rule,” but he prefaces that indictment with the thought that it “may offer a useful critical language” (Levy <span>2007</span>, 462). That, I think, is a thought worth pursuing. Perhaps we will be less frustrated with subsidiarity if we see it not primarily as a decision rule or principle of institutional design, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as an essential challenge to the dominant vocabulary of the sovereign territorial state?</p><p>To be sure, subsidiarity labors under the long shadow of the Westphalian imaginary, a vision of politics anchored in justifying coercion
{"title":"Subsidiarity in the Shadow of Sovereignty","authors":"Loren King","doi":"10.1111/josp.70014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70014","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Subsidiarity frustrates. Emerging from Catholic roots to become an explicit part of EU law,<sup>1</sup> the principle admits of clear articulation as an ideal (‘vest authority as close as feasible to those most affected’) but then invites conflicting interpretations and elaborations.</p><p>As a workable principle, subsidiarity founders seemingly when we need it most: when we ask what, precisely, that principle regulates. Andreas Føllesdal has shown that distinct interpretations of subsidiarity have strikingly incongruous political implications, with any “apparent consensus … gained only by obfuscation” (Føllesdal <span>1998</span>, 190). And as a moral precept, subsidiarity promises a politics sensitive to diverse needs and responsive to local knowledge; yet in practice, any implementation of the ideal pulls us back toward an authoritative center to regulate disputes and coordinate all of this local wisdom. Jenna Bednar describes subsidiarity as “the soul of federalism” (Bednar <span>2014</span>, 231) and she has in mind two complementary rationales: ensuring that political power is close to the people affected, while also finding efficient ways to satisfy diverse preferences. Of particular interest in Bednar's account is the epistemic role for subsidiarity in bringing a wider range of perspectives to bear on judging new policies than might otherwise be the case in a more centralized system. Here, then, the justification of subsidiarity appeals to efficiency and accountability, not simply for any given snapshot of needs, interests, and associated policies, but also (and more critically) to the constitutional and administrative system as a whole.<sup>2</sup> Still, these epistemic hopes for subsidiarity seem to assume, as Jacob Levy puts it, “a fantastic level of competence, knowledge, and disinterestedness on the part of the body that allocates decision-making authority in each case—itself usually one of the contenders for the authority at stake” (Levy <span>2007</span>, 462).</p><p>I love subsidiarity for these frustrations and ambiguities. In this respect, it is the perfect moral maxim for the real worlds of political institutions and practices, where most of us, most of the time, muddle through the messy day-to-day complexities of living together, while leaving space for dissent and resistance.</p><p>Levy argues that subsidiarity “fails as an institutional decision rule,” but he prefaces that indictment with the thought that it “may offer a useful critical language” (Levy <span>2007</span>, 462). That, I think, is a thought worth pursuing. Perhaps we will be less frustrated with subsidiarity if we see it not primarily as a decision rule or principle of institutional design, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as an essential challenge to the dominant vocabulary of the sovereign territorial state?</p><p>To be sure, subsidiarity labors under the long shadow of the Westphalian imaginary, a vision of politics anchored in justifying coercion","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"427-436"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Subsidiarity is a principle holding that final decision-making authority (viz., the power not to have another entity substitute its own decisions, issue fines, etc.) should presumptively belong to the candidate authority claimant “closest” to the decision or those affected by or subject to that decision.1 Most definitions of subsidiarity include a proviso holding that its constitutive presumption only applies where a unit is capable of addressing the underlying issue.2 When faced with questions concerning who should have the final word on decisions about a given subject (education, healthcare, defense, etc.) or particular issues (whether to permit minority schools, require vaccines, go to war, etc.), in other words, one should presumptively favor the “closest” unit capable of addressing the subject or issue.
Subsidiarity so understood has a long historical pedigree. While scholars debate whether earlier arguments favoring the authority of closer decision-making units are continuous with the contemporary concept of subsidiarity—and whether it even makes sense to talk of “closer” units—(at least) analogous concepts appear throughout the history of political thought.3 Key historical figures, like Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and Johannes Althusius are often read as supporting analogous principles, if not subsidiarity itself.4 Recent work suggests comparable concepts have appeared across the globe, potentially assuaging concerns that subsidiarity is irremediably tied to Western preconceptions.5
Subsidiarity also plays prominent roles in diverse contemporary legal and political debates. It features or is often invoked in international law, European Union law, and many states' domestic constitutional laws—and features prominently in doctrinal and normative analyses of international, regional, and domestic governance. It is raised in relevant debates to identify the entities that could possess constitutional or devolved authority in states; guide the allocation of authority to those bodies; structure international law; establish boundaries of transnational authority; constitute state boundaries; keep peace; or justify transfers of funds between entities.6 It is thus raised to explain why and when, for example, Germany should be able to make decisions independent of the E.U. and why its länder (known in other countries as states, provinces, cantons, etc.) should be able to make decisions free from central/federal government interference. Depending on the domain in which it applies, subsidiarity can impact everything from who is in a state (if, e.g., Germany should set immigration policy) to health outcomes (if, e.g., Saxony should control health policy). Subsidiarity is not, however, only invoked in constitutional contexts. To wit, it also features in persistent debates about the relationship between the state and other entities that claim authority. It is, for example,
{"title":"Subsidiarity as a Normative Political Concept: Contemporary and Historical Reflections","authors":"Michael Da Silva, Daniel Weinstock","doi":"10.1111/josp.70013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70013","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Subsidiarity is a principle holding that final decision-making authority (viz., the power not to have another entity substitute its own decisions, issue fines, etc.) should presumptively belong to the candidate authority claimant “closest” to the decision or those affected by or subject to that decision.<sup>1</sup> Most definitions of subsidiarity include a proviso holding that its constitutive presumption only applies where a unit is capable of addressing the underlying issue.<sup>2</sup> When faced with questions concerning who should have the final word on decisions about a given subject (education, healthcare, defense, etc.) or particular issues (whether to permit minority schools, require vaccines, go to war, etc.), in other words, one should presumptively favor the “closest” unit capable of addressing the subject or issue.</p><p>Subsidiarity so understood has a long historical pedigree. While scholars debate whether earlier arguments favoring the authority of closer decision-making units are continuous with the contemporary concept of subsidiarity—and whether it even makes sense to talk of “closer” units—(at least) analogous concepts appear throughout the history of political thought.<sup>3</sup> Key historical figures, like Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and Johannes Althusius are often read as supporting analogous principles, if not subsidiarity itself.<sup>4</sup> Recent work suggests comparable concepts have appeared across the globe, potentially assuaging concerns that subsidiarity is irremediably tied to Western preconceptions.<sup>5</sup></p><p>Subsidiarity also plays prominent roles in diverse contemporary legal and political debates. It features or is often invoked in international law, European Union law, and many states' domestic constitutional laws—and features prominently in doctrinal and normative analyses of international, regional, and domestic governance. It is raised in relevant debates to identify the entities that could possess constitutional or devolved authority in states; guide the allocation of authority to those bodies; structure international law; establish boundaries of transnational authority; constitute state boundaries; keep peace; or justify transfers of funds between entities.<sup>6</sup> It is thus raised to explain why and when, for example, Germany should be able to make decisions independent of the E.U. and why its länder (known in other countries as states, provinces, cantons, etc.) should be able to make decisions free from central/federal government interference. Depending on the domain in which it applies, subsidiarity can impact everything from who is in a state (if, e.g., Germany should set immigration policy) to health outcomes (if, e.g., Saxony should control health policy). Subsidiarity is not, however, only invoked in constitutional contexts. To wit, it also features in persistent debates about the relationship between the state and other entities that claim authority. It is, for example, ","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"363-368"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The question whether the principle of subsidiarity can apply in a given legal or political order is not systematically addressed in subsidiarity research.<sup>1</sup> An explanation is that the conditions under which subsidiarity can apply appear to be straightforward and undemanding. They are already met, it may seem, wherever there is a government hierarchy. Two levels suffice. Authority should then be allocated to, or exercised at, the lower level, according to the principle of subsidiarity.</p><p>The premise of this article<sup>2</sup> is that the applicability conditions of subsidiarity are not as straightforward and undemanding as may seem. One claim in this article is that the conditions vary with the specific conception of subsidiarity that is adopted. Not all conceptions presuppose a government hierarchy. Some conceptions presuppose an assistance relation between smaller and larger units of authority (Cahill <span>2017</span>). Another claim is that the applicability conditions of these conceptions are not always met. And this is not necessarily a flaw of the legal order in question. In some legal orders, the principle of subsidiarity is simply out of place, inconsistent with the structure that these orders ought to have in light of principles of democracy and rule of law. It is therefore crucial, I propose, to study the conditions under which a conception of subsidiarity can apply and to examine whether those conditions are met, or could be met, by the legal order in which the principle is supposed to apply. Ideally, the literature should relate subsidiarity conceptions to types of legal orders. The conditions of applicability connect the two.</p><p>Within the confines of this article, I cannot present a comprehensive theory of subsidiarity and the conditions of this principle's application, in which a typology of conceptions is related to a typology of legal orders. What I can do here, however, is illustrate a more integrated approach to subsidiarity in which conceptions and their conditions of application are confronted with kinds of legal order. The question that I shall address in this article is whether subsidiarity can apply in the case of the European Union. The answer to that question is surely important in itself (Section 3.2) but the aim here is also to develop, in the course of the case study, an integrated approach to subsidiarity and legal order. This approach can then be used and further developed in other cases. I shall argue that the applicability conditions of the hierarchical and the assistance conception of subsidiarity are not met in the case of the European Union (hereafter also: EU). I explain as well why the principle that is referred to as subsidiarity within EU law is not a principle of subsidiarity. It has the name but not the defining feature of the principle. I also ask whether the EU legal order should be transformed to make room for subsidiarity. I argue for a negative answer. In the final section, I col
{"title":"No Place for Subsidiarity in the European Union. An Integrated Approach to Subsidiarity and Legal Order","authors":"Bertjan Wolthuis","doi":"10.1111/josp.70010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70010","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The question whether the principle of subsidiarity can apply in a given legal or political order is not systematically addressed in subsidiarity research.<sup>1</sup> An explanation is that the conditions under which subsidiarity can apply appear to be straightforward and undemanding. They are already met, it may seem, wherever there is a government hierarchy. Two levels suffice. Authority should then be allocated to, or exercised at, the lower level, according to the principle of subsidiarity.</p><p>The premise of this article<sup>2</sup> is that the applicability conditions of subsidiarity are not as straightforward and undemanding as may seem. One claim in this article is that the conditions vary with the specific conception of subsidiarity that is adopted. Not all conceptions presuppose a government hierarchy. Some conceptions presuppose an assistance relation between smaller and larger units of authority (Cahill <span>2017</span>). Another claim is that the applicability conditions of these conceptions are not always met. And this is not necessarily a flaw of the legal order in question. In some legal orders, the principle of subsidiarity is simply out of place, inconsistent with the structure that these orders ought to have in light of principles of democracy and rule of law. It is therefore crucial, I propose, to study the conditions under which a conception of subsidiarity can apply and to examine whether those conditions are met, or could be met, by the legal order in which the principle is supposed to apply. Ideally, the literature should relate subsidiarity conceptions to types of legal orders. The conditions of applicability connect the two.</p><p>Within the confines of this article, I cannot present a comprehensive theory of subsidiarity and the conditions of this principle's application, in which a typology of conceptions is related to a typology of legal orders. What I can do here, however, is illustrate a more integrated approach to subsidiarity in which conceptions and their conditions of application are confronted with kinds of legal order. The question that I shall address in this article is whether subsidiarity can apply in the case of the European Union. The answer to that question is surely important in itself (Section 3.2) but the aim here is also to develop, in the course of the case study, an integrated approach to subsidiarity and legal order. This approach can then be used and further developed in other cases. I shall argue that the applicability conditions of the hierarchical and the assistance conception of subsidiarity are not met in the case of the European Union (hereafter also: EU). I explain as well why the principle that is referred to as subsidiarity within EU law is not a principle of subsidiarity. It has the name but not the defining feature of the principle. I also ask whether the EU legal order should be transformed to make room for subsidiarity. I argue for a negative answer. In the final section, I col","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"378-388"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Subsidiarity: Normative Principles for Authority Allocation in Democracies","authors":"Colin W. Rowe","doi":"10.1111/josp.70009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"389-400"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>Subsidiarity typically refers to the presumption that issues should be addressed at the most “local” level capable of addressing them. The nature of the presumption, how to specify the “local” and the entities with valid claims, and how to interpret “capability” remain contested. Yet these basic features figure in most accounts of subsidiarity.<sup>1</sup> Subsidiarity so-understood is asked to play numerous roles in numerous contexts.<sup>2</sup> Yet dominant historical and contemporary accounts thereof can be broadly distinguished along two types detailed below: those seeking to use subsidiarity as a guide to constitutional ordering within legal systems and those seeking to use it as a guide to the appropriate relationship between groups each claiming domains of authority. These purposes are distinct even where related. Whether uses of the term “subsidiarity” for each consistently refer to the same concept, let alone one historically continuous concept, is debatable.</p><p>This article argues that subsidiarity is more likely to make a distinct contribution to moral ontology when addressing the relationship between groups claiming distinct domains of authority, particularly as between states and intermediate groups like churches and universities. Deflationary critiques suggest that subsidiarity cannot play its intended constitutional ordering roles. Continuing to use the term in constitutional debates threatens confusion, which is exacerbated where the same term is frequently and aptly used to refer to a distinct concept operating in another normative domain. The term should be reserved for that other domain.</p><p>My argument proceeds as follows. First, I outline intended historical and contemporary uses of “subsidiarity.” Next, I detail why subsidiarity is unlikely to play a distinct role in constitutional ordering. Then, I explain how subsidiarity can play its intended role outside constitutional contexts. A conclusion outlines some implications of my findings. The mix of historical and conceptual/normative analyses throughout is non-standard in analytic political philosophy but appropriate here for at least three reasons. First, it places the piece in conversation and continuity with existing scholarship. Subsidiarity is a social, rather than natural, phenomenon. Most contemporary work thereon accordingly contains historical and normative components.<sup>3</sup></p><p>Second, attending to historical and normative considerations better fulfills relevant conceptual desiderata. A theory of a political concept should, plausibly, identify its distinct contribution to moral ontology and licit and illicit uses of the term. It should also offer a means of evaluating whether the concept can play its intended normative role(s). Attending to the specific problems subsidiarity has been asked to play helps identify its possible normative roles and referents, thereby providing a target for analysis. A theory will be better, all else being equal, if the
{"title":"Subsidiarity, States, and Intermediate Groups: Maintaining Subsidiarity's Distinct Contribution to Moral Philosophy","authors":"Michael Da Silva","doi":"10.1111/josp.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.70002","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Subsidiarity typically refers to the presumption that issues should be addressed at the most “local” level capable of addressing them. The nature of the presumption, how to specify the “local” and the entities with valid claims, and how to interpret “capability” remain contested. Yet these basic features figure in most accounts of subsidiarity.<sup>1</sup> Subsidiarity so-understood is asked to play numerous roles in numerous contexts.<sup>2</sup> Yet dominant historical and contemporary accounts thereof can be broadly distinguished along two types detailed below: those seeking to use subsidiarity as a guide to constitutional ordering within legal systems and those seeking to use it as a guide to the appropriate relationship between groups each claiming domains of authority. These purposes are distinct even where related. Whether uses of the term “subsidiarity” for each consistently refer to the same concept, let alone one historically continuous concept, is debatable.</p><p>This article argues that subsidiarity is more likely to make a distinct contribution to moral ontology when addressing the relationship between groups claiming distinct domains of authority, particularly as between states and intermediate groups like churches and universities. Deflationary critiques suggest that subsidiarity cannot play its intended constitutional ordering roles. Continuing to use the term in constitutional debates threatens confusion, which is exacerbated where the same term is frequently and aptly used to refer to a distinct concept operating in another normative domain. The term should be reserved for that other domain.</p><p>My argument proceeds as follows. First, I outline intended historical and contemporary uses of “subsidiarity.” Next, I detail why subsidiarity is unlikely to play a distinct role in constitutional ordering. Then, I explain how subsidiarity can play its intended role outside constitutional contexts. A conclusion outlines some implications of my findings. The mix of historical and conceptual/normative analyses throughout is non-standard in analytic political philosophy but appropriate here for at least three reasons. First, it places the piece in conversation and continuity with existing scholarship. Subsidiarity is a social, rather than natural, phenomenon. Most contemporary work thereon accordingly contains historical and normative components.<sup>3</sup></p><p>Second, attending to historical and normative considerations better fulfills relevant conceptual desiderata. A theory of a political concept should, plausibly, identify its distinct contribution to moral ontology and licit and illicit uses of the term. It should also offer a means of evaluating whether the concept can play its intended normative role(s). Attending to the specific problems subsidiarity has been asked to play helps identify its possible normative roles and referents, thereby providing a target for analysis. A theory will be better, all else being equal, if the","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"412-426"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.70002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information - NASSP Page","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/josp.12572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12572","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/josp.12572","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144244307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Subsidiarity and Public Reason: Two Cheers Are Quite Enough","authors":"Andreas Follesdal","doi":"10.1111/josp.12607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12607","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46756,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Philosophy","volume":"56 3","pages":"401-411"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145297634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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