Strategic alliances and shared auditors

IF 6.1 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-05-10 DOI:10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101271
Mufaddal Baxamusa , Anand Jha , K.K. Raman
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Abstract

Strategic alliances are voluntary corporate arrangements for mutual benefit. Although alliances are common as an alternative to M&As, they require cooperation between alliance partners who continue to operate as independent companies. Thus, relational risk—the probability and consequences of unsatisfactory cooperation or opportunistic behavior—is inherent in alliances and a major determinant of alliance success. In this paper, we examine and find that alliance announcement CARs are higher for companies sharing the same auditor with their alliance partner. Further, our findings suggest that the shared auditor effect is stronger for alliances where potential relational risk between alliance partners is greater. Our findings hold when we use “withdrawn” (i.e., the withdrawal of an announced alliance before its start date) as an alternative, albeit inverse, measure of alliance success. Collectively, we provide novel evidence which suggests that auditors add shareholder value by playing a matchmaking role in alliance formation, building inter-company trust and mitigating relational risk by facilitating the sharing of non-financial information between potential alliance partners among their audit clients.

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战略联盟和共享审计师
战略联盟是企业自愿做出的互利安排。虽然联盟作为并购的一种替代方式很常见,但联盟需要联盟伙伴之间的合作,而这些伙伴仍作为独立公司运营。因此,关系风险--合作不尽如人意或机会主义行为的概率和后果--是联盟的内在因素,也是联盟成功与否的主要决定因素。在本文中,我们研究发现,与联盟伙伴共享同一审计师的公司的联盟公告资本充足率更高。此外,我们的研究结果表明,在联盟伙伴之间潜在关系风险较大的联盟中,共享审计师效应更强。当我们使用 "联盟撤销"(即在联盟开始日期前撤销已宣布的联盟)作为联盟成功与否的替代衡量标准时,我们的研究结果仍然成立。总之,我们提供的新证据表明,审计师通过在联盟形成过程中牵线搭桥,建立公司间信任,并通过促进审计客户潜在联盟伙伴之间共享非财务信息来降低关系风险,从而增加股东价值。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.70
自引率
9.30%
发文量
78
审稿时长
34 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Stability provides an international forum for rigorous theoretical and empirical macro and micro economic and financial analysis of the causes, management, resolution and preventions of financial crises, including banking, securities market, payments and currency crises. The primary focus is on applied research that would be useful in affecting public policy with respect to financial stability. Thus, the Journal seeks to promote interaction among researchers, policy-makers and practitioners to identify potential risks to financial stability and develop means for preventing, mitigating or managing these risks both within and across countries.
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