Evolutionary game analysis on cross-border cooperative R&D of intelligent new energy vehicle industry

Abstract

Purpose

Intelligent new energy vehicles (INEVs) are becoming the competitive hotspot for the automobile industry. The major purpose of this study is to determine how to increase innovation efficiency through knowledge sharing and technology spill between new energy vehicle (NEV) enterprises and technology enterprises. This will help to improve the core competence of the automobile industry in China. Also, it serves as a guide for the growth of other strategic.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors construct a tripartite evolutionary game model to study the cross-border cooperative innovation problem. Firstly, the payment matrix of NEV enterprise, technology enterprise and government is established, and the expected revenue of each participant is determined. Then, the replication dynamic equations and evolutionary stability strategies are analyzed. Finally, the theoretical research is validated through numerical simulation.

Findings

Results showed that: (1) An optimal range of revenue distribution coefficient exists in the cross-border cooperation. (2) Factors like research and development (R&D) success rate, subsidies, resource and technology complementarity, and vehicles intelligence positively influence the evolution towards cooperative strategies. (3) Factors like technology spillover risk cost inhibit the evolution towards cooperative strategies. To be specific, when the technology spillover risk cost is greater than 2.5, two enterprises are inclined to choose independent R&D, and the government chooses to provide subsidy.

Research limitations/implications

The research perspective and theoretical analysis are helpful to further explore the cross-border cooperation of the intelligent automobile industry. The findings suggest that the government can optimize the subsidy policy according to the R&D capability and resource allocation of automobile industry. Moreover, measures are needed to reduce the risk of technology spillovers to encourage enterprise to collaborate and innovate. The results can provide reference for enterprises’ strategic choice and government’s policy making.

Originality/value

The INEV industry has become an important development direction of the global automobile industry. However, there is limited research on cross-border cooperation of INEV industry. Hence, authors construct a tripartite evolutionary game model involving NEV enterprise, technology enterprise and the government, and explore the relationship of cooperation and competition among players in the INEV industry, which provides a new perspective for the development of the INEV industry.