Does the military lose public confidence without compliance with civilian control? Experimental evidence from Japan

Abstract

The military’s compliance with civilian control – a requisite of democracy – is believed to be a key determinant of public confidence in the military. However, this claim is empirically inconclusive, and its analytical framework is underdeveloped at an institutional and individual level. Furthermore, most extant studies focus on the USA, and its validity in other environments is unknown. Hence, this study examined the causal relationship via an online survey experiment using hypothetical scenarios in Japan, an established democracy with a considerable armed force and civil–military norms imported from the USA decades ago. The results showed that the Japanese participants significantly lost their trust in the military for incompliance with civilian control amid an armed conflict. However, the magnitude of the impact was context-dependent; it substantially differed per the directions of incompliance (arbitrary action or inaction), the actors involved in the control (the prime minister and legislature), and the respondents’ attributes (partisanship). These findings reduce empirical inconclusiveness regarding the mechanism of public confidence in the military and could help to detect ominous signs regarding public attitudes toward democratic principles in modern society. Moreover, this study provides clues to understanding what people in Japan think about the aspect of control of their de facto military and how they evaluate this organization. These findings have significant implications for understanding international security dynamics, particularly at a time when Japan is launching its largest arms build-up since World War II to make its defense budget the third-largest worldwide, after the USA and China.