Pub Date : 2024-10-12DOI: 10.1177/00223433241261551
Kari Paasonen
It is often proposed that the young unemployed are more likely to engage in political violence, conflicts, and protests. One problem in studying the unemployed – especially in the Global South – are the blurred lines between the unemployed, the employed, and those working in the informal sector. Further, the employed are a heterogeneous group so employment quality might also play an important role. To tackle these issues, this study uses a new quantitative dataset, which covers youth in five Middle Eastern and North African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. These data provide considerably more fine-grained information about the employment situations of the respondents than the datasets previously used. The study investigates separately two forms of political participation: in political violence and in demonstrations. The regression analyses show that there is no clear difference between the young unemployed and the young employed in their likelihood to participate in the studied political activities. However, some features related to employment matter. Those whose employment status is ambiguous are substantially more likely to participate in demonstrations and political violence than the employed. Among those who work, those who are dissatisfied with their work and those who work fewer hours participate more often in these activities. Income on its own does not seem to have an effect; however, those who have more assets are more likely to participate, and compared to those who feel themselves middle income, those feeling rich or poor are more likely to engage in political violence and demonstrations. The results suggest that instead of thinking in terms of a dichotomy of the employed and unemployed, more emphasis should be placed on understanding the variety of employment situations and employment quality and their impact on political instability.
{"title":"It’s not just about jobs: The significance of employment quality for participation in political violence and protests in selected Arab Mediterranean countries","authors":"Kari Paasonen","doi":"10.1177/00223433241261551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241261551","url":null,"abstract":"It is often proposed that the young unemployed are more likely to engage in political violence, conflicts, and protests. One problem in studying the unemployed – especially in the Global South – are the blurred lines between the unemployed, the employed, and those working in the informal sector. Further, the employed are a heterogeneous group so employment quality might also play an important role. To tackle these issues, this study uses a new quantitative dataset, which covers youth in five Middle Eastern and North African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. These data provide considerably more fine-grained information about the employment situations of the respondents than the datasets previously used. The study investigates separately two forms of political participation: in political violence and in demonstrations. The regression analyses show that there is no clear difference between the young unemployed and the young employed in their likelihood to participate in the studied political activities. However, some features related to employment matter. Those whose employment status is ambiguous are substantially more likely to participate in demonstrations and political violence than the employed. Among those who work, those who are dissatisfied with their work and those who work fewer hours participate more often in these activities. Income on its own does not seem to have an effect; however, those who have more assets are more likely to participate, and compared to those who feel themselves middle income, those feeling rich or poor are more likely to engage in political violence and demonstrations. The results suggest that instead of thinking in terms of a dichotomy of the employed and unemployed, more emphasis should be placed on understanding the variety of employment situations and employment quality and their impact on political instability.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142415573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-28DOI: 10.1177/00223433241256274
Paul L Johnson, Max Z Margulies
This article tests whether social distance between the military and society leads soldiers to refrain from violence against protesters, and how that expectation affects the regime’s decision of whether to deploy the military in the first place. In contrast with previous research that primarily examined aggregated protest campaigns and often in geographically limited samples, this study is conducted at the micro-level using daily event data. It employs the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System dataset to identify more than 36,000 protest-day events in 168 countries between 1997 and 2015, coding whether and how soldiers responded. In addition, this study also demonstrates theoretically and empirically the need to differentiate conscription from the military participation rate as measures of social distance. Contrary to expectations, it does not find evidence that conscription results in a lower likelihood of violence or deters the regime from deploying soldiers to put down protests, and it finds only weak evidence that higher military participation rate results in a lower likelihood of violence. It also finds that conscription increases rather than decreases the likelihood of soldiers being deployed against protests.
{"title":"Divided loyalty: Are broadly recruited militaries less likely to repress nonviolent antigovernment protests?","authors":"Paul L Johnson, Max Z Margulies","doi":"10.1177/00223433241256274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241256274","url":null,"abstract":"This article tests whether social distance between the military and society leads soldiers to refrain from violence against protesters, and how that expectation affects the regime’s decision of whether to deploy the military in the first place. In contrast with previous research that primarily examined aggregated protest campaigns and often in geographically limited samples, this study is conducted at the micro-level using daily event data. It employs the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System dataset to identify more than 36,000 protest-day events in 168 countries between 1997 and 2015, coding whether and how soldiers responded. In addition, this study also demonstrates theoretically and empirically the need to differentiate conscription from the military participation rate as measures of social distance. Contrary to expectations, it does not find evidence that conscription results in a lower likelihood of violence or deters the regime from deploying soldiers to put down protests, and it finds only weak evidence that higher military participation rate results in a lower likelihood of violence. It also finds that conscription increases rather than decreases the likelihood of soldiers being deployed against protests.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142329043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-28DOI: 10.1177/00223433241265057
Gino Pauselli
Why do people support promoting human rights? Common explanations center on the characteristics of states or individuals, particularly ideology. In this study, I focus on the role of empathy for outgroups. Contact theory suggests that intergroup contact reduces prejudice and increases support for outgroup members. I argue that empathy for outgroups increases support for defending the rights of foreigners abroad. Testing this argument is challenging given selection biases and the potential confounding effects of high prejudice and alternative norms. I use geocoded public opinion data from 35 African countries to study the level of contact with outgroups and its impact on preferences for promoting rights overseas. I use the geographic distance to the nearest international border and border crossing as a novel measure of contact with outgroups and find that the closer an individual is to an international land border or an international crossing point, the higher their support for preventing human rights abuses in other countries. These results are robust to a battery of covariates, robustness checks, and model specifications. In addition, the study shows that border hardening reduces support for human rights policies, while proximity to international borders is not correlated with other potential confounders such as concerns about security and migration. Overall, this study provides evidence that border zones, despite being the edge of sovereignty, generate stakeholders for human rights.
{"title":"Mapping advocacy support: Geographic proximity to outgroups and human rights promotion","authors":"Gino Pauselli","doi":"10.1177/00223433241265057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241265057","url":null,"abstract":"Why do people support promoting human rights? Common explanations center on the characteristics of states or individuals, particularly ideology. In this study, I focus on the role of empathy for outgroups. Contact theory suggests that intergroup contact reduces prejudice and increases support for outgroup members. I argue that empathy for outgroups increases support for defending the rights of foreigners abroad. Testing this argument is challenging given selection biases and the potential confounding effects of high prejudice and alternative norms. I use geocoded public opinion data from 35 African countries to study the level of contact with outgroups and its impact on preferences for promoting rights overseas. I use the geographic distance to the nearest international border and border crossing as a novel measure of contact with outgroups and find that the closer an individual is to an international land border or an international crossing point, the higher their support for preventing human rights abuses in other countries. These results are robust to a battery of covariates, robustness checks, and model specifications. In addition, the study shows that border hardening reduces support for human rights policies, while proximity to international borders is not correlated with other potential confounders such as concerns about security and migration. Overall, this study provides evidence that border zones, despite being the edge of sovereignty, generate stakeholders for human rights.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142329041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-27DOI: 10.1177/00223433241258368
Hans Jonas Gunzelmann
What drives the cohesion of secessionist movements? Previous research emphasized the role of internal and external factors but produced mixed results regarding their effects. This article advances scholarship on this question by examining the role of critical junctures as periods of heightened contingency that can shift movements towards fragmentation or cohesion. It focuses on independence referendums and how states respond to them as important critical junctures, and on how they shape interorganizational relations as a key dimension of movement cohesion. Empirically, it explores the effects of the 2017 referendum in Catalonia using a mixed-methods research design that combines qualitative inquiry with network analyses of protest event data. The network analyses showed that the movement was notably less cohesive in the protest arena after the referendum than during the referendum campaign. Qualitative materials were employed to inductively identify strategy framing processes as key mechanisms to explain this development. Frame alignment around the referendum as a shared goal led to more cohesion during the campaign. After the event, a frame dispute over the meaning of the referendum led to diverging strategies and fragmented the movement, as state repression limited the movement’s room for maneuver. The findings suggest that research on secessionist movement cohesion should pay more attention to critical junctures and how secessionists make sense of them.
{"title":"How critical junctures shape secessionist movement cohesion: Strategies, framing processes, and interorganizational relations before and after the 2017 referendum in Catalonia","authors":"Hans Jonas Gunzelmann","doi":"10.1177/00223433241258368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241258368","url":null,"abstract":"What drives the cohesion of secessionist movements? Previous research emphasized the role of internal and external factors but produced mixed results regarding their effects. This article advances scholarship on this question by examining the role of critical junctures as periods of heightened contingency that can shift movements towards fragmentation or cohesion. It focuses on independence referendums and how states respond to them as important critical junctures, and on how they shape interorganizational relations as a key dimension of movement cohesion. Empirically, it explores the effects of the 2017 referendum in Catalonia using a mixed-methods research design that combines qualitative inquiry with network analyses of protest event data. The network analyses showed that the movement was notably less cohesive in the protest arena after the referendum than during the referendum campaign. Qualitative materials were employed to inductively identify strategy framing processes as key mechanisms to explain this development. Frame alignment around the referendum as a shared goal led to more cohesion during the campaign. After the event, a frame dispute over the meaning of the referendum led to diverging strategies and fragmented the movement, as state repression limited the movement’s room for maneuver. The findings suggest that research on secessionist movement cohesion should pay more attention to critical junctures and how secessionists make sense of them.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142328629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-21DOI: 10.1177/00223433241261566
Michael C Horowitz, Joshua A Schwartz
The reconnaissance strike complex is synonymous with modern military power, and prominent realist theories would have predicted rapid proliferation after its successful debut in the Gulf War. Instead, the complex has proliferated slowly. To explain this puzzle, we theorize that interstate security threats significantly impact proliferation, but not in the way traditionally presumed. Although the literature on weapons proliferation has largely assumed a monotonically increasing relationship should hold between the capabilities of a state’s adversaries and a state’s own capability, we draw from the economics literature and game theoretic insights from political science to argue that the relationship should resemble an inverted-U. When states have rivals with moderate reconnaissance strike capabilities, they have security incentives to compete with them. However, when states face highly advanced adversaries, it becomes more difficult to escape or match their competition, making symmetrical acquisition less appealing. While most prior research focuses on narrower aspects of the reconnaissance strike complex like missiles or smart bombs, we test our theory on a novel dataset tracking country-level acquisition of eight aspects of the complex from 1980 to 2017: Ballistic missiles; bombers; cruise missiles; fighter aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; precision-guided munitions; satellites; and submarines. We find strong support for our inverted-U argument. States that have rivals with moderate reconnaissance strike capabilities have over double the reconnaissance strike capabilities themselves than states that have rivals with very low or very high capabilities. Our findings hold for broader measures of the complex that closely proxy a state’s general military capabilities, narrower measures of the complex, and alternative measures of general military sophistication, indicating our theory has broad applicability. This article explains why some states invest heavily in conventional capabilities despite an already-large lead over their adversaries, and why other states instead opt to invest in alternatives rather than balancing symmetrically.
侦察打击综合体是现代军事力量的代名词，著名的现实主义理论曾预言，在海湾战争中成功亮相后，该综合体将迅速扩散。然而，该综合体的扩散速度却十分缓慢。为了解释这一谜团，我们从理论上认为，国家间的安全威胁对武器扩散产生了重大影响，但影响方式与传统推测不同。尽管有关武器扩散的文献大多假定国家对手的能力与国家自身的能力之间存在单调递增的关系，但我们借鉴经济学文献和政治学博弈论的观点，认为这种关系应类似于倒 "U "型。当国家的对手具备中等侦察打击能力时，国家就有与之竞争的安全动机。然而，当国家面对高度先进的对手时，就更难逃脱或与之匹敌，从而降低了对称获取的吸引力。之前的研究大多集中于侦察打击综合体的狭义方面，如导弹或智能炸弹，而我们则在一个新的数据集上检验了我们的理论，该数据集追踪了从1980年到2017年国家层面对综合体八个方面的获取情况：弹道导弹；轰炸机；巡航导弹；战斗机；情报、监视和侦察资产；精确制导弹药；卫星和潜艇。我们发现，我们的倒 U 型论点得到了强有力的支持。与拥有中等侦察打击能力的对手相比，拥有极低或极高侦察打击能力的对手所拥有的侦察打击能力要高出一倍以上。我们的研究结果适用于更广义的综合衡量标准（密切代表一国的一般军事能力）、更狭义的综合衡量标准以及一般军事先进性的其他衡量标准，这表明我们的理论具有广泛的适用性。这篇文章解释了为什么有些国家在已经大幅领先对手的情况下仍大力投资于常规能力，而另一些国家则选择投资于替代能力而非对称平衡。
{"title":"To compete or strategically retreat? The global diffusion of reconnaissance strike","authors":"Michael C Horowitz, Joshua A Schwartz","doi":"10.1177/00223433241261566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241261566","url":null,"abstract":"The reconnaissance strike complex is synonymous with modern military power, and prominent realist theories would have predicted rapid proliferation after its successful debut in the Gulf War. Instead, the complex has proliferated slowly. To explain this puzzle, we theorize that interstate security threats significantly impact proliferation, but not in the way traditionally presumed. Although the literature on weapons proliferation has largely assumed a monotonically increasing relationship should hold between the capabilities of a state’s adversaries and a state’s own capability, we draw from the economics literature and game theoretic insights from political science to argue that the relationship should resemble an inverted-U. When states have rivals with moderate reconnaissance strike capabilities, they have security incentives to compete with them. However, when states face highly advanced adversaries, it becomes more difficult to escape or match their competition, making symmetrical acquisition less appealing. While most prior research focuses on narrower aspects of the reconnaissance strike complex like missiles or smart bombs, we test our theory on a novel dataset tracking country-level acquisition of eight aspects of the complex from 1980 to 2017: Ballistic missiles; bombers; cruise missiles; fighter aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; precision-guided munitions; satellites; and submarines. We find strong support for our inverted-U argument. States that have rivals with moderate reconnaissance strike capabilities have over double the reconnaissance strike capabilities themselves than states that have rivals with very low or very high capabilities. Our findings hold for broader measures of the complex that closely proxy a state’s general military capabilities, narrower measures of the complex, and alternative measures of general military sophistication, indicating our theory has broad applicability. This article explains why some states invest heavily in conventional capabilities despite an already-large lead over their adversaries, and why other states instead opt to invest in alternatives rather than balancing symmetrically.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142306185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-07DOI: 10.1177/00223433241255010
Max Z Margulies
Are countries that use conscription more restrained in their use of military force? A common argument holds that military conscription restrains leaders from using force because it increases the political cost of war and distributes them more evenly and broadly across the population. Despite this intuition, empirical evidence to support it is at best inconclusive. This article introduces a novel perspective on the relationship between military recruitment (MR) policies and conflict initiation (CI) by arguing that the military’s size relative to society – its military participation rate (MPR) – is an important and overlooked part of this story. MPR is a more direct measure of the population’s exposure to the costs of war, but high MPR may also increase CI by enhancing military capacity. By incorporating MPR into the analysis of CI, both independently and in interaction with conscription, this article provides a more comprehensive understanding of how MR practices shape CI. It tests these new hypotheses about the relationship between MPR, conscription and CI using a variety of time-series models that cover all country-years from 1816 to 2011. The findings do not support the conventional wisdom, instead revealing that neither conscription nor volunteerism is independently associated with restrained initiation of military conflicts abroad. On the contrary, these recruitment practices are more likely to be associated with an increase in the likelihood of CI. These findings indicate that we should be skeptical of traditional arguments that assume conscription leads to restraint in the use of force, either independently or conditional on MPR. These counterintuitive results underscore the need for additional research on the complex relationship between MR practices, civil–military relations and foreign policy.
实行征兵制的国家在使用军事力量方面是否更加克制？一种常见的论点认为，征兵制会限制领导人使用武力，因为它增加了战争的政治成本，并将这些成本更均匀、更广泛地分配给民众。尽管有这样的直觉，但支持这一观点的经验证据充其量也只能说是不确定的。本文就征兵（MR）政策与冲突引发（CI）之间的关系提出了一个新的视角，认为军队相对于社会的规模--参军率（MPR）--是这一问题中被忽视的重要部分。参军率可以更直接地衡量民众承受战争代价的程度，但高参军率也可能通过提高军事能力来增加冲突的发生。通过将 MPR 单独纳入对 CI 的分析以及与征兵制度的互动分析，本文更全面地了解了 MR 实践是如何塑造 CI 的。文章使用各种时间序列模型（涵盖 1816 年至 2011 年的所有国家年份）检验了这些关于 MPR、征兵和 CI 之间关系的新假设。研究结果并不支持传统观点，而是揭示了征兵制和志愿服务都与抑制海外军事冲突的发起没有独立联系。相反，这些征兵做法更有可能与发生冲突的可能性增加有关。这些研究结果表明，我们应该怀疑那些认为征兵会导致限制使用武力的传统论点，无论是独立的还是以 MPR 为条件的。这些反直觉的结果突出表明，有必要对军民关系实践、军民关系和外交政策之间的复杂关系进行更多的研究。
{"title":"Drafting restraint: Are military recruitment policies associated with interstate conflict initiation?","authors":"Max Z Margulies","doi":"10.1177/00223433241255010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241255010","url":null,"abstract":"Are countries that use conscription more restrained in their use of military force? A common argument holds that military conscription restrains leaders from using force because it increases the political cost of war and distributes them more evenly and broadly across the population. Despite this intuition, empirical evidence to support it is at best inconclusive. This article introduces a novel perspective on the relationship between military recruitment (MR) policies and conflict initiation (CI) by arguing that the military’s size relative to society – its military participation rate (MPR) – is an important and overlooked part of this story. MPR is a more direct measure of the population’s exposure to the costs of war, but high MPR may also increase CI by enhancing military capacity. By incorporating MPR into the analysis of CI, both independently and in interaction with conscription, this article provides a more comprehensive understanding of how MR practices shape CI. It tests these new hypotheses about the relationship between MPR, conscription and CI using a variety of time-series models that cover all country-years from 1816 to 2011. The findings do not support the conventional wisdom, instead revealing that neither conscription nor volunteerism is independently associated with restrained initiation of military conflicts abroad. On the contrary, these recruitment practices are more likely to be associated with an increase in the likelihood of CI. These findings indicate that we should be skeptical of traditional arguments that assume conscription leads to restraint in the use of force, either independently or conditional on MPR. These counterintuitive results underscore the need for additional research on the complex relationship between MR practices, civil–military relations and foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142152414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-29DOI: 10.1177/00223433241252552
Minnie M Joo
Moderate (or ‘limited’) rebel goals and inclusive political institutions have been suggested to increase the chances of rebel–government negotiations. This article attempts to shed light on the politics of rebel–government negotiations by presenting new, systematic data on the scope of rebel goals and demonstrating both theoretically and empirically that it is the interaction of moderate rebel goals and inclusive political institutions – rather than each variable in isolation – that helps disputants overcome bargaining problems and engage in negotiations. Particularly, the article contends that while moderate rebel goals allow the disputants to recognize that negotiations may be mutually beneficial, the presence of a dual commitment problem – where rebel groups and governments are both concerned about the opponent’s commitment to negotiated settlements – hinders them from negotiating. In such cases, the institutional features of polyarchy, defined by Dahl as competitive and inclusive elections accompanied by civil liberties, alleviate this dual commitment problem and induce moderate rebels and the government to follow through with their incentives to negotiate. Statistical results from newly collected data on rebel group goals and rebel–government negotiations support this claim: rebel–government negotiations are significantly more likely to occur when rebel groups espouse moderate goals and the level of polyarchy in a country is sufficiently high. Results indicate that the influence of rebel goals and institutions on negotiations is better understood in conjunction.
{"title":"Resolving bargaining problems in civil conflicts: Goals, institutions and negotiations","authors":"Minnie M Joo","doi":"10.1177/00223433241252552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241252552","url":null,"abstract":"Moderate (or ‘limited’) rebel goals and inclusive political institutions have been suggested to increase the chances of rebel–government negotiations. This article attempts to shed light on the politics of rebel–government negotiations by presenting new, systematic data on the scope of rebel goals and demonstrating both theoretically and empirically that it is the interaction of moderate rebel goals and inclusive political institutions – rather than each variable in isolation – that helps disputants overcome bargaining problems and engage in negotiations. Particularly, the article contends that while moderate rebel goals allow the disputants to recognize that negotiations may be mutually beneficial, the presence of a dual commitment problem – where rebel groups and governments are both concerned about the opponent’s commitment to negotiated settlements – hinders them from negotiating. In such cases, the institutional features of polyarchy, defined by Dahl as competitive and inclusive elections accompanied by civil liberties, alleviate this dual commitment problem and induce moderate rebels and the government to follow through with their incentives to negotiate. Statistical results from newly collected data on rebel group goals and rebel–government negotiations support this claim: rebel–government negotiations are significantly more likely to occur when rebel groups espouse moderate goals and the level of polyarchy in a country is sufficiently high. Results indicate that the influence of rebel goals and institutions on negotiations is better understood in conjunction.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142100656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-28DOI: 10.1177/00223433241254997
Rafael Mesquita, Antonio Pires
This article introduces a novel corpus containing all resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) from 1946 to 2019, the network of citations between them, and an online tool for exploring them. Resolutions adopted by the organization provide a valuable record of the evolution of multilateralism and political ideas on the global stage. Given that resolutions typically cite past ones, the resulting network of references offers a wealth of information on the UNGA’s most relevant themes over time. This article applies network analysis to the corpus of approximately 18,000 resolutions and 77,000 citations, aiming to answer questions such as: What are the most cited resolutions of all? Are there thematic clusters? And can we delineate historic patterns based on themes prioritized? Our findings show that leading resolutions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stemmed from the early years of the UNGA and created cores around which thematic clusters emerged. We conclude by listing highly cited resolutions and prominent clusters, while also conducting a descriptive exploration of how some of the largest clusters formed. The dominant clusters addressed human rights, development, decolonization and peace and security, and by monitoring their evolution we offer a new, data-intensive account of the interaction between these topics since 1946.
{"title":"The references of the nations: Introducing a corpus of United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1946 and their citation network","authors":"Rafael Mesquita, Antonio Pires","doi":"10.1177/00223433241254997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241254997","url":null,"abstract":"This article introduces a novel corpus containing all resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) from 1946 to 2019, the network of citations between them, and an online tool for exploring them. Resolutions adopted by the organization provide a valuable record of the evolution of multilateralism and political ideas on the global stage. Given that resolutions typically cite past ones, the resulting network of references offers a wealth of information on the UNGA’s most relevant themes over time. This article applies network analysis to the corpus of approximately 18,000 resolutions and 77,000 citations, aiming to answer questions such as: What are the most cited resolutions of all? Are there thematic clusters? And can we delineate historic patterns based on themes prioritized? Our findings show that leading resolutions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stemmed from the early years of the UNGA and created cores around which thematic clusters emerged. We conclude by listing highly cited resolutions and prominent clusters, while also conducting a descriptive exploration of how some of the largest clusters formed. The dominant clusters addressed human rights, development, decolonization and peace and security, and by monitoring their evolution we offer a new, data-intensive account of the interaction between these topics since 1946.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142089965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-08-16DOI: 10.1177/00223433241249352
Rebecca Tapscott, Daniel Rincón Machón
Conflict research is rife with ethical issues, and the field is increasingly reflecting on how to best address these. Recent debates in political science have mainly focused on ethics in practice, leaving questions of procedural ethics to the side. But procedural ethics are important: they are increasingly required across all areas of research, they are the bedrock of institutional approaches to regulating ethics, and they shape ideas about what constitutes ethical research practice. This article introduces the Research Ethics Governance dataset, the first globally comprehensive dataset of national-level ethics regulations. The dataset provides a picture of the status of research ethics regulations and how they pertain to conflict research. While 87% of countries have requirements for ethical review, only 25% extend those regulations to the social sciences. Of countries with no evidence of requirements, nearly half are classed as fragile or conflict-affected states. The data will be useful for scholars concerned with questions of research ethics, as well as those seeking to study the politics of this regulatory structure and its implications for knowledge production.
{"title":"Procedural ethics for social science research: Introducing the Research Ethics Governance dataset","authors":"Rebecca Tapscott, Daniel Rincón Machón","doi":"10.1177/00223433241249352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241249352","url":null,"abstract":"Conflict research is rife with ethical issues, and the field is increasingly reflecting on how to best address these. Recent debates in political science have mainly focused on ethics in practice, leaving questions of procedural ethics to the side. But procedural ethics are important: they are increasingly required across all areas of research, they are the bedrock of institutional approaches to regulating ethics, and they shape ideas about what constitutes ethical research practice. This article introduces the Research Ethics Governance dataset, the first globally comprehensive dataset of national-level ethics regulations. The dataset provides a picture of the status of research ethics regulations and how they pertain to conflict research. While 87% of countries have requirements for ethical review, only 25% extend those regulations to the social sciences. Of countries with no evidence of requirements, nearly half are classed as fragile or conflict-affected states. The data will be useful for scholars concerned with questions of research ethics, as well as those seeking to study the politics of this regulatory structure and its implications for knowledge production.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141994386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-30DOI: 10.1177/00223433241249341
Hannah Baron, Omar García-Ponce, Jorge Olmos Camarillo, Lauren E Young, Thomas Zeitzoff
In contexts marked by high violence and widespread impunity, how do citizens articulate and justify their preferences about crime and punishment? What kind of moral logic and reasoning do they employ when discussing punishments? Does support for punitive punishment derive from moralistic and deontological concerns that perpetrators need to be punished because it is right and proper? Or do people support punitive punishments because they feel they are effective? To address this question, we document and analyze stated preferences for punishment in response to crime from 62 in-depth qualitative interviews with individuals affected by violence in the Mexican state of Michoacán. We conduct a quantitative analysis of how different forms of moral justifications are related to preferred punishments for specific crime events, and a qualitative content analysis to investigate possible mechanisms. We find that two types of moral reasoning are more likely to be used to justify punitive violence: (1) consequentialist reasoning which involves weighing the costs and benefits of an action; (2) and reasoning that dehumanizes accused criminals. Deontological justifications about the right or just action, while extremely common, are used fairly equally across arguments for and against punitive violence. Our study sheds light on the diverse moral frames employed to justify the endorsement of punitive violence.
{"title":"Moral reasoning and support for punitive violence after crime","authors":"Hannah Baron, Omar García-Ponce, Jorge Olmos Camarillo, Lauren E Young, Thomas Zeitzoff","doi":"10.1177/00223433241249341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433241249341","url":null,"abstract":"In contexts marked by high violence and widespread impunity, how do citizens articulate and justify their preferences about crime and punishment? What kind of moral logic and reasoning do they employ when discussing punishments? Does support for punitive punishment derive from moralistic and deontological concerns that perpetrators need to be punished because it is right and proper? Or do people support punitive punishments because they feel they are effective? To address this question, we document and analyze stated preferences for punishment in response to crime from 62 in-depth qualitative interviews with individuals affected by violence in the Mexican state of Michoacán. We conduct a quantitative analysis of how different forms of moral justifications are related to preferred punishments for specific crime events, and a qualitative content analysis to investigate possible mechanisms. We find that two types of moral reasoning are more likely to be used to justify punitive violence: (1) consequentialist reasoning which involves weighing the costs and benefits of an action; (2) and reasoning that dehumanizes accused criminals. Deontological justifications about the right or just action, while extremely common, are used fairly equally across arguments for and against punitive violence. Our study sheds light on the diverse moral frames employed to justify the endorsement of punitive violence.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141857942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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