Do analysts play a monitoring role? Evidence from exogenous changes in litigation risk

Abstract

This paper examines whether securities litigation and sell-side equity analysts play a substitutive versus complementary role as an external governance mechanism. We expect the 1999 ruling on the stricter interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act to make it easier for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit to defend against securities class actions filed by shareholders, resulting in weaker protection from a litigation channel and stronger demand for analyst activity. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that analyst coverage increases as litigation risk decreases in the Ninth Circuit firms. Moreover, we find that analyst earnings forecast accuracy increases for firms in the Ninth Circuit following the ruling, consistent with analysts exerting greater efforts to perform their monitoring role. In cross-sectional tests, we find that the substitution relation between litigation risk and analyst research is more pronounced in firms with a high level of ex-ante litigation risk. We conduct extensive robustness tests, including another legal event exogenously increasing the risk of litigation, to gain confidence in our interpretations. We contribute to the literature by documenting causal evidence that analysts have greater incentives to provide meaningful equity research as gatekeepers in times of weaker investor protection by securities litigation.