Cost-sharing incentive for collaborative innovation between main manufacturer-core supplier based on risk factorsCost-sharing incentive for collaborative innovation between main manufacturer-core supplier based on risk factors

Abstract

This paper considers the “main manufacturer-supplier” model in collaborative cooperation among firms which requires the leader to invest significant resources and bear huge risks. However, few scholars simultaneously consider innovation risks and incentive issues under the model. We construct a Stackelberg game incentive model with different cost-sharing ratios under the risk of technological innovation. We characterize the equilibrium of the model and highlight the key role played by the main manufacturer and supplier. The results are as follows: (a) Main manufacturer can implement the cost-sharing incentive strategy under certain conditions, which is, its profit coefficient is greater than 0.75 times that of supplier and the cost-sharing ratio’s expected coefficient is greater than the minimum threshold. (b) The optimal cost-sharing ratio is directly proportional to the profit coefficient of the main manufacturer, inversely proportional to that of the supplier, and shows an inverted U-shape function with the probability of successful technological innovation. (c)This strategy can motivate suppliers to invest more resources, reduce the investment of the main manufacturer, simultaneously increase the profits of the main manufacturer and supplier in the certain ranges of innovation success probability and profit coefficients, with significant incentive effects.