The testimony challenge against the possibility of philosophical knowledge

IF 0.4 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY METAPHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-05-15 DOI:10.1111/meta.12683
Octavio García
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We access most of our most cherished beliefs via testimony. Philosophy is no exception. We treat spoken and written philosophical testimony as evidence for philosophical claims. Nonetheless, this paper argues that philosophical testimony is unable to justify philosophical beliefs. If testimony is the only evidence we have to justify philosophical beliefs, this entails skepticism about philosophy. Call this the testimony challenge. First, the paper argues that philosophical testimony does not meet the conditions under which evidence can justify our beliefs. Second, it shows that philosophical testimony cannot provide preemptive epistemic reasons as science and mathematics do. Finally, it answers the self-defeat objection and a set of objections aiming to block the thesis that philosophical testimony does not justify philosophical beliefs. The paper aims to rethink the role of philosophical testimony in philosophy and reinforce the skeptical worries raised by methodological and disagreement challenges.

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证言对哲学知识可能性的挑战
我们最珍视的大多数信念都是通过见证获得的。哲学也不例外。我们将口头和书面的哲学证词视为哲学主张的证据。然而,本文认为哲学证言无法证明哲学信仰的正确性。如果证言是我们证明哲学信仰的唯一证据,这就意味着我们对哲学持怀疑态度。我们称之为 "证言挑战"。首先,本文认为哲学证言不符合证据能够证明我们的信念的条件。其次,它表明哲学证言不能像科学和数学那样提供先发制人的认识论理由。最后,本文回答了自相矛盾的反对意见和一系列旨在阻止哲学证言不能证明哲学信仰的论点的反对意见。本文旨在重新思考哲学证言在哲学中的作用,并强化方法论和分歧挑战所引发的怀疑忧虑。
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来源期刊
METAPHILOSOPHY
METAPHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: Metaphilosophy publishes articles and reviews books stressing considerations about philosophy and particular schools, methods, or fields of philosophy. The intended scope is very broad: no method, field, or school is excluded.
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