METAPHILOSOPHY最新文献

This article consistently elaborates the extra-contextual nature of metaphysical knowledge. Metaphysicsis seen as a semantic construction of culture that produces a certain type of thinking, memory, and identification: that is, subjectivity, and sociality as an ethical and axiological model of interaction with the world and the Other. The paper argues that metaphysics is a kind of orientation in space and that culture is a semiotic way of world orientation, or collection of spaces into an intelligible structure, a specific characteristic of human existence in the universe. Indeed, metaphysics through the space of culture allows one to experience the universe empirically as unity, to assume the presence of meaning. Based on the analysis, the paper summarizes the definition of the phenomenon of culture as a specifically human way of mastering space and controlling time, consciousness as a topology of reflective practices, and virtual reality technology as a space of pure metaphysics.

How should we, as philosophers, respond to the pure moral testimony of people in marginalized positions? Some philosophers argue that marginalized people have an epistemic advantage concerning their experiences of marginalization, such that, if we are non-marginalized, then we should defer to their moral testimony concerning these experiences. We might accept this as a requirement for ordinary conversation but doubt that any such requirement obtains when we do philosophy, since philosophy requires a critical stance. This paper argues that philosophers should also defer in such cases. It concludes that non-marginalized philosophers can only properly address certain moral propositions concerning the experiences of marginalized people if they engage in ongoing philosophical discussions with such people, starting from a position of trust.

This essay develops a naturalist framework based on Hume, Darwin, and Wittgenstein against postmodernist constructivism. That framework claims universal features of human biology, cognition, and behavior to explain our cultural histories, running contrary to two core constructivist doctrines of postmodernist scholarship: mutual opacity and epistemic violence. Mutual opacity posits the incommensurability of systems rooted in differing contexts, cultures, and group identities, while epistemic violence morally impugns the extension of the knowledge claims of any such system beyond its strictly localized boundaries. This is the extension that universalist approaches, like naturalism, are recriminated against owing to their claims to discover encompassing standpoint-independent and transcultural features of human constitution and modes of life. Comparative evaluation of these approaches exposes the failure of postmodernist constructivism to explain parallel practices, conventions, and institutions across human cultural histories, which universalist naturalism succeeds at, while moreover revealing how this failure undermines its agendas of social justice.

Virtuous leadership is the focus of a growing body of academic literature but is little discussed by contemporary philosophers. Current treatments tend to over-generalisation: assimilating diverse features to a few broad categories and applying simplified ethical theories. This essay argues that virtue and character education need to be keyed to specific activities, that “virtuous leadership” is in danger of being confused with extrinsic activism, and that the history of ethics in health care provides an instructive example of thinking ethically about practice. Questions commonly posed in the literature—What specific virtues are required for leadership? How may these be formed?—are unduly simple and often rest on faulty assumptions about the nature of leadership and of the structure of virtuous action. Philosophers engaged in advising professionals about the virtues of leadership would do well to consider how the relevant points apply to their own practice.

Rik Peels's (2017) Fundamental Argument is an important argument against epistemic scientism. The crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument is that if nonscientific sources of belief did not provide us with knowledge, neither could the sciences. But, the sciences do provide us with knowledge. Thus, epistemic scientism is false. This paper defends Peels's argument against recent criticisms. In particular, Hietanen and colleagues criticize Peels's argument for resting on what they call the “garbage in, garbage out” principle (GIGO). This paper strengthens their attacks on the GIGO principle. It shows, however, that we don't need the GIGO principle to motivate the crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument. Instead, it argues that the crucial premise is true for the following reasons: scientific knowledge is the result of successful inquiry; at some point we lacked scientific knowledge; and, we cannot successfully inquire without some prior knowledge.

Philosophical practice, an art of living rooted in ancient traditions, is enriched by modern techniques such as individual counseling, Socratic group dialogues, and organizational consulting. Philosophical counseling, a key aspect of this practice, employs traditional philosophical frameworks and rational reasoning to address clients' concerns, distinguishing itself from psychotherapy while respecting individual autonomy. The growing Western interest in Asian philosophies also underscores a shared pursuit of wisdom, spirituality, and meaning. This paper examines the development, key features, and leading proponents of philosophical practice, its relationship with academic philosophy, and the tensions between their differing aims and methods. The outlook for philosophical counseling is promising, offering an alternative to medical approaches for existential issues and expanding its scope to personal guidance, conflict resolution, and life-skill development. Its future trajectory hinges on societal trends toward secularization, the de-medicalization of mental health, and the increasing recognition of philosophy's intrinsic practical value.

This paper employs structural topic modeling (STM) to describe the academic philosophy landscape in Brazil. Based on a public national database, a corpus consisting of 12,515 abstracts of monographs defended in philosophy graduate programs between 1991 and 2021 was compiled. The final STM model identified 74 meaningful research topics, clustered into 7 thematic categories. This study discusses the prevalence of the most significant topics and categories, their trends across three decades, and their (positive or negative) association with the supervisor's gender. Results show the first empirical evidence that Brazilian philosophical research exhibits a greater focus on philosophers than on specific themes or problems. Moreover, by visualizing the variations in topic prevalence over time, it was possible to track the rise or decline of the major interest categories and topics. Finally, results also show which topics are more influenced or less influenced by gender.

This paper studies the structure of semantic theories over modular computational systems and applies the algebraic Theory of Institutions to provide a logical representation of such theories. A modular semantic theory is here defined by a cluster of semantic theories, each for a single program's module, and by a set of relations connecting models of different semantic theories. A semantic theory of a single module is provided in terms of the set of ∑-models mapped from the category Th of ∑-theories and generating a hierarchy of structures from an abstract model to a concrete model of data. The collection of abstract models representing different modules of a program is formalised as the category of institutions INS, where theory morphisms express refinements, integrations, and compositions between couples of modules. Finally, it is required that a morphism in INS at any level occurs iff the same morphism occurs at the lower level alongside the Th hierarchy.

This paper argues for a broad definition of philosophical sources and how Indigenous traditional knowledge fits that definition. It concludes by showing how, following the previous two points, an Indigenous document such as the Huarochirí Manuscript can be considered a philosophical source by academic philosophers. The paper has three sections: the first deals with the methodological point of addressing what can be considered as philosophy. This section presents a conversational approach to philosophy. This approach, although broad, properly captures the practices of inquiring about philosophical issues as is commonly done in Western academic circles, but without excluding the practices of non-Western cultures from being labelled as philosophical. The second section argues for the analytical distinction between a philosophical source, a philosophical text, and a philosophical insight. It shows that what makes a philosophical source such are the philosophical insights that it can provide. The final section shows how the Huarochirí Manuscript has merits making it worthy of being considered a philosophical source and thus a relevant academic source for those working in the field of philosophy.

This paper proposes an interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of tyche (τύχη), a Greek term that can be alternatively translated as luck, fortune, or fate. The paper disentangles various threads of argument in the primary sources to argue for a realist understanding of what we moderns call “luck.” In short, it contends that Aristotle's account of these issues is mostly correct and merits close attention when canvassing recent philosophical debates about luckology. Aristotle argues that science pertains to the general rule; it is not about the particular. Particular events have contingent content that exceeds the scope of science. Even if we could predict all future events with ultimate accuracy, we would still be left wondering why good or bad things happen to specific people. Although luck is not a scientific category, it has an existential reality that leaves momentous events open to metaphysical and even religious interpretation.