METAPHILOSOPHY最新文献

Central to pragmatist naturalism is understanding experience as an embodied engagement within an environment. Also, social and participative relationships are embodied in locally shared experience and imaginaries. As notions of embodiment become mainstream, we are facing a trend that could render them obsolete. Humans begin to inhabit regions of the metaverse as disembodied avatars. They leave their physical identities behind to become tokenized actants in crypto worlds. Participative relationships suffer the same fate: public-key cryptography offers instruments that compete with analogue governance institutions, such as fiat money, personal identity, and intellectual property. This paper turns to science and technology studies and actor-network theory to translate classical pragmatist ideas to these new digital lifeworlds. Not only does this reveal the residual connection of digital worlds with physically embodied experience, it also invites the search for new participative relationships that may include human and non-human actants on a more equal footing.

The twelfth volume of Oxford Studies in Metaphysics begins with a debate between Amie Thomasson and Ross Cameron on the nature of metaphysics. In short, Thomasson defends her “easy ontology” position that there are no substantive metaphysical questions and argues against Cameron's position, according to which truthmaker questions are not easy. Cameron responds by criticizing Thomasson's easy ontology and defending truthmaker metaphysics. This paper defends Thomasson. Specifically, it argues that Cameron (1) distorts epistemic two-dimensionalism's notion of epistemic possibility, (2) falls prey to the Picture Theory of language he claims (rightly) to reject, and (3) begs the question against Thomasson by assuming that her modal normativism is false. The defense is valuable more widely because it clarifies the relations between easy ontology, modal normativism, truthmaker metaphysics, and two-dimensional semantics.

Human attention has become a touchstone of widespread concern across the humanities, sciences, and broader culture in much of the world. The emergence of a new, heavily capitalized, and technologically sophisticated industry “commodifying” human attention (what has been called “human fracking”) has given rise to a transdisciplinary conversation about attentional problems. Philosophical analyses of attention take on special importance in the context of these new developments. Drawing on historical epistemology and the critical perspective of the history and philosophy of science, this paper examines the major positions in contemporary philosophy that have staked accounts of human attention. Ultimately, this metaphilosophical analysis juxtaposes analytic and Continental approaches, and contends that much current philosophical work on human attention fails to take adequate account of the sublated genealogy of instrumentalizing/cybernetic scientific practices that have constituted attention as an object of inquiry across the twentieth century. The implications for forward-looking investigations are considered.

This paper addresses the question of how to account for the distinctive way in which, as a matter of fact, we react to philosophical disagreement and, more generally, to philosophical testimony. The paper explains how exactly the idea that understanding occupies a central place in philosophy can account for this. It examines two interpretations of this idea and argues that the second, but not the first, can solve the so-called puzzle of philosophical testimony. This second interpretation turns out to be compatible with the idea that philosophy aims at finding out or knowing substantive philosophical truths rather than at understanding them. The paper then turns to the question of whether this central place means that philosophy is not a collective discipline.

This paper argues that W. V. Quine, often seen as scientific naturalism's foremost champion, advances an expansive ontology that leaves room for so-called supernatural phenomena—telepathy or clairvoyance—if they satisfy appropriate empirical tests. Contrary to the image of a rigid physicalist, Quine's methodological continuity and fallibilism permit provisional inclusion of any entity, “physical” or not, when theoretically and empirically fruitful. His resolve to start “in the middle” and treat philosophy as continuous with science contrasts with stricter naturalisms that categorically dismiss paranormal claims. Simultaneously, Quine rejects a priori philosophical pronouncements, denying autonomous or irreducible normativity beyond empirical science. Distinguishing Quine's “soft” naturalism from reductive physicalism and liberal naturalist views, the paper shows his position as inclusive regarding empirically testable phenomena yet methodologically monistic in privileging science as ultimate arbiter of ontological disputes. Quine's openness to unconventional hypotheses underscores that naturalism need not be metaphysically dogmatic but must remain anchored in empirical inquiry.

Disciplinary spaces are conveniences that satisfy interests or obligations at minimal cost to effort or attention. We glide through them while passing from task to task, wanting efficiency with modest care for detail. These disciplines are orienting; others are productive. Ideas of holism and open societies are ideologies that organize societies in ways they prefigure. Orienting spaces allow alternate ways to satisfy an aim or task. Ideological spaces are prescriptive; we behave as they require. Skeptics doubt the accuracy of our perceptions, though modest efficiency, more than accuracy, is usually the aim of practical life. Inquiry wants truth. Practical life wants it too: in the skills and precision of its crafts, in the casual routine of disciplinary spaces.

This article examines the intellectual legacy of Central Asian scholars and thinkers of the ninth to thirteenth centuries, known as the Eastern Renaissance, and their role in shaping world science and culture. The paper analyses their philosophical and scientific achievements, comparing them with ancient and medieval European traditions. It demonstrates that the cultural flowering in Central Asia and the Middle East during this period paralleled the European Renaissance of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. Thinkers of the Eastern Renaissance embraced a humanistic worldview, emphasizing individuality and drawing inspiration from ancient philosophers and scholars. Unlike Europe, where parts of the ancient heritage were forgotten, the East preserved, studied, and expanded classical knowledge. This paper highlights the fact that this intellectual movement significantly contributed to global science, philosophy, and culture, reinforcing the idea that the Eastern Renaissance was not a regional phenomenon but a key stage in humanity's cultural and scientific development.

Plotinus offers a compelling defense of reason's central role in the universe. In contrast to contemporary approaches that often reduce rationality to a mere instrument of profit, Plotinus posits that true rationality lies in the soul's harmonious union with the One. This unity, he argues, is achieved through a rigorous process of spiritual and intellectual development. Central to Plotinus's philosophy is the notion that the human soul, capable of both irrationality and rationality, must actively strive for the latter. By engaging in a rigorous intellectual and spiritual journey, the soul can transcend its limitations and align itself with the cosmic order. This process involves overcoming dualities, cultivating a beautiful life, and developing a conscious understanding of the world. Ultimately, Plotinus's vision offers a compelling counterpoint to the prevailing materialistic and market-driven perspectives. By embracing rationality as a means of achieving spiritual and intellectual fulfillment, individuals can contribute to the creation of a more harmonious and unified world.

This paper introduces a model-based account of meaning, arguing that meaning properties reside in models rather than in the external world. Building on this view, it explores how such an instrumentalist framework can engage critically with various concerns raised by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Kripke[nstein]—each of whom voiced scepticism toward certain conceptions of semantic theorising and, in some cases, the reification of meaning. While the scope and nature of their respective criticisms may differ, the paper suggests they share a broadly deflationary attitude toward semantic metaphysics. Twentieth-century challenges to mainstream truth-conditional semantics, from verificationism, inferentialism, and other alternatives, have further complicated the semantic landscape, prompting a reconsideration of metaphysical assumptions in theories of meaning. In light of both scepticism about meaning and explanatory disagreement in semantics, the paper questions the metaphysical interpretation of theories of meaning and proposes a reoriented understanding of semantic theorising—one that is formally tractable yet philosophically restrained.