{"title":"Ten Years After: Revisiting the Ouster Of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood","authors":"Ebtisam Hussein","doi":"10.1111/mepo.12746","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 marked a turning point in Egypt's modern history. The long-persecuted Muslim Brotherhood immediately became a key political player, and its candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won election to lead the country. But despite those two years of popular engagement and victories at the ballot box, Morsi was ousted and the movement banished once again after a confrontation with the military in July 2013. Why did the Brotherhood choose to risk a conflict with the armed forces and not seek a compromise? This article contends that the decision was driven by the Muslim Brotherhood's long history of persecution, its broad base of support, its impressive successes after Mubarak fell, and its fear of losing the presidency. These set the Brotherhood on a course of action that suited its experiences and preferences. This path led the movement to ignore several facts suggesting it must seek to coordinate with the armed forces: The Brotherhood and the military did not enjoy cordial relations after Morsi's election in 2012; the movement's grassroots power was substantial, but there was no evidence it could prevail over the military's demand for Morsi to step down; and the military maintained its internal cohesion. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood's historical path guided its decision to avoid cooperation.</p>","PeriodicalId":46060,"journal":{"name":"Middle East Policy","volume":"31 2","pages":"124-135"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Middle East Policy","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12746","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 marked a turning point in Egypt's modern history. The long-persecuted Muslim Brotherhood immediately became a key political player, and its candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won election to lead the country. But despite those two years of popular engagement and victories at the ballot box, Morsi was ousted and the movement banished once again after a confrontation with the military in July 2013. Why did the Brotherhood choose to risk a conflict with the armed forces and not seek a compromise? This article contends that the decision was driven by the Muslim Brotherhood's long history of persecution, its broad base of support, its impressive successes after Mubarak fell, and its fear of losing the presidency. These set the Brotherhood on a course of action that suited its experiences and preferences. This path led the movement to ignore several facts suggesting it must seek to coordinate with the armed forces: The Brotherhood and the military did not enjoy cordial relations after Morsi's election in 2012; the movement's grassroots power was substantial, but there was no evidence it could prevail over the military's demand for Morsi to step down; and the military maintained its internal cohesion. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood's historical path guided its decision to avoid cooperation.
期刊介绍:
The most frequently cited journal on the Middle East region in the field of international affairs, Middle East Policy has been engaging thoughtful minds for more than 25 years. Since its inception in 1982, the journal has been recognized as a valuable addition to the Washington-based policy discussion. Middle East Policy provides an influential forum for a wide range of views on U.S. interests in the region and the value of the policies that are supposed to promote them.