Middle East Policy最新文献

This essay analyzes the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip as it has unfolded in the year since Hamas's October 7, 2023, attacks. It first details the death and destruction Tel Aviv has wrought over that period, the predictions for mass casualties to come, and the state-sanctioned violence and theft faced by Palestinians not just in Gaza but across the occupied territories and Israel. It then examines why Washington's support of Tel Aviv has remained steadfast despite domestic and international condemnation, arguing that President Joe Biden's Zionist ideology has played a decisive role. The article further shows that Israel's interest in the territorial dispossession of Palestinians under the cover of war has led its right-wing government to thwart efforts at a ceasefire that would return the hostages still held by Hamas. The analysis concludes with a reflection on the antiwar protests that continue to roil US campuses as Donald Trump returns to power.

Since the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, Tehran and Moscow have increased their collaboration. Iran supported Russia's war in Ukraine, believing that it would weaken the Americans, reduce the effects of sanctions, and benefit its battered economy. Similarly, Russia sought to use Iran as a tool to challenge US influence in the region. However, the authors contend, the costs and benefits have been asymmetrical: While Moscow has gained strategic advantages at minimal expense, the Islamic Republic has borne substantial geopolitical burdens. This study explores the evolution of Iran-Russia relations and assesses the implications for both countries in their conflicts with the United States. It analyzes their cooperation on the wars in Syria and Ukraine, showing that Tehran has been compelled to act in Moscow's interests but has not always received the same support. This has come into sharp relief since the beginning of Israel's war on Gaza, as Iran has faced attacks on its allies and on its own territory. To defend itself and its interests, it needs advanced military equipment, which the Russians have yet to provide. The evidence indicates that Iran's reliance on Russia has led to more harm than benefit.

Tunisian President Kais Saied's coup in July 2021 has confronted the Renaissance Party, or Ennahda, with a dilemma: Reassume the comfortable position of defending freedoms and maintain party unity, or implement internal reforms, including an overhaul of its leadership and platform. But the party is trapped in a vicious circle. The political context requires unity and is therefore not conducive to a messy process of internal change. However, reform is needed to restore Ennahda's relevance. The repression of Ennahda and imprisonment of its key leaders—including its president, Rached Ghannouchi—make it unlikely that the party's 11th congress, which had been due to take place in 2020, will ever be scheduled. This article examines Ennahda's ascent after the 2011 uprisings and its role both in the transition to democracy and in the events that led to Saied's takeover. It then analyzes critiques by current and former party officials to understand the internal debate over renewing the platform and installing fresh leadership. It also evaluates alternatives to the party, as it is likely to fade gradually. At stake for Tunisia more broadly is the representation of the conservative segment of the population and the return of a pluralist and competitive political scene.

In the summer of 2020, Turkey and Greece deployed naval vessels in the contested eastern Mediterranean waters, which led first to a standoff and eventually a collision. Soon after, a US warship arrived at Crete. While this move should have been intended to calm tensions between the two historical rivals, some observers saw this as a show of support for Greece, marking a significant shift from the traditional American role of mediator. This article examines the US responses to gas exploration and other disputes in the eastern Mediterranean, including the Greek-Turkish divide over Cyprus. It argues that Washington's tilt toward Athens has been pushing Ankara to deepen its economic, diplomatic, and even military relations with Moscow. The United States could rebalance with Turkey and drive a wedge between it and Russia, for instance through incorporating its NATO ally into strategies for reducing Europe's reliance on President Vladimir Putin for energy resources. But if the current zero-sum approach persists, Turkey is likely to continue to look east—which is not in the American interest.

This article examines the role of Chinese armaments in recent Middle Eastern conflicts, showing that although their use has increased over the past decade, they remain less numerous or significant compared to those from the United States and Russia. Chinese-made weapons have been used in conflicts in Gaza, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Lebanon due to affordability, streamlined procurement processes, and improved quality. China's critics have alleged that it has played a negative role in these conflicts through proliferation, claims that Beijing has consistently denied. This research investigates the accuracy of these charges and assesses whether China's role should be considered prominent. The study examines weapons that have been used in five ongoing regional conflicts, including the Gaza war. It finds that, unlike Washington and Moscow, which have deliberately transferred military equipment to the region, China has avoided intentionally directing armaments to Middle Eastern conflict zones. Instead, Chinese arms have been redistributed by third parties. The analysis concludes that China's strategy of balancing its relationships across states in conflict has limited the amount of its weapons in the region and kept the impact of those armaments to a minimum.

The combination of the October 7 attacks and Israel's retaliation in the Gaza Strip has brought the Middle East closer than ever to all-out war. While analysts focus on the long-running enmity between Tel Aviv and Tehran, this article contends that the region can move toward stability only with changes in US policy, especially toward Iran. Ending 40 years of hostile relations would not only help reduce the likelihood of a prolonged Israel-Iran war but also create the conditions necessary to resolve crises in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. The key is to revive the nuclear negotiations and move to a deal that can tamp down rivalries that threaten West Asian security. The author, who as an Iranian official participated in early rounds of nuclear talks in the early 2000s, analyzes the US-Iran rivalry, recommends how to move toward a nuclear-free region, and makes recommendations for shifts in American strategy.

In April 2024, Iran launched its first-ever military strikes on Israeli soil. While the United States and its allies see Tehran as potentially stoking the Gaza war and spreading the conflict across the region, the Islamic Republic has actually drawn its neighbors closer and enjoys friendlier relations with them today than at nearly any point in its 45-year history. This rapprochement had been pursued informally by successive Iranian administrations since the late 1980s. However, it was formally adopted as the “good-neighbor policy” by President Ebrahim Raisi, who served from 2021 until his death in a May 2024 helicopter crash. Raisi's successor, Masoud Pezeshkian, has both the desire to continue the policy and a favorable regional environment within which to do so. Despite serious challenges, Iran has improved engagement with longtime rivals like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE. Even cross-border clashes with the Taliban in Afghanistan have been downplayed in favor of dialogue. Neighborly policies are impermanent. A number of structural and political obstacles could change Iran's calculations, but the approach is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

This article assesses Russia's policy and behavior since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, and Israel's war on Gaza. For years, Moscow's approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict was based on “equidistance” between the two parties—maintaining working relations with the Israelis and pledging friendship to the Palestinians. However, the outbreak of the latest war led Russia to take a clearly pro-Palestinian stance and harshly criticize Tel Aviv's military response. The analysis shows that while relations were strained by Russian officials’ anti-Israel statements, Moscow did not fundamentally alter its position. It did not cross Israel's red lines by arming Hamas and other militant groups, nor did it abandon its well-established commitment to the two-state solution. Russia's rhetoric and its high-level diplomacy primarily serve to court the pro-Palestinian Global South and to escape the diplomatic isolation sparked by the war in Ukraine.