Middle East Policy最新文献

In June 2025, Israel bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, military commanders and scientists, and civilian areas, with assistance from the United States—Washington's first foray into conventional warfare against the Islamic Republic. This triggered debates in Iran about the merits of a weapons-grade atomic program. This study contends that Iranian elites have historically sought to maintain a fluid scheme that lacks easily enforceable nonproliferation parameters, using negotiations and the threat of conflict to buy time and build up the nuclear program. Despite setbacks from the June war, Tehran is continuing this strategy and holding onto power against pressure from the United States. The article examines Iran's moves since the war and its demands in the early stages of revived negotiations. It then probes the history of the nuclear crisis to determine lessons that should inform future talks. Ultimately, though this is unlikely, peaceful ties will require Washington to rebalance its approach. The Trump administration and its successors will have to consider incentives for Iran's elites to channel their preference for regime survival into a greater openness toward the West. Otherwise, US-Iran relations will remain conflictual.

In June 2025, Iran and Israel engaged in their first direct war. Unlike the two confrontations of the previous year, this conflict began with an Israeli attack on Iranian territory. The intensity and duration of the fighting, and the types of weapons used, were unprecedented and unpredictable. Both sides claimed victory: Israel and the United States cited a setback of Iran's nuclear program by at least one year, as well as uncertainty over whether it will ever succeed. Iran took pride in its ability to strike Israeli military bases and research centers, despite the multilayered air-defense systems and the assistance Israel received from its allies. The situation remains fragile, as no peace agreement, or even ceasefire, has been signed, and both sides are preparing for the next round. What they once pursued covertly will likely unfold far more transparently in the future, with consequences for both countries, the broader region, and the world. This article analyzes the causes, objectives, and consequences of the war, drawing on first-hand sources, including official reports published in Iranian media and press outlets. Interviews with political, security, military, and technical experts, plus confidential government sources, are used to critically assess these reports.

RETRACTION: S. Hamidi and E. Mozdkhah, “Turkey's Hydropolitics: Building Order in the Middle East,” Middle East Policy 30, no. 1 (2023): 36–47, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12671.

The above article, published online on 2 March 2023 in Wiley Online Library (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/), has been retracted by agreement between the journal editor, A.R. Joyce; The Middle East Policy Council; and John Wiley & Sons, Inc. The retraction has been agreed due to unattributed overlap between this article and a Farsi-language article published in Iran—Water Resources Research [Ghoreishi et al. (2020): https://www.iwrr.ir/article_105732.html]. The authors were not able to provide a reasonable explanation for the significant text overlap. Therefore, the article must be retracted. The authors disagree with this decision.

Since the early 2000s, major natural gas discoveries in the Levant Basin—the Tamar and Leviathan fields in Israel, and Zohr in Egypt—have substantially changed the eastern Mediterranean's energy landscape. While the growing interdependence among regional countries has promised integration and “economic peace,” it has not prevented wars between Israel and both Gaza and Lebanon. This article examines gas diplomacy between Israel and its Arab neighbors: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Gaza. It argues that we must recognize the limits of gas diplomacy, but its significance should not be overlooked or underestimated. While armed conflict persists, interdependence has arguably prevented escalation in some cases and contributed to diplomatic efforts, as well. The article further shows that nuclear power, projected to meet a large share of the region's growing demand for electricity and water desalination, will require cooperation among Israeli and Arab governments.

The prevalent assumption in media discourse suggests that, due to an intelligence failure and the perception of Hamas's being effectively deterred, Israel was unexpectedly attacked on October 7, 2023. This study, by contrast, delves into the concept of “dehumanization of disregard” within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, drawing from Judith Butler's notion of “ungrievable death.” It posits that Israeli attitudes toward the Gazan population are marked by indifference and neglect. This passive dehumanization coexists with, yet is distinct from, a more active form that overtly degrades Palestinian inhabitants within the human hierarchy. The article contends that this dehumanization of disregard, which fails to recognize the Gazan population, almost inevitably leads to a denial of their capacity to make a difference and challenge the indirect Israeli control over the Strip. The study examines how this disregard became institutionalized in Israel's approach to Gaza and contributed to the October 7 catastrophe. It concludes that acknowledging Palestinian humanity is not merely a security imperative but an essential precondition for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and advancing toward a sustainable political settlement.

Russia's military and diplomatic victories in Syria once appeared to cement its status as a dominant power in the Middle East. However, the swift collapse of the Assad regime exposed cracks in Moscow's regional and global credibility. Our analysis reveals that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's downfall delivers a triple blow—strategic, reputational, and domestic. Strategically, it dismantles Russia's foothold in the Middle East, jeopardizing its access to facilities and weakening its ability to challenge Western influence. Reputationally, Russia's failure to protect a key ally has damaged its image as a reliable partner and raises doubts among regional actors about its ability to provide security and safeguard friendly regimes. Domestically, Assad's ouster undermines the foundation of President Vladimir Putin's legitimacy, which relies in part on asserting Russia's international standing. This loss, compounded by the ongoing war in Ukraine, international sanctions, and resource limitations, weakens Russia's ability to maintain its presence and power in the Middle East, further demonstrated by its inability to support Iran as it faced attacks by Israel and the United States. The collapse of the Assad regime thus signals a decisive shift, likely relegating Russia to a marginal role in regional geopolitics.

Between 2011 and 2015, more than 30,000 foreign fighters, most from the Arab world, traveled to Syria and Iraq to join radical jihadi groups. This article explores another group of combatants who have largely been ignored in the literature: pan-Arab foreign fighters. This element was mostly part of the Arab Nationalist Guard, a secular, highly ideological organization that constituted the largest group of anti-Islamic State fighters in Syria. It was also the third-largest transnational non-jihadist movement fighting on the side of Damascus. Based on extensive interviews with pan-Arab fighters and their leaders, the article examines what may be a last-gasp attempt to revive Arab nationalism. Indeed, the transnational Arab Nationalist Guard represents a final effort of such a movement before the fall of Damascus in December 2024. The interviews also provide the basis for analyzing the pan-Arabists’ complex relations with the Assad regime, as well as with Iran and Hezbollah.

Gulf investment across the Arab states has skyrocketed since the 2000s. Such activity not only links corporate entities but also weaves new connections between business leaders. We take a birds-eye view of the pan-Arab corporate elite by analyzing the network of transnational interlocking directorships. These involve directors who sit on boards of two or more firms headquartered in different countries. We include 1,111 directors of the 135 largest firms from across the Arab world. A transnational pan-Arab corporate elite has indeed emerged, though it is less dense than its counterparts in regions such as Europe or Latin America. The network radiates from the Gulf to other parts of the region. Arab autocrats may find it more difficult to maintain political control of transnational corporate elites than domestic business leaders, who tend to be more reliant on regime goodwill. But transnational corporate elites are more likely to push for further neoliberal restructuring and regional economic integration than for democratization.