Unequal by malice, protesters by outrage: Agent perceptions drive moralization of, and collective action against, inequality

IF 3.2 2区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL British Journal of Social Psychology Pub Date : 2024-05-20 DOI:10.1111/bjso.12761
Carmen Cervone, Caterina Suitner, Luciana Carraro, Andrea Menini, Anne Maass
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Abstract

Economic inequality does not encounter strong protests even though individuals are generally against it. One potential explanation of this paradox is that individuals do not perceive inequality as caused by intentional agents, which, in line with the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Schein & Gray, 2018), should prevent its assessment as immoral and consequently dampen moral outrage and collective action. Across three studies, we test and confirm this hypothesis. In Studies 1 (N = 395) and 2 (N = 337), the more participants believed that inequality is human driven and caused by intentional agents, the more they moralized inequality, felt outraged and wanted to engage in collective action. This was confirmed in Study 3 (N = 243) through an experimental design. Thus, our research shows that agent perception is crucial in the moralization of economic inequality and, more broadly, that morality can be a powerful motivator and effectively mobilize people to action.

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不平等源于恶意,抗议者源于愤怒:代理人的看法推动了不平等的道德化和集体行动。
尽管个人普遍反对经济不平等,但经济不平等并未遭到强烈抗议。对这一悖论的一个潜在解释是,个人并不认为不平等是由有意行为者造成的,根据 "二元道德理论"(Schein & Gray, 2018),这应防止将不平等评价为不道德,从而抑制道德愤怒和集体行动。我们通过三项研究检验并证实了这一假设。在研究 1(N = 395)和研究 2(N = 337)中,参与者越是相信不平等是人为因素造成的,他们就越是将不平等道德化,感到愤怒,并希望参与集体行动。研究 3(N = 243)通过实验设计证实了这一点。因此,我们的研究表明,行为主体的认知对于经济不平等的道德化至关重要,更广泛地说,道德可以成为一种强大的动力,有效地动员人们采取行动。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.50
自引率
7.40%
发文量
85
期刊介绍: The British Journal of Social Psychology publishes work from scholars based in all parts of the world, and manuscripts that present data on a wide range of populations inside and outside the UK. It publishes original papers in all areas of social psychology including: • social cognition • attitudes • group processes • social influence • intergroup relations • self and identity • nonverbal communication • social psychological aspects of personality, affect and emotion • language and discourse Submissions addressing these topics from a variety of approaches and methods, both quantitative and qualitative are welcomed. We publish papers of the following kinds: • empirical papers that address theoretical issues; • theoretical papers, including analyses of existing social psychological theories and presentations of theoretical innovations, extensions, or integrations; • review papers that provide an evaluation of work within a given area of social psychology and that present proposals for further research in that area; • methodological papers concerning issues that are particularly relevant to a wide range of social psychologists; • an invited agenda article as the first article in the first part of every volume. The editorial team aims to handle papers as efficiently as possible. In 2016, papers were triaged within less than a week, and the average turnaround time from receipt of the manuscript to first decision sent back to the authors was 47 days.
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