British Journal of Social Psychology最新文献

In addition to sources (e.g. scripture) that directly disseminate religious agents' minds (e.g. attitudes), an egocentric model suggests one's own mind may serve as a basis for estimating religious agents' minds. However, the egocentric model is rarely directly tested for inferences of religious agents' minds, and such tests have largely been limited to correlational methodologies, morally charged topics, and to a focus on God or Jesus rather than evil religious agents (e.g. Satan). To expand testing, we conducted two studies with Christians that addressed these limiting factors. In Study 1, correlational evidence supported the egocentric model in how participants estimated both God's and Satan's attitudes on moral topics. In Study 2, experimental evidence supported this conclusion and extended it to both moral and amoral topics: People estimated God's and Satan's attitudes differently as a function of a persuasion manipulation that changed their own knowledge on issues. These findings extend support for an egocentric account of how Christians can infer religious agents' minds.

Citizens in democracies are increasingly dissatisfied with democratic governance, distrustful of elected officials and view politicians as aloof and detached. We argue that this is, in part, due to the overrepresentation of elites in political office. We conducted four studies (N = 2009) in the U.K. focusing on the education sector. That is, we explore the impact of the overrepresentation of privately educated individuals—who represent >7% of the population but 30%–70% of the political cabinet—on political trust. Studies 1a and 1b measured perceptions and stereotypes of politicians, and Studies 2–4 manipulated the proportion of privately educated politicians in political institutions. Results show that trust in political institutions is eroded when there is overrepresentation of those educated in the private sector. We explore boundary conditions showing that effects are stronger for those who question meritocratic principles in the educational sector and that the effect is mediated through perceptions of deservingness.

Nigeria has one of the largest youth populations in the world. Across three rounds of a total of 17 focus group discussions in and around Abuja (N = 115), we discussed the sociopolitical situation in Nigeria before and after the national elections in 2023. Participants spoke of the need for change, and in their future-thinking, they positioned youth as key drivers for change. Through a narrative analysis, we explore this positioning, as well as the exclusion of youth from decision-making spaces. Participants–young and older–speak of the exclusion of youth as blocking imagined futures for the nation. We divided the results into two main narratives: narratives of despair and narratives of hope. Agency and power are positioned differently within these–as owned by the elites in the first set of narratives, and by the people (particularly the youth) in the latter. The former is the more prominent and emphasized narrative, speaking to the challenging situation in Nigeria. We make use of concepts of hope, agency, and world-making to discuss the data, keeping in mind the restrictive context and hindrances in place. Combined, this allows for exploring the impact of future stories on the present, and places agency and power (and the lack thereof) front and centre.

The Roma—an ethnic minority group in Europe—continues to face high levels of discrimination. This research explores how the quality of contact between Roma and non-Roma is associated with collective action participation for Roma rights in Spain. It examines non-Roma as potential allies (Study 1; N = 239) and Roma (Study 2; N = 259), while considering the roles of social class, social identification (Roma and multiculturalist identities) and perceived discrimination in this process. Study 1 found that for non-Roma, high-quality contact with Roma, particularly with those attributed to a low social class, was related to non-Roma collective action both directly and indirectly through the high perception of discrimination and multiculturalist identity. However, the results of Study 2 with the Roma sample indicated that the quality of contact with non-Roma was associated with a lower perception of discrimination towards Roma, which in turn was related to lower intention to participate in collective action. Nevertheless, the quality of contact was associated with higher Roma intention to participate in collective action through increased multiculturalist identity, counteracting the sedative effects of contact. These findings emphasize the importance of social class, identity and perceived discrimination when examining the relationship between contact and collective action.

Awe is a self-transcendent emotion generating a range of benefits at the individual and at the societal level. Yet, research within the domain of intergroup relations is scarce. Across three studies—two experimental and one cross-sectional (total N = 2113)—we explored whether, how and for whom awe is negatively related to prejudice towards sexual minority group members (LGBT individuals) among sexual majority group members (heterosexual people). We found that participants assigned to a nature-induced awe (vs. control, Study 1; vs. control vs. amusement, Study 2) condition reported lower prejudice towards LGBT people. Moreover, Study 2 shed light on the underlying mechanisms through which nature-induced awe leads to lower prejudice, demonstrating the parallel mediating role of self-transcendence and belief in oneness, two constructs related to the promotion of broader group identities, by changing perceptions of the self and the world, respectively. Study 3 revealed that dispositional awe exerted a stronger negative effect on prejudice among heterosexual individuals with less frequent intergroup interactions with LGBT group members. The present investigation provides important insights into the complexity of the relationship between awe and prejudice, revealing that awe could be a powerful tool to reduce prejudice.

The military is widely regarded as an extension and tool of government and society, and unreliable military behaviour during operations can have far-reaching strategic and political consequences. Historically, literature has focused on the role of leaders in preventing disaster, emphasizing their traits, styles and attributes. Building on the Social Identity approach and High-Reliability Organization theorizing, this paper uses thematic analysis to develop an alternative understanding of leadership as a group process to which all members contribute—not least, the front-line personnel who do the followership that is ultimately the proof of leadership. Supported by evidence from semi-structured interviews with air force personnel (N = 25), analysis points to the importance of collective mind and social identity (a shared sense of ‘us’). It also suggests that social identity strength, content and alignment—and the identity leadership shaping this—provides a basis for the High-Reliability Followership that allows military groups to avoid potentially disastrous events. In this way, the creation of HROs hinges on the combined actions of identity leaders who work to represent, advance and create a specific sense of shared identity and engaged followers who internalize that identity content and enact it through behaviour that supports high reliability.

As artificial intelligence (AI) evolves, conspiracy theories have emerged that authorities will use AI to oppress humanity, or AI itself will. We propose that perceived high autonomy and low interdependence of AI increase AI-related conspiracy beliefs. Four studies (total N = 1897) have examined this line of reasoning. Study 1 (N = 300) supported the hypotheses in a correlational survey. Studies 2 (N = 400) and 3 (pre-registered; N = 400) manipulated the autonomy and interdependence of AI in experiments. Both studies found that higher autonomy and lower interdependence increased AI-related conspiracy beliefs, while perceived threat to society mediated these effects in most cases. Study 4 (pre-registered) replicated findings from Study 2 in the United States (N = 400) and China (N = 397) and found cultural differences in AI-related conspiracy beliefs. These findings illuminate how the perceived properties of AI contribute to AI-related conspiracy beliefs.

Nostalgia, a sentimental longing for one's past, confers important psychological benefits: positive affect, social connectedness, meaning in life, self-continuity, self-esteem, optimism, and inspiration. Is nostalgia equally beneficial in populations that have experienced a difficult upbringing? We explored boundaries of nostalgia's psychological benefits in an experiment among Gaza Strip youth (N = 416). We hypothesized additionally that resilience would catalyse the impact of nostalgia, with high-resilience participants benefiting more than low-resilience ones. Nostalgia only augmented social connectedness. As hypothesized, however, resilience emerged as a moderator. Whereas nostalgia increased positive affect and social connectedness among high-resilience individuals, it reduced positive affect, meaning in life, self-esteem, and inspiration among low-resilience ones. Social environmental hardship plausibly limits the reach of nostalgia's benefits.

The war in Ukraine has deepened ideological divides, particularly in neighbouring countries such as Romania and Moldova. This study examines how pro-Russian supporters in these nations construct narratives to sustain moral superiority while justifying the invasion of Ukraine. Drawing on Social Identity Theory (SIT) and theoretical models of social creativity and moral disengagement, we analyse how a positive collective identity is maintained despite support for morally contentious actions. Through thematic analysis of social media content expressing pro-Russian viewpoints, we identified strategies including reframing aggressive actions as morally justifiable, making favourable group comparisons, and emphasizing ingroup virtues while dehumanizing the outgroup. These approaches facilitate rationalization, mitigate cognitive dissonance, and preserve perceptions of moral superiority. Conspiracy theories about global powers manipulating the conflict further reinforce distrust in mainstream narratives and absolve Russia of responsibility. Our findings highlight how social identity mechanisms function to protect group identity, potentially intensifying ideological divisions and bolstering support for morally problematic positions. This research also provides insights into ways of combating misinformation and developing effective counter-narratives in modern geopolitical conflicts.

Social identification and group norms have been identified as key social psychological determinants of engagement in protective public health behaviours, such as social distancing, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing upon both social identity and balanced identity theories, the research tests the utility of a Social Identity Model of Behavioural Associations (SIMBA)—which proposes reciprocal, interactive associations among self-group, group-behaviour and self-behaviour concepts—for the measurement of British national identification, group norms and social distancing behaviour at two different points during the pandemic. An online study asked participants (Time 1 N = 151, Time 2 N = 136) to complete implicit and explicit (i.e. self-report) measures both during and post-lockdown. Results demonstrated associations to be relatively stable across time and found strong correlational confirmation that the strength of any one association in the SIMBA could be predicted by the interactive strength of the remaining two—both implicitly and explicitly. However, the strength of any one association, as measured post-lockdown, was not predicted by the interaction between the change scores of the remaining two—suggesting that the constructs may not be long-range predictors of one another. Findings are discussed in terms of the value of the SIMBA for the measurement and modification of novel, emergent group-based associations.