Crowdsourcing peer information to change spending behavior

IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-22 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103858
Francesco D’Acunto , Alberto G. Rossi , Michael Weber
{"title":"Crowdsourcing peer information to change spending behavior","authors":"Francesco D’Acunto ,&nbsp;Alberto G. Rossi ,&nbsp;Michael Weber","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103858","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We isolate the information channel of peer effects in consumption in a setting that excludes a role for common shocks or social pressure—a spending panel paired with crowdsourced information about anonymous “peers” elicited at different times. Consumers converge to peers’ spending, and more so when peer signals are more informative. Convergence is asymmetric: within 12 months of information provision, overspenders close 17% and underspenders 5% of their gap relative to peers. We exploit the quasi-random assignment to peer groups in an instrumental-variable strategy and implement an experiment for external validity. Our results are consistent with information-based theories of overconsumption.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"157 ","pages":"Article 103858"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24000813","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

We isolate the information channel of peer effects in consumption in a setting that excludes a role for common shocks or social pressure—a spending panel paired with crowdsourced information about anonymous “peers” elicited at different times. Consumers converge to peers’ spending, and more so when peer signals are more informative. Convergence is asymmetric: within 12 months of information provision, overspenders close 17% and underspenders 5% of their gap relative to peers. We exploit the quasi-random assignment to peer groups in an instrumental-variable strategy and implement an experiment for external validity. Our results are consistent with information-based theories of overconsumption.

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
众包同行信息,改变消费行为
我们在排除共同冲击或社会压力的情况下,分离了消费中同伴效应的信息渠道--消费面板与在不同时间获得的匿名 "同伴 "众包信息配对。消费者的消费趋同于同伴的消费,当同伴的消费信号信息量更大时,趋同程度更高。趋同是不对称的:在提供信息后的 12 个月内,超支者缩小了与同龄人 17% 的差距,而支出不足者缩小了 5% 的差距。我们利用准随机分配到同龄人群体的工具变量策略,并实施了一项外部有效性实验。我们的研究结果与基于信息的过度消费理论是一致的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
15.80
自引率
4.50%
发文量
192
审稿时长
37 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.
期刊最新文献
Aspirational utility and investment behavior Arbitrage-based recovery Gig labor: Trading safety nets for steering wheels Information sharing in financial markets From employee to entrepreneur: The role of unemployment risk
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1