Pub Date : 2024-11-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103970
Andreas Aristidou , Aleksandar Giga , Suk Lee , Fernando Zapatero
We explore the extent to which aspirations – such as those forged in the course of social interactions – explain ‘puzzling’ behavioral patterns in investment decisions. We motivate an aspirational utility, reminiscent of Friedman and Savage (1948), where social considerations (e.g., status concerns) provide an economic foundation for aspirations. We show this utility can explain a range of observed investor behaviors, such as the demand for both right- and left-skewed assets; aspects of the disposition effect; and patterns in stock-market participation consistent with empirical observations. We corroborate our theoretical findings with two novel laboratory experimental studies, where we observed participants’ preference for skewness in risky lotteries shift as lab-induced aspirations shifted.
{"title":"Aspirational utility and investment behavior","authors":"Andreas Aristidou , Aleksandar Giga , Suk Lee , Fernando Zapatero","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103970","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103970","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the extent to which aspirations – such as those forged in the course of social interactions – explain ‘puzzling’ behavioral patterns in investment decisions. We motivate an aspirational utility, reminiscent of Friedman and Savage (1948), where social considerations (<em>e.g.</em>, status concerns) provide an economic foundation for aspirations. We show this utility can explain a range of observed investor behaviors, such as the demand for both right- and left-skewed assets; aspects of the disposition effect; and patterns in stock-market participation consistent with empirical observations. We corroborate our theoretical findings with two novel laboratory experimental studies, where we observed participants’ preference for skewness in risky lotteries shift as lab-induced aspirations shifted.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103970"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103969
Ferenc Horvath
We develop a novel recovery theorem based on no-arbitrage principles. To implement our Arbitrage-Based Recovery Theorem empirically, one needs to observe the Arrow–Debreu prices only for one single maturity. We perform several different density tests and mean prediction tests using more than 26 years of S&P 500 options data, and we find evidence that our method can correctly recover the probability distribution of the S&P 500 index return on a monthly horizon, despite the presence of a non-trivial permanent SDF component.
{"title":"Arbitrage-based recovery","authors":"Ferenc Horvath","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103969","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103969","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a novel recovery theorem based on no-arbitrage principles. To implement our Arbitrage-Based Recovery Theorem empirically, one needs to observe the Arrow–Debreu prices only for one single maturity. We perform several different density tests and mean prediction tests using more than 26 years of S&P 500 options data, and we find evidence that our method can correctly recover the probability distribution of the S&P 500 index return on a monthly horizon, despite the presence of a non-trivial permanent SDF component.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103969"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using administrative data on credit profiles matched with unemployment insurance (UI) for individuals in the U.S., we show that laid-off workers with access to Uber rely less on household debt, experience fewer delinquencies, and are less likely to apply for UI benefits. Our empirical strategy exploits both the staggered market entry of Uber across cities and the differential benefit of its entry across car owners based on car age, a key eligibility requirement of the platform. We conclude that the introduction of Uber reduced reliance on these alternative means of smoothing extreme income shocks.
{"title":"Gig labor: Trading safety nets for steering wheels","authors":"Vyacheslav Fos , Naser Hamdi , Ankit Kalda , Jordan Nickerson","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103956","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103956","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using administrative data on credit profiles matched with unemployment insurance (UI) for individuals in the U.S., we show that laid-off workers with access to Uber rely less on household debt, experience fewer delinquencies, and are less likely to apply for UI benefits. Our empirical strategy exploits both the staggered market entry of Uber across cities and the differential benefit of its entry across car owners based on car age, a key eligibility requirement of the platform. We conclude that the introduction of Uber reduced reliance on these alternative means of smoothing extreme income shocks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103956"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103967
Itay Goldstein , Yan Xiong , Liyan Yang
We study information sharing between strategic investors who are informed about asset fundamentals. We demonstrate that a coarsely informed investor optimally chooses to share information if his counterparty investor is well informed. By doing so, the coarsely informed investor invites the other investor to trade against his information, thereby reducing his price impact. Paradoxically, the well informed investor loses from receiving information because of the resulting worsened market liquidity and the more aggressive trading by the coarsely informed investor. Our analysis sheds light on phenomena such as private communications among investors and public information sharing on social media.
{"title":"Information sharing in financial markets","authors":"Itay Goldstein , Yan Xiong , Liyan Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103967","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103967","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study information sharing between strategic investors who are informed about asset fundamentals. We demonstrate that a coarsely informed investor optimally chooses to share information if his counterparty investor is well informed. By doing so, the coarsely informed investor invites the other investor to trade against his information, thereby reducing his price impact. Paradoxically, the well informed investor loses from receiving information because of the resulting worsened market liquidity and the more aggressive trading by the coarsely informed investor. Our analysis sheds light on phenomena such as private communications among investors and public information sharing on social media.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103967"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142592595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-11-04DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103966
Ai Jun Hou , Sara Jonsson , Xiaoyang Li , Qinglin Ouyang
We use Swedish administrative data to study the role of unemployment risk in salaried employees’ decisions to become entrepreneurs. Using the 2001 relaxation of Sweden’s last-in-first-out (LIFO) dismissal rule as an exogenous shock to unemployment risk, we find that employees facing increased unemployment risk are more likely to become entrepreneurs. The effect is more pronounced for employees with longer tenure, as they were newly exposed to greater unemployment risk. When we track entrepreneurs’ income dynamics and the performance of their ventures, we find that entrepreneurs who used to face greater unemployment risk do not underperform compared to other entrepreneurs. Our results provide some of the first empirical evidence of how employees respond to increased unemployment risk.
{"title":"From employee to entrepreneur: The role of unemployment risk","authors":"Ai Jun Hou , Sara Jonsson , Xiaoyang Li , Qinglin Ouyang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103966","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103966","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We use Swedish administrative data to study the role of unemployment risk in salaried employees’ decisions to become entrepreneurs. Using the 2001 relaxation of Sweden’s last-in-first-out (LIFO) dismissal rule as an exogenous shock to unemployment risk, we find that employees facing increased unemployment risk are more likely to become entrepreneurs. The effect is more pronounced for employees with longer tenure, as they were newly exposed to greater unemployment risk. When we track entrepreneurs’ income dynamics and the performance of their ventures, we find that entrepreneurs who used to face greater unemployment risk do not underperform compared to other entrepreneurs. Our results provide some of the first empirical evidence of how employees respond to increased unemployment risk.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103966"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142578894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We characterize investors’ moral preferences in a parsimonious experimental setting, where we auction stocks with various ethical features. We find strong evidence that investors seek to align their investments with their social values (“value alignment”), and find no evidence of behavior driven by the social impact of investment decisions (“impact-seeking preferences”). First, the willingness to pay (WTP) for a stock is an increasing and quasi-linear function of corporate externalities. Second, this WTP does not change when corporate externalities are made contingent on investors buying the auctioned stock. Our results are thus compatible with a utility-maximization model where non-pecuniary benefits of firms’ externalities only accrue through stock ownership, not through the actual impact of investment decisions. Finally, the ability to directly contribute to the externality (by donating) does not reduce the willingness to pay for virtuous stocks.
{"title":"The moral preferences of investors: Experimental evidence","authors":"Jean-François Bonnefon , Augustin Landier , Parinitha Sastry , David Thesmar","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103955","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103955","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We characterize investors’ moral preferences in a parsimonious experimental setting, where we auction stocks with various ethical features. We find strong evidence that investors seek to align their investments with their social values (“value alignment”), and find no evidence of behavior driven by the social impact of investment decisions (“impact-seeking preferences”). First, the willingness to pay (WTP) for a stock is an increasing and quasi-linear function of corporate externalities. Second, this WTP does not change when corporate externalities are made contingent on investors buying the auctioned stock. Our results are thus compatible with a utility-maximization model where non-pecuniary benefits of firms’ externalities only accrue through stock ownership, not through the actual impact of investment decisions. Finally, the ability to directly contribute to the externality (by donating) does not reduce the willingness to pay for virtuous stocks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103955"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142572798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-28DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103958
Manuel Adelino , Antoinette Schoar , Felipe Severino
This paper develops a difference-in-differences estimator that uses annual changes in the conforming loan limit and the 80% loan-to-value (LTV) threshold to isolate the impact of easier access to credit on house prices. Houses that become eligible for financing with an 80% LTV conforming loan increase in value by about $1.17 per square foot, controlling for a rich set of characteristics. Our estimates imply a local elasticity of house prices to interest rates below 6, which suggests that interest rates are capitalized into prices to a lesser extent than proposed by studies relying on more aggregate variation.
{"title":"Credit supply and house prices: Evidence from mortgage market segmentation","authors":"Manuel Adelino , Antoinette Schoar , Felipe Severino","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103958","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103958","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper develops a difference-in-differences estimator that uses annual changes in the conforming loan limit and the 80% loan-to-value (LTV) threshold to isolate the impact of easier access to credit on house prices. Houses that become eligible for financing with an 80% LTV conforming loan increase in value by about $1.17 per square foot, controlling for a rich set of characteristics. Our estimates imply a local elasticity of house prices to interest rates below 6, which suggests that interest rates are capitalized into prices to a lesser extent than proposed by studies relying on more aggregate variation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103958"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142528740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-28DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103953
Pascal J. Maenhout , Andrea Vedolin , Hao Xing
Errors in survey expectations display waves of pessimism and optimism. This paper develops a novel theoretical framework of time-varying beliefs capturing this fact. In our model, dynamic beliefs arise endogenously due to agents’ attitude towards alternative models. Decision-maker’s distorted beliefs generate countercyclical risk aversion, procyclical portfolio weights, and countercyclical equilibrium asset returns. A calibrated version of our model is shown to jointly match salient features in survey data and equity markets.
{"title":"Robustness and dynamic sentiment","authors":"Pascal J. Maenhout , Andrea Vedolin , Hao Xing","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103953","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103953","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Errors in survey expectations display waves of pessimism and optimism. This paper develops a novel theoretical framework of time-varying beliefs capturing this fact. In our model, dynamic beliefs arise endogenously due to agents’ attitude towards alternative models. Decision-maker’s distorted beliefs generate countercyclical risk aversion, procyclical portfolio weights, and countercyclical equilibrium asset returns. A calibrated version of our model is shown to jointly match salient features in survey data and equity markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103953"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142528738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-25DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103957
Xavier Vives , Zhiqiang Ye
We study how information technology (IT) affects lender competition, entrepreneurs’ investment, and welfare in a spatial model. The effects of an IT improvement depend on whether it weakens the influence of lender–borrower distance on monitoring costs. If it does, it has a hump-shaped effect on entrepreneurs’ investment and social welfare. If not, competition intensity does not vary, improving lender profits, entrepreneurs’ investment, and social welfare. When entrepreneurs’ moral hazard problem is severe, IT-induced competition is more likely to reduce investment and welfare. We also find that lenders’ price discrimination is not welfare-optimal. Our results are consistent with received empirical work on lending to SMEs.
{"title":"Information technology and lender competition","authors":"Xavier Vives , Zhiqiang Ye","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103957","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103957","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study how information technology (IT) affects lender competition, entrepreneurs’ investment, and welfare in a spatial model. The effects of an IT improvement depend on whether it weakens the influence of lender–borrower distance on monitoring costs. If it does, it has a hump-shaped effect on entrepreneurs’ investment and social welfare. If not, competition intensity does not vary, improving lender profits, entrepreneurs’ investment, and social welfare. When entrepreneurs’ moral hazard problem is severe, IT-induced competition is more likely to reduce investment and welfare. We also find that lenders’ price discrimination is not welfare-optimal. Our results are consistent with received empirical work on lending to SMEs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103957"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142528739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-10-23DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103954
Roman Inderst , Marcus M. Opp
Our paper analyzes whether a planner should design a taxonomy for sustainable investment products when conventional tools for environmental regulation can also be used to address externalities arising from firm production. We first show that the private market provision of ESG funds marketed to retail investors involves greenwashing, so that a mandatory taxonomy is necessary to generate real effects of sustainable finance. However, the introduction of such a taxonomy can only improve welfare, on top of optimally chosen environmental regulation, if financial frictions constrain socially valuable economic activity. Otherwise, environmental policy alone is sufficient to optimally address externalities.
{"title":"Sustainable finance versus environmental policy: Does greenwashing justify a taxonomy for sustainable investments?","authors":"Roman Inderst , Marcus M. Opp","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103954","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103954","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Our paper analyzes whether a planner should design a taxonomy for sustainable investment products when conventional tools for environmental regulation can also be used to address externalities arising from firm production. We first show that the private market provision of ESG funds marketed to retail investors involves greenwashing, so that a mandatory taxonomy is necessary to generate real effects of sustainable finance. However, the introduction of such a taxonomy can only improve welfare, on top of optimally chosen environmental regulation, if financial frictions constrain socially valuable economic activity. Otherwise, environmental policy alone is sufficient to optimally address externalities.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103954"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142528737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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