Pub Date : 2025-01-09DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103990
Alexandre Corhay, Howard Kung, Lukas Schmid
We document that the increasing polarization in Tobin’s Q within industries is closely connected to the growing divergence in rents and the emergence of superstar firms over the past four decades, while discount rates and growth rates did not exhibit the same increasing dispersion. We explain these industry polarization trends in an estimated general equilibrium model where each industry consists of large superstar oligopolists and small monopolistically competitive firms with endogenous transitions between them. Small firms make investments in speculative innovation to increase their probability of becoming superstars. Our model estimation finds that rising entry barriers in both small and superstar firms contribute to rising polarization in markups, but the rising barriers to creating small firms and increasing tastes for goods produced by superstars account for most of the divergence in Q. Stunting the creation of small firms generates greater incentives for speculative innovation, magnifying the impact of market power dispersion on industry polarization in Q.
{"title":"Q: Risk, rents, or growth?","authors":"Alexandre Corhay, Howard Kung, Lukas Schmid","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103990","url":null,"abstract":"We document that the increasing polarization in Tobin’s <mml:math altimg=\"si13.svg\" display=\"inline\"><mml:mi>Q</mml:mi></mml:math> within industries is closely connected to the growing divergence in rents and the emergence of superstar firms over the past four decades, while discount rates and growth rates did not exhibit the same increasing dispersion. We explain these industry polarization trends in an estimated general equilibrium model where each industry consists of large superstar oligopolists and small monopolistically competitive firms with endogenous transitions between them. Small firms make investments in speculative innovation to increase their probability of becoming superstars. Our model estimation finds that rising entry barriers in both small and superstar firms contribute to rising polarization in markups, but the rising barriers to creating small firms and increasing tastes for goods produced by superstars account for most of the divergence in <mml:math altimg=\"si13.svg\" display=\"inline\"><mml:mi>Q</mml:mi></mml:math>. Stunting the creation of small firms generates greater incentives for speculative innovation, magnifying the impact of market power dispersion on industry polarization in <mml:math altimg=\"si13.svg\" display=\"inline\"><mml:mi>Q</mml:mi></mml:math>.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142968119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-06DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103975
Huaizhi Chen, Richard Evans, Yang Sun
Using a panel of self-declared benchmarks, we examine funds’ use of mismatched benchmarks over time. Mismatching is high at the beginning of our sample (45 % of TNA in 2008), consistent with prior studies, but declines significantly over time (27 % in 2020), driven by existing specialized funds changing benchmarks to match their style. Market forces including investor learning, institutional governance, market competition, and product positioning all play a role in benchmark correction decisions. For funds with difficult to categorize investment strategies, mismatched benchmarks are less associated with performance bias. Our study highlights the value of market solutions in aligning manager-investor interests.
{"title":"Self-Declared benchmarks and fund manager intent: “Cheating” or competing?","authors":"Huaizhi Chen, Richard Evans, Yang Sun","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103975","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103975","url":null,"abstract":"Using a panel of self-declared benchmarks, we examine funds’ use of mismatched benchmarks over time. Mismatching is high at the beginning of our sample (45 % of TNA in 2008), consistent with prior studies, but declines significantly over time (27 % in 2020), driven by existing specialized funds changing benchmarks to match their style. Market forces including investor learning, institutional governance, market competition, and product positioning all play a role in benchmark correction decisions. For funds with difficult to categorize investment strategies, mismatched benchmarks are less associated with performance bias. Our study highlights the value of market solutions in aligning manager-investor interests.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142968121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-31DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103992
Luca Coraggio, Marco Pagano, Annalisa Scognamiglio, Joacim Tåg
We develop a novel measure of job-worker allocation quality (JAQ) by exploiting employer-employee data with machine learning techniques. Based on our measure, the quality of job-worker matching correlates positively with individual labor earnings and firm productivity, as well as with market competition, non-family firm status, and employees’ human capital. Management plays a key role in job-worker matching: when managerial hirings and firings persistently raise management quality, the matching of rank-and-file workers to their jobs improves. JAQ can be constructed from any employer–employee data set including workers’ occupations, and used to explore research questions in corporate finance and organization economics.
{"title":"JAQ of all trades: Job mismatch, firm productivity and managerial quality","authors":"Luca Coraggio, Marco Pagano, Annalisa Scognamiglio, Joacim Tåg","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103992","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a novel measure of job-worker allocation quality (<mml:math altimg=\"si174.svg\" display=\"inline\"><mml:mi mathvariant=\"italic\">JAQ</mml:mi></mml:math>) by exploiting employer-employee data with machine learning techniques. Based on our measure, the quality of job-worker matching correlates positively with individual labor earnings and firm productivity, as well as with market competition, non-family firm status, and employees’ human capital. Management plays a key role in job-worker matching: when managerial hirings and firings persistently raise management quality, the matching of rank-and-file workers to their jobs improves. <mml:math altimg=\"si174.svg\" display=\"inline\"><mml:mi mathvariant=\"italic\">JAQ</mml:mi></mml:math> can be constructed from any employer–employee data set including workers’ occupations, and used to explore research questions in corporate finance and organization economics.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"83 10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142929210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-26DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103986
Stefano Cassella, Te-Feng Chen, Huseyin Gulen, Yan Liu
We propose a latent-variables approach to recover extrapolative beliefs from asset prices. We estimate a present-value model of the price–dividend ratio of the market that embeds both return extrapolation and cash-flow extrapolation, alongside discount rates and rational expectations of dividend growth. This approach allows us to measure extrapolation bias without having to rely on survey data, and it inherently guarantees that the researcher focuses on a set of beliefs that matter for price formation. We show that extrapolative beliefs extracted from prices are highly correlated with surveys and that survey-based and price-based extrapolative beliefs share similar predictive properties for future returns, with the former improving upon the latter.
{"title":"Extracting extrapolative beliefs from market prices: An augmented present-value approach","authors":"Stefano Cassella, Te-Feng Chen, Huseyin Gulen, Yan Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103986","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a latent-variables approach to recover extrapolative beliefs from asset prices. We estimate a present-value model of the price–dividend ratio of the market that embeds both return extrapolation and cash-flow extrapolation, alongside discount rates and rational expectations of dividend growth. This approach allows us to measure extrapolation bias without having to rely on survey data, and it inherently guarantees that the researcher focuses on a set of beliefs that matter for price formation. We show that extrapolative beliefs extracted from prices are highly correlated with surveys and that survey-based and price-based extrapolative beliefs share similar predictive properties for future returns, with the former improving upon the latter.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142889325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-24DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103985
Roger M. Edelen, Kingsley Y.L. Fong, Jingyi Han
We study the impact of disclosure and inattention on the decision to retain fee-based financial advice using a two-tiered natural regulatory experiment. Increased salience in fee disclosure raises the drop rate for advice, implying improved attention — particularly for relatively sophisticated investors. However, a novel auto-drop requirement for inattentive investors generates far more drops, implying limited attention despite salient disclosure — particularly for the unsophisticated. Contrary to studies of commission-based advice, we find that investors benefit from fee-based advice. Benefits are higher for less sophisticated investors, who tend to be detrimentally auto-dropped. Drops triggered by salient disclosure tend to be beneficial.
{"title":"Regulating inattention in fee-based financial advice","authors":"Roger M. Edelen, Kingsley Y.L. Fong, Jingyi Han","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103985","url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of disclosure and inattention on the decision to retain fee-based financial advice using a two-tiered natural regulatory experiment. Increased salience in fee disclosure raises the drop rate for advice, implying improved attention — particularly for relatively sophisticated investors. However, a novel auto-drop requirement for inattentive investors generates far more drops, implying limited attention despite salient disclosure — particularly for the unsophisticated. Contrary to studies of commission-based advice, we find that investors benefit from fee-based advice. Benefits are higher for less sophisticated investors, who tend to be detrimentally auto-dropped. Drops triggered by salient disclosure tend to be beneficial.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"320 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142889330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-21DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103984
Stefano Giglio, Matteo Maggiori, Johannes Stroebel, Zhenhao Tan, Stephen Utkus, Xiao Xu
We analyze survey data on ESG beliefs and preferences in a large panel of retail investors linked to administrative data on their investment portfolios. The survey elicits investors’ expectations of long-term ESG equity returns and asks about their motivations, if any, to invest in ESG assets. We document four facts. First, investors generally expected ESG investments to underperform the market. Between mid-2021 and late-2023, the average expected 10-year annualized return of ESG investments relative to the overall stock market was −2.1%. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity across investors in their ESG return expectations and their motives for ESG investing: 48% of survey respondents do not see any reason to invest in ESG, 24% are primarily motivated by ethical considerations, 22% are driven by climate hedging motives, and 6% are motivated by return expectations. Third, there is a strong link between individuals’ reported ESG investment motives and their actual investment behaviors, with the highest ESG portfolio holdings among individuals who report ethics-driven investment motives. Fourth, financial considerations matter independently of other investment motives: we find meaningful ESG holdings only for investors who expect these investments to outperform the market, even among those investors who reported that their most important ESG investment motives were ethical or hedging reasons.
{"title":"Four facts about ESG beliefs and investor portfolios","authors":"Stefano Giglio, Matteo Maggiori, Johannes Stroebel, Zhenhao Tan, Stephen Utkus, Xiao Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103984","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze survey data on ESG beliefs and preferences in a large panel of retail investors linked to administrative data on their investment portfolios. The survey elicits investors’ expectations of long-term ESG equity returns and asks about their motivations, if any, to invest in ESG assets. We document four facts. First, investors generally expected ESG investments to underperform the market. Between mid-2021 and late-2023, the average expected 10-year annualized return of ESG investments relative to the overall stock market was <mml:math altimg=\"si1.svg\" display=\"inline\"><mml:mo>−</mml:mo></mml:math>2.1%. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity across investors in their ESG return expectations and their motives for ESG investing: 48% of survey respondents do not see any reason to invest in ESG, 24% are primarily motivated by ethical considerations, 22% are driven by climate hedging motives, and 6% are motivated by return expectations. Third, there is a strong link between individuals’ reported ESG investment motives and their actual investment behaviors, with the highest ESG portfolio holdings among individuals who report ethics-driven investment motives. Fourth, financial considerations matter independently of other investment motives: we find meaningful ESG holdings only for investors who expect these investments to outperform the market, even among those investors who reported that their most important ESG investment motives were ethical or hedging reasons.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"279 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142873918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-19DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103987
Caroline Flammer, Thomas Giroux, Geoffrey M. Heal
We study biodiversity finance—the use of private capital to finance biodiversity conservation and restoration—which is a new practice in sustainable finance. First, we provide a conceptual framework that lays out how biodiversity can be financed by pure private capital and blended financing structures. In the latter, private capital is blended with public or philanthropic capital, whose aim is to de-risk private capital investments. The main element underlying both types of financing is the “monetization” of biodiversity, that is, using investments in biodiversity to generate a financial return for private investors. Second, we provide empirical evidence using deal-level data from a leading biodiversity finance institution. Our findings are consistent with a three-dimensional efficient frontier (return, risk, and biodiversity impact)—deals with a favorable risk-return profile tend to be financed by pure private capital, whereas for other deals the biodiversity impact needs to be sufficiently large for blended finance to be used. Overall, our results suggest that blended finance is an important tool for improving the risk-return profile of these projects, thereby increasing their appeal to private investors and crowding in private capital. Finally, our results suggest that private capital is unlikely to substitute for effective public policies in addressing the biodiversity crisis.
{"title":"Biodiversity finance","authors":"Caroline Flammer, Thomas Giroux, Geoffrey M. Heal","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103987","url":null,"abstract":"We study biodiversity finance—the use of private capital to finance biodiversity conservation and restoration—which is a new practice in sustainable finance. First, we provide a conceptual framework that lays out how biodiversity can be financed by pure private capital and blended financing structures. In the latter, private capital is blended with public or philanthropic capital, whose aim is to de-risk private capital investments. The main element underlying both types of financing is the “monetization” of biodiversity, that is, using investments in biodiversity to generate a financial return for private investors. Second, we provide empirical evidence using deal-level data from a leading biodiversity finance institution. Our findings are consistent with a three-dimensional efficient frontier (return, risk, and biodiversity impact)—deals with a favorable risk-return profile tend to be financed by pure private capital, whereas for other deals the biodiversity impact needs to be sufficiently large for blended finance to be used. Overall, our results suggest that blended finance is an important tool for improving the risk-return profile of these projects, thereby increasing their appeal to private investors and crowding in private capital. Finally, our results suggest that private capital is unlikely to substitute for effective public policies in addressing the biodiversity crisis.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142873917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-16DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103974
Mathijs Cosemans, Rik Frehen
This paper uses hand-collected historical data to provide empirical evidence on the strategic trading behavior of insiders and its consequences for outsiders. Specifically, we collect all equity trades of all insiders and outsiders in an era without legal restrictions on insider trading and a market where trading is non-anonymous. We find that access to private information creates a significant gap between the post-trade returns of insiders and outsiders. Consistent with theory, insiders capitalize on their information advantage by hiding their identity and timing their trades. Both experienced and inexperienced outsiders face expected losses due to this strategic insider trading.
{"title":"Strategic insider trading and its consequences for outsiders: Evidence from the eighteenth century","authors":"Mathijs Cosemans, Rik Frehen","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103974","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses hand-collected historical data to provide empirical evidence on the strategic trading behavior of insiders and its consequences for outsiders. Specifically, we collect all equity trades of all insiders and outsiders in an era without legal restrictions on insider trading and a market where trading is non-anonymous. We find that access to private information creates a significant gap between the post-trade returns of insiders and outsiders. Consistent with theory, insiders capitalize on their information advantage by hiding their identity and timing their trades. Both experienced and inexperienced outsiders face expected losses due to this strategic insider trading.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142873968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-12DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103973
Jack Liebersohn, Jesse Rothstein
Rising interest rates can create “mortgage rate lock” for homeowners with fixed rate mortgages, who can hold onto their low rates as long as they stay in their homes but would have to take on new mortgages with higher rates if they moved. We show mobility rates fell in 2022 and 2023 for homeowners with mortgages, as market rates rose. We observe both absolute declines and declines relative to homeowners without mortgages, who are unaffected by mortgage rate lock. Mobility declines are not explained by changes in home values. Overall, our estimates imply that rising interest rates reduced mobility in 2022 and 2023 for households with mortgages by 16% and caused $20bn of deadweight loss.
{"title":"Household mobility and mortgage rate lock","authors":"Jack Liebersohn, Jesse Rothstein","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103973","url":null,"abstract":"Rising interest rates can create “mortgage rate lock” for homeowners with fixed rate mortgages, who can hold onto their low rates as long as they stay in their homes but would have to take on new mortgages with higher rates if they moved. We show mobility rates fell in 2022 and 2023 for homeowners with mortgages, as market rates rose. We observe both absolute declines and declines relative to homeowners without mortgages, who are unaffected by mortgage rate lock. Mobility declines are not explained by changes in home values. Overall, our estimates imply that rising interest rates reduced mobility in 2022 and 2023 for households with mortgages by 16% and caused $20bn of deadweight loss.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142825477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103972
Jonathan B. Berk , Jules H. van Binsbergen
The change in the cost of capital that results from a divestiture strategy can be closely approximated by a simple function of three parameters: (1) the fraction of socially conscious capital, (2) the fraction of targeted firms in the economy and (3) the return correlation between the targeted firms and the rest of the stock market. When calibrated to current data, we demonstrate that the impact on the cost of capital is too small to meaningfully affect real investment decisions. We then derive the conditions that would be required for the strategy to have a meaningful impact. We empirically corroborate our theoretical results by studying firm changes in ESG status and are unable to detect an impact of ESG divestiture strategies on the cost of capital of treated firms. Our results suggest that to have impact, instead of divesting, socially conscious investors should invest and exercise their rights of control to change corporate policy.
{"title":"The impact of impact investing","authors":"Jonathan B. Berk , Jules H. van Binsbergen","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103972","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103972","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The change in the cost of capital that results from a divestiture strategy can be closely approximated by a simple function of three parameters: (1) the fraction of socially conscious capital, (2) the fraction of targeted firms in the economy and (3) the return correlation between the targeted firms and the rest of the stock market. When calibrated to current data, we demonstrate that the impact on the cost of capital is too small to meaningfully affect real investment decisions. We then derive the conditions that would be required for the strategy to have a meaningful impact. We empirically corroborate our theoretical results by studying firm changes in ESG status and are unable to detect an impact of ESG divestiture strategies on the cost of capital of treated firms. Our results suggest that to have impact, instead of divesting, socially conscious investors should invest and exercise their rights of control to change corporate policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"164 ","pages":"Article 103972"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142759101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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