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The return of return dominance: Decomposing the cross-section of prices
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104059
Ricardo Delao , Xiao Han , Sean Myers
What explains cross-sectional dispersion in stock valuation ratios? We find that 75% of dispersion in price–earnings ratios is reflected in differences in future returns, while only 25% is reflected in differences in future earnings growth. This holds at both the portfolio-level and the firm-level. We reconcile these conclusions with previous literature which has found a strong relation between prices and future profitability. Our results support models in which the cross-section of price–earnings ratios is driven mainly by discount rates or mispricing rather than future earnings growth. Evaluating six models of the value premium, we find that most models struggle to match our results; however, models with long-lived differences in risk exposure or gradual learning about parameters perform the best. The lack of earnings growth differences at long horizons provides new evidence in favor of long-run return predictability. We also show a similar dominance of predicted returns for explaining the dispersion in return surprises.
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引用次数: 0
Collateral value uncertainty and mortgage credit provision
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104054
Erica Xuewei Jiang , Anthony Lee Zhang
Houses with higher value uncertainty receive less mortgage credit: mortgages backed by these houses are more likely to be rejected, have higher interest rates, and have lower loan-to-price ratios. The relationship between house value uncertainty and credit availability is driven partly by a classic channel in which uncertainty lowers debt recovery rates, and partly by a novel channel where more uncertain appraisals make regulatory constraints on loan size more likely to bind. We build a structural model to quantify the effects of each channel, and show how a shift toward computerized asset appraisals could influence credit access.
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引用次数: 0
Payments and privacy in the digital economy
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104050
Toni Ahnert , Peter Hoffmann , Cyril Monnet
We propose a model of lending, payments choice, and privacy in the digital economy. While digital payments enable merchants to sell goods online, they reveal information to their lender. Cash guarantees anonymity, but limits distribution to less efficient offline venues. In equilibrium, merchants trade off the efficiency gains from online distribution (with digital payments) and the informational rents from staying anonymous (with cash). While new technologies can reduce the privacy concerns associated with digital payments, they also redistribute surplus from the lender to merchants. Hence, privacy enhancements do not always improve welfare.
{"title":"Payments and privacy in the digital economy","authors":"Toni Ahnert ,&nbsp;Peter Hoffmann ,&nbsp;Cyril Monnet","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104050","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104050","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a model of lending, payments choice, and privacy in the digital economy. While digital payments enable merchants to sell goods online, they reveal information to their lender. Cash guarantees anonymity, but limits distribution to less efficient offline venues. In equilibrium, merchants trade off the efficiency gains from online distribution (with digital payments) and the informational rents from staying anonymous (with cash). While new technologies can reduce the privacy concerns associated with digital payments, they also redistribute surplus from the lender to merchants. Hence, privacy enhancements do not always improve welfare.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104050"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143791870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Data sales and data dilution
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104053
Ernest Liu , Song Ma , Laura Veldkamp
We explore indicators of market power in a data market. Markups cannot measure competition, because most data products’ marginal cost is zero, making the markup infinite. Yet, data monopolists may not exert monopoly power because they cannot commit to restricting data sales to future customers. This limited commitment and strategic substitutability of data undermine sellers’ monopoly power. But data subscriptions restore this monopoly power. Evidence from online data markets supports the model’s insight that subscriptions indicate market power. Model and evidence reveal that data subscriptions are better for consumers because they sustain the incentive to invest in high-quality data.
{"title":"Data sales and data dilution","authors":"Ernest Liu ,&nbsp;Song Ma ,&nbsp;Laura Veldkamp","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104053","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104053","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore indicators of market power in a data market. Markups cannot measure competition, because most data products’ marginal cost is zero, making the markup infinite. Yet, data monopolists may not exert monopoly power because they cannot commit to restricting data sales to future customers. This limited commitment and strategic substitutability of data undermine sellers’ monopoly power. But data subscriptions restore this monopoly power. Evidence from online data markets supports the model’s insight that subscriptions indicate market power. Model and evidence reveal that data subscriptions are better for consumers because they sustain the incentive to invest in high-quality data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104053"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143785776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rules versus discretion in capital regulation
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104060
Urban Jermann , Haotian Xiang
We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks’ incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency problem. In a model with non-maturing deposits where optimal withdrawals make deposits endogenously long-term, we find commitment to have important effects on the optimal level and cyclicality of capital adequacy. Our results call for a systematic framework that limits capital regulators’ discretion.
{"title":"Rules versus discretion in capital regulation","authors":"Urban Jermann ,&nbsp;Haotian Xiang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104060","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104060","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks’ incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency problem. In a model with non-maturing deposits where optimal withdrawals make deposits endogenously long-term, we find commitment to have important effects on the optimal level and cyclicality of capital adequacy. Our results call for a systematic framework that limits capital regulators’ discretion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104060"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143783417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Customer data access and fintech entry: Early evidence from open banking 客户数据访问与金融科技进入：开放银行的早期证据
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103950
Tania Babina , Saleem Bahaj , Greg Buchak , Filippo De Marco , Angus Foulis , Will Gornall , Francesco Mazzola , Tong Yu
Open banking (OB) empowers bank customers to share their financial transaction data with fintechs and other banks. New cross-country data shows 49 countries adopted OB policies, privacy preferences predict policy adoption, and adoption spurs fintech entry. UK microdata shows that OB enables: (i) consumers to access both financial advice and credit; (ii) SMEs to establish new lending relationships. In a calibrated model, OB universally improves welfare through entry and product improvements when used for advice. When used for credit, OB promotes entry and competition by reducing adverse selection, but higher prices for costlier or privacy-conscious consumers partially offset these benefits.
{"title":"Customer data access and fintech entry: Early evidence from open banking","authors":"Tania Babina ,&nbsp;Saleem Bahaj ,&nbsp;Greg Buchak ,&nbsp;Filippo De Marco ,&nbsp;Angus Foulis ,&nbsp;Will Gornall ,&nbsp;Francesco Mazzola ,&nbsp;Tong Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103950","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103950","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Open banking (OB) empowers bank customers to share their financial transaction data with fintechs and other banks. New cross-country data shows 49 countries adopted OB policies, privacy preferences predict policy adoption, and adoption spurs fintech entry. UK microdata shows that OB enables: (i) consumers to access both financial advice and credit; (ii) SMEs to establish new lending relationships. In a calibrated model, OB universally improves welfare through entry and product improvements when used for advice. When used for credit, OB promotes entry and competition by reducing adverse selection, but higher prices for costlier or privacy-conscious consumers partially offset these benefits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 103950"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143783418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic digitization in currency and payment competition
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104055
Lin William Cong , Simon Mayer
We model the competition between digital forms of fiat money and private digital money. Countries digitize their currencies–by upgrading existing or launching new payment systems (including CBDCs)–to compete with foreign fiat currencies and private digital money. A pecking order emerges: less dominant currencies digitize earlier, reflecting a first-mover advantage; dominant currencies delay digitization until they face competition; the weakest currencies forgo digitization. However, delayed digitization allows private digital money to gain widespread adoption, eventually weakening fiat money’s role. We highlight how geopolitical considerations, stablecoins, and interoperability between fiat and private digital money shape the dynamics of currency competition.
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引用次数: 0
Central bank liquidity reallocation and bank lending: Evidence from the tiering system
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104058
Carlo Altavilla , Miguel Boucinha , Lorenzo Burlon , Mariassunta Giannetti , Julian Schumacher
We document that the reallocation of central bank reserves towards banks with higher liquidity needs fosters credit supply. Exploiting the ECB's tiered reserve remuneration system for identification, we show that this system encouraged banks with low reserve holdings to obtain more reserves through the money market. Concomitantly, these banks reduced their securities holdings and extended more credit. We estimate that the reallocation of one euro of reserves towards banks with ex ante low reserve holdings resulted in an increase in credit supply of about 15 cents.
{"title":"Central bank liquidity reallocation and bank lending: Evidence from the tiering system","authors":"Carlo Altavilla ,&nbsp;Miguel Boucinha ,&nbsp;Lorenzo Burlon ,&nbsp;Mariassunta Giannetti ,&nbsp;Julian Schumacher","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104058","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104058","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We document that the reallocation of central bank reserves towards banks with higher liquidity needs fosters credit supply. Exploiting the ECB's tiered reserve remuneration system for identification, we show that this system encouraged banks with low reserve holdings to obtain more reserves through the money market. Concomitantly, these banks reduced their securities holdings and extended more credit. We estimate that the reallocation of one euro of reserves towards banks with ex ante low reserve holdings resulted in an increase in credit supply of about 15 cents.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104058"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143768533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reaching for yield: Evidence from households
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104057
Francisco Gomes , Cameron Peng , Oksana Smirnova , Ning Zhu
The literature has documented “reaching for yield”—the phenomenon of investing more in risky assets when interest rates drop—among institutional investors. We analyze detailed transaction data from a large brokerage firm to provide direct field evidence that individual investors also exhibit this behavior. Consistent with models of portfolio choice with labor income, reaching for yield is more pronounced among younger and less-wealthy individuals. Consistent with prospect theory, reaching for yield is more pronounced when investors are trading at a loss. Finally, we observe and discuss the phenomenon of “reverse reaching for yield.”
有文献记载了机构投资者 "追求收益"--在利率下降时更多投资于风险资产的现象。我们分析了一家大型经纪公司的详细交易数据，为个人投资者也表现出这种行为提供了直接的实地证据。与劳动收入的投资组合选择模型相一致，追求收益率的行为在年轻人和财富较少的人中更为明显。与前景理论相一致的是，当投资者在亏损的情况下进行交易时，追求收益的行为更为明显。最后，我们观察并讨论了 "反向追求收益 "的现象。
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引用次数: 0
The retail execution quality landscape
IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Journal of Financial Economics
Pub Date : 2025-04-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104051
Anne Haubo Dyhrberg , Andriy Shkilko , Ingrid M. Werner
We demonstrate that off-exchange (wholesaler) executions provide significant cost savings to retail investors. Wholesaler concentration has raised regulatory concerns; however, we show that the largest wholesalers offer the lowest costs due to economies of scale. The entry of a new large wholesaler reduces incumbent scale economies, resulting in higher execution costs. Most retail brokers route to multiple wholesalers and actively monitor their performance, rewarding those offering lower execution costs with more volume. While retail investors benefit from the current landscape across all stocks, those trading small stocks benefit the most.
{"title":"The retail execution quality landscape","authors":"Anne Haubo Dyhrberg ,&nbsp;Andriy Shkilko ,&nbsp;Ingrid M. Werner","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104051","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104051","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We demonstrate that off-exchange (wholesaler) executions provide significant cost savings to retail investors. Wholesaler concentration has raised regulatory concerns; however, we show that the largest wholesalers offer the lowest costs due to economies of scale. The entry of a new large wholesaler reduces incumbent scale economies, resulting in higher execution costs. Most retail brokers route to multiple wholesalers and actively monitor their performance, rewarding those offering lower execution costs with more volume. While retail investors benefit from the current landscape across all stocks, those trading small stocks benefit the most.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104051"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143758970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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