Pub Date : 2025-02-18DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104024
Lin William Cong , Guanhao Feng , Jingyu He , Xin He
We introduce a new class of tree-based models, P-Trees, for analyzing (unbalanced) panel of individual asset returns, generalizing high-dimensional sorting with economic guidance and interpretability. Under the mean–variance efficient framework, P-Trees construct test assets that significantly advance the efficient frontier compared to commonly used test assets, with alphas unexplained by benchmark pricing models. P-Tree tangency portfolios also constitute traded factors, recovering the pricing kernel and outperforming popular observable and latent factor models for investments and cross-sectional pricing. Finally, P-Trees capture the complexity of asset returns with sparsity, achieving out-of-sample Sharpe ratios close to those attained only by over-parameterized large models.
{"title":"Growing the efficient frontier on panel trees","authors":"Lin William Cong , Guanhao Feng , Jingyu He , Xin He","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104024","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104024","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We introduce a new class of tree-based models, P-Trees, for analyzing (unbalanced) panel of individual asset returns, generalizing high-dimensional sorting with economic guidance and interpretability. Under the mean–variance efficient framework, P-Trees construct test assets that significantly advance the efficient frontier compared to commonly used test assets, with alphas unexplained by benchmark pricing models. P-Tree tangency portfolios also constitute traded factors, recovering the pricing kernel and outperforming popular observable and latent factor models for investments and cross-sectional pricing. Finally, P-Trees capture the complexity of asset returns with sparsity, achieving out-of-sample Sharpe ratios close to those attained only by over-parameterized large models.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"167 ","pages":"Article 104024"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143437613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-13DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104022
Ramona Dagostino
Do federal tax incentives for banks investing in municipal bonds support local governments during recessions? This paper exploits a change in tax benefits for banks purchasing municipal bonds and finds that expanding access to bank financing during recessions increases local governments’ debt issuance and employment growth. The estimated job multiplier is 22 jobs per million dollars of spending. There is moderate evidence of mortgage loans being crowded out by banks’ increased holdings of municipal bonds.
{"title":"The impact of bank financing on municipalities’ bond issuance and the real economy","authors":"Ramona Dagostino","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104022","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104022","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do federal tax incentives for banks investing in municipal bonds support local governments during recessions? This paper exploits a change in tax benefits for banks purchasing municipal bonds and finds that expanding access to bank financing during recessions increases local governments’ debt issuance and employment growth. The estimated job multiplier is 22 jobs per million dollars of spending. There is moderate evidence of mortgage loans being crowded out by banks’ increased holdings of municipal bonds.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"166 ","pages":"Article 104022"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143395491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-13DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104007
Christian Breitung, Sebastian Müller
We leverage the capabilities of GPT-3 to generate historical business descriptions for over 63,000 global firms. Utilizing these descriptions and advanced embedding models from OpenAI, we construct time-varying business networks that represent business links across the globe. We showcase the performance of these networks by studying the lead–lag effect for global stocks and predicting target firms in M&A deals. We demonstrate how masking firm-specific details can mitigate look-ahead bias concerns that may arise from the use of embedding models with a recent knowledge cutoff, and how to differentiate between competitor, supplier, and customer links by fine-tuning an open-source language model.
{"title":"Global Business Networks","authors":"Christian Breitung, Sebastian Müller","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104007","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We leverage the capabilities of GPT-3 to generate historical business descriptions for over 63,000 global firms. Utilizing these descriptions and advanced embedding models from OpenAI, we construct time-varying business networks that represent business links across the globe. We showcase the performance of these networks by studying the lead–lag effect for global stocks and predicting target firms in M&A deals. We demonstrate how masking firm-specific details can mitigate look-ahead bias concerns that may arise from the use of embedding models with a recent knowledge cutoff, and how to differentiate between competitor, supplier, and customer links by fine-tuning an open-source language model.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"166 ","pages":"Article 104007"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143395599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-13DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104009
Gloria Yang Yu
Does the early-career exposure of bank CEOs to the 1980s savings and loans (S&L) crisis affect the outcomes of banks they subsequently managed? We measure the S&L crisis exposure by the bank failure rate in the states where CEOs worked during the S&L crisis. Armed with this measure, we find that banks managed by CEOs with higher S&L crisis exposure took on less risk and that these banks better survived the financial crisis of 2008. In particular, CEOs adjusted risk attitudes in areas causing the S&L crisis: their more intense crisis experience reduced banks’ interest rate risk, exposure to risky financial innovation and credit risk. We establish the causal interpretation of the findings by evaluating the impact of crisis exposure via CEO hometown states and exploiting quasi-exogenous turnovers due to CEO retirement. Overall, CEOs learned from the past industry crisis which helped curtail their institutions’ risk exposures and enhance later crisis performance.
{"title":"Do bank CEOs learn from banking crises?","authors":"Gloria Yang Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104009","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104009","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Does the early-career exposure of bank CEOs to the 1980s savings and loans (S&L) crisis affect the outcomes of banks they subsequently managed? We measure the S&L crisis exposure by the bank failure rate in the states where CEOs worked during the S&L crisis. Armed with this measure, we find that banks managed by CEOs with higher S&L crisis exposure took on less risk and that these banks better survived the financial crisis of 2008. In particular, CEOs adjusted risk attitudes in areas causing the S&L crisis: their more intense crisis experience reduced banks’ interest rate risk, exposure to risky financial innovation and credit risk. We establish the causal interpretation of the findings by evaluating the impact of crisis exposure via CEO hometown states and exploiting quasi-exogenous turnovers due to CEO retirement. Overall, CEOs learned from the past industry crisis which helped curtail their institutions’ risk exposures and enhance later crisis performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"166 ","pages":"Article 104009"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143395490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-13DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104019
Itai Agur, Anil Ari, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia
Lenders can exploit households’ payment data to infer their creditworthiness. When households value privacy, they then face a tradeoff between protecting such privacy and attaining better credit conditions. We study how introducing an informationally more intrusive digital payment vehicle affects households’ cash use, credit access, and welfare. A tech monopolist controls the intrusiveness of the new payment method and manipulates information asymmetries among households and oligopolistic banks to extract data contracts that are more lucrative than lending on its own. The laissez-faire equilibrium entails a digital payment vehicle that is more intrusive than socially optimal, providing a rationale for regulation.
{"title":"Bank competition and household privacy in a digital payment monopoly","authors":"Itai Agur, Anil Ari, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104019","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104019","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Lenders can exploit households’ payment data to infer their creditworthiness. When households value privacy, they then face a tradeoff between protecting such privacy and attaining better credit conditions. We study how introducing an informationally more intrusive digital payment vehicle affects households’ cash use, credit access, and welfare. A tech monopolist controls the intrusiveness of the new payment method and manipulates information asymmetries among households and oligopolistic banks to extract data contracts that are more lucrative than lending on its own. The laissez-faire equilibrium entails a digital payment vehicle that is more intrusive than socially optimal, providing a rationale for regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"166 ","pages":"Article 104019"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143395600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-08DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104006
James F. Albertus , Brent Glover , Oliver Levine
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act unlocked as much as $1.7 trillion of U.S. multinationals’ foreign cash. We examine the real and financial response to this liquidity shock and find that firms did not increase capital expenditures, employment, R&D, or M&A, regardless of financial constraints. On the financial side, firms paid out only about one-third of the new liquidity to shareholders and retained half as cash. This high retention was not associated with poor governance. The high propensity to retain the liquidity shock as cash, even among well-governed firms with limited financial constraints, is difficult to reconcile with existing theory.
{"title":"The real and financial effects of internal liquidity: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act","authors":"James F. Albertus , Brent Glover , Oliver Levine","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104006","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act unlocked as much as $1.7 trillion of U.S. multinationals’ foreign cash. We examine the real and financial response to this liquidity shock and find that firms did not increase capital expenditures, employment, R&D, or M&A, regardless of financial constraints. On the financial side, firms paid out only about one-third of the new liquidity to shareholders and retained half as cash. This high retention was not associated with poor governance. The high propensity to retain the liquidity shock as cash, even among well-governed firms with limited financial constraints, is difficult to reconcile with existing theory.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"166 ","pages":"Article 104006"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143350554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a novel measure of job-worker allocation quality () by exploiting employer-employee data with machine learning techniques. Based on our measure, the quality of job-worker matching correlates positively with individual labor earnings and firm productivity, as well as with market competition, non-family firm status, and employees’ human capital. Management plays a key role in job-worker matching: when managerial hirings and firings persistently raise management quality, the matching of rank-and-file workers to their jobs improves. can be constructed from any employer–employee data set including workers’ occupations, and used to explore research questions in corporate finance and organization economics.
{"title":"JAQ of all trades: Job mismatch, firm productivity and managerial quality","authors":"Luca Coraggio , Marco Pagano , Annalisa Scognamiglio , Joacim Tåg","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103992","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103992","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a novel measure of job-worker allocation quality (<span><math><mi>JAQ</mi></math></span>) by exploiting employer-employee data with machine learning techniques. Based on our measure, the quality of job-worker matching correlates positively with individual labor earnings and firm productivity, as well as with market competition, non-family firm status, and employees’ human capital. Management plays a key role in job-worker matching: when managerial hirings and firings persistently raise management quality, the matching of rank-and-file workers to their jobs improves. <span><math><mi>JAQ</mi></math></span> can be constructed from any employer–employee data set including workers’ occupations, and used to explore research questions in corporate finance and organization economics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"164 ","pages":"Article 103992"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142929210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103984
Stefano Giglio , Matteo Maggiori , Johannes Stroebel , Zhenhao Tan , Stephen Utkus , Xiao Xu
We analyze survey data on ESG beliefs and preferences in a large panel of retail investors linked to administrative data on their investment portfolios. The survey elicits investors’ expectations of long-term ESG equity returns and asks about their motivations, if any, to invest in ESG assets. We document four facts. First, investors generally expected ESG investments to underperform the market. Between mid-2021 and late-2023, the average expected 10-year annualized return of ESG investments relative to the overall stock market was 2.1%. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity across investors in their ESG return expectations and their motives for ESG investing: 48% of survey respondents do not see any reason to invest in ESG, 24% are primarily motivated by ethical considerations, 22% are driven by climate hedging motives, and 6% are motivated by return expectations. Third, there is a strong link between individuals’ reported ESG investment motives and their actual investment behaviors, with the highest ESG portfolio holdings among individuals who report ethics-driven investment motives. Fourth, financial considerations matter independently of other investment motives: we find meaningful ESG holdings only for investors who expect these investments to outperform the market, even among those investors who reported that their most important ESG investment motives were ethical or hedging reasons.
{"title":"Four facts about ESG beliefs and investor portfolios","authors":"Stefano Giglio , Matteo Maggiori , Johannes Stroebel , Zhenhao Tan , Stephen Utkus , Xiao Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103984","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103984","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We analyze survey data on ESG beliefs and preferences in a large panel of retail investors linked to administrative data on their investment portfolios. The survey elicits investors’ expectations of long-term ESG equity returns and asks about their motivations, if any, to invest in ESG assets. We document four facts. First, investors generally expected ESG investments to underperform the market. Between mid-2021 and late-2023, the average expected 10-year annualized return of ESG investments relative to the overall stock market was <span><math><mo>−</mo></math></span>2.1%. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity across investors in their ESG return expectations and their motives for ESG investing: 48% of survey respondents do not see any reason to invest in ESG, 24% are primarily motivated by ethical considerations, 22% are driven by climate hedging motives, and 6% are motivated by return expectations. Third, there is a strong link between individuals’ reported ESG investment motives and their actual investment behaviors, with the highest ESG portfolio holdings among individuals who report ethics-driven investment motives. Fourth, financial considerations matter independently of other investment motives: we find meaningful ESG holdings only for investors who expect these investments to outperform the market, even among those investors who reported that their most important ESG investment motives were ethical or hedging reasons.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"164 ","pages":"Article 103984"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142873918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103974
Mathijs Cosemans , Rik Frehen
This paper uses hand-collected historical data to provide empirical evidence on the strategic trading behavior of insiders and its consequences for outsiders. Specifically, we collect all equity trades of all insiders and outsiders in an era without legal restrictions on insider trading and a market where trading is non-anonymous. We find that access to private information creates a significant gap between the post-trade returns of insiders and outsiders. Consistent with theory, insiders capitalize on their information advantage by hiding their identity and timing their trades. Both experienced and inexperienced outsiders face expected losses due to this strategic insider trading.
{"title":"Strategic insider trading and its consequences for outsiders: Evidence from the eighteenth century","authors":"Mathijs Cosemans , Rik Frehen","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103974","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103974","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper uses hand-collected historical data to provide empirical evidence on the strategic trading behavior of insiders and its consequences for outsiders. Specifically, we collect all equity trades of all insiders and outsiders in an era without legal restrictions on insider trading and a market where trading is non-anonymous. We find that access to private information creates a significant gap between the post-trade returns of insiders and outsiders. Consistent with theory, insiders capitalize on their information advantage by hiding their identity and timing their trades. Both experienced and inexperienced outsiders face expected losses due to this strategic insider trading.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"164 ","pages":"Article 103974"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142873968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-02-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103985
Roger M. Edelen , Kingsley Y.L. Fong , Jingyi Han
We study the impact of disclosure and inattention on the decision to retain fee-based financial advice using a two-tiered natural regulatory experiment. Increased salience in fee disclosure raises the drop rate for advice, implying improved attention — particularly for relatively sophisticated investors. However, a novel auto-drop requirement for inattentive investors generates far more drops, implying limited attention despite salient disclosure — particularly for the unsophisticated. Contrary to studies of commission-based advice, we find that investors benefit from fee-based advice. Benefits are higher for less sophisticated investors, who tend to be detrimentally auto-dropped. Drops triggered by salient disclosure tend to be beneficial.
{"title":"Regulating inattention in fee-based financial advice","authors":"Roger M. Edelen , Kingsley Y.L. Fong , Jingyi Han","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103985","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103985","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the impact of disclosure and inattention on the decision to retain fee-based financial advice using a two-tiered natural regulatory experiment. Increased salience in fee disclosure raises the drop rate for advice, implying improved attention — particularly for relatively sophisticated investors. However, a novel auto-drop requirement for inattentive investors generates far more drops, implying limited attention despite salient disclosure — particularly for the unsophisticated. Contrary to studies of commission-based advice, we find that investors benefit from fee-based advice. Benefits are higher for less sophisticated investors, who tend to be detrimentally auto-dropped. Drops triggered by salient disclosure tend to be beneficial.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"164 ","pages":"Article 103985"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142889330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号