Cross-ownership and green managerial delegation contracts in a mixed oligopoly

IF 5.5 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2024.102993
Mingqing Xing , Sang-Ho Lee
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Abstract

This study examines strategic interactions between cross-ownership and managerial delegation contracts with environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) incentives in a mixed oligopoly. We find that private firms always utilize ECSR incentives in competing prices under cross-ownership, whereas public managers do so only when there is severe environmental damage. We also demonstrate that the ECSR incentives for welfare-weighted public managers are always lower than for their profit-weighted counterparts when they employ ECSR incentives, which leads to lower environmental damage and greater social welfare. Finally, we show that welfare-weighted public delegation increases the private firm's ECSR compared to no public delegation, which is reversed in the profit-weighted variant. Our findings suggest that the government should design an environmental incentive scheme to their public managers that can also induce private managers to behave more aggressively in abatement activities as the degree of cross-ownership increases.

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混合寡头垄断中的交叉所有权和绿色管理委托合同
本研究探讨了在混合寡头垄断中,交叉所有权与带有环境企业社会责任(ECSR)激励机制的管理委托合同之间的战略互动关系。我们发现,在交叉所有权条件下,私营企业总是利用环境企业社会责任激励机制进行价格竞争,而公共管理者只有在出现严重环境损害时才会这样做。我们还证明,当福利加权的公共管理者采用 ECSR 激励机制时,他们的 ECSR 激励机制总是低于利润加权的公共管理者,从而导致更低的环境损害和更高的社会福利。最后,我们发现福利加权的公共授权会增加私营企业的 ECSR,而利润加权的公共授权则相反。我们的研究结果表明,随着交叉所有权程度的增加,政府应该为其公共管理者设计一个环境激励计划,该计划也能促使私人管理者在减排活动中表现得更加积极。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
91
期刊介绍: The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.
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