Persistence in repeated games encourages the evolution of spite

IF 1.2 4区 生物学 Q4 ECOLOGY Theoretical Population Biology Pub Date : 2024-05-31 DOI:10.1016/j.tpb.2024.05.001
Shun Kurokawa
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Abstract

Social behavior is divided into four types: altruism, spite, mutualism, and selfishness. The former two are costly to the actor; therefore, from the perspective of natural selection, their existence can be regarded as mysterious. One potential setup which encourages the evolution of altruism and spite is repeated interaction. Players can behave conditionally based on their opponent's previous actions in the repeated interaction. On the one hand, the retaliatory strategy (who behaves altruistically when their opponent behaved altruistically and behaves non-altruistically when the opponent player behaved non-altruistically) is likely to evolve when players choose altruistic or selfish behavior in each round. On the other hand, the anti-retaliatory strategy (who is spiteful when the opponent was not spiteful and is not spiteful when the opponent player was spiteful) is likely to evolve when players opt for spiteful or mutualistic behavior in each round. These successful conditional behaviors can be favored by natural selection. Here, we notice that information on opponent players’ actions is not always available. When there is no such information, players cannot determine their behavior according to their opponent's action. By investigating the case of altruism, a previous study (Kurokawa, 2017, Mathematical Biosciences, 286, 94–103) found that persistent altruistic strategies, which choose the same action as the own previous action, are favored by natural selection. How, then, should a spiteful conditional strategy behave when the player does not know what their opponent did? By studying the repeated game, we find that persistent spiteful strategies, which choose the same action as the own previous action, are favored by natural selection. Altruism and spite differ concerning whether retaliatory or anti-retaliatory strategies are favored by natural selection; however, they are identical concerning whether persistent strategies are favored by natural selection.

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在重复的游戏中坚持不懈,会促进怨恨的进化。
社会行为分为四种类型:利他主义、怨恨主义、互助主义和自私自利。前两种行为对行为者来说代价高昂;因此,从自然选择的角度来看,它们的存在可以说是神秘的。鼓励利他主义和怨恨进化的一种潜在设置是重复互动。在重复互动中,参与者可以根据对手之前的行为做出有条件的行为。一方面,当玩家在每一轮选择利他或利己行为时,报复策略(当对手采取利他行为时,玩家采取利他行为;当对手采取非利他行为时,玩家采取非利他行为)很可能会进化。另一方面,反报复策略(当对手不报复时,自己报复;当对手报复时,自己不报复)则可能在每个回合中选择报复或互利行为。这些成功的条件行为会受到自然选择的青睐。在这里,我们注意到对手棋手的行动信息并不总是可用的。在没有此类信息的情况下,棋手无法根据对手的行动来决定自己的行为。通过调查利他主义的情况,之前的一项研究(Kurokawa,2017,Mathematical Biosciences,286,94-103)发现,选择与自己之前行动相同的行动的持续利他主义策略会受到自然选择的青睐。那么,当玩家不知道对手做了什么时,唾弃性条件策略应该如何表现呢?通过对重复博弈的研究,我们发现,选择与自己先前行动相同的行动的持续唾弃策略会受到自然选择的青睐。利他主义和恶意策略在报复性策略还是反报复性策略受到自然选择青睐的问题上存在差异;但是,在持续性策略是否受到自然选择青睐的问题上,两者是一致的。
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来源期刊
Theoretical Population Biology
Theoretical Population Biology 生物-进化生物学
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
14.30%
发文量
43
审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: An interdisciplinary journal, Theoretical Population Biology presents articles on theoretical aspects of the biology of populations, particularly in the areas of demography, ecology, epidemiology, evolution, and genetics. Emphasis is on the development of mathematical theory and models that enhance the understanding of biological phenomena. Articles highlight the motivation and significance of the work for advancing progress in biology, relying on a substantial mathematical effort to obtain biological insight. The journal also presents empirical results and computational and statistical methods directly impinging on theoretical problems in population biology.
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