The Complementarity and Substitution Effects of CSR‐Focused Governance Mechanisms on CSR Decoupling

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI:10.1111/corg.12591
Mohammad Abweny, Godfred Adjapong Afrifa, Abdullah Iqbal
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Abstract

Research Question/IssueThe study examines whether CSR‐focused governance mechanisms (CSR committees, standalone CSR reports, and CSR contracting) operate as complements or substitutes for each other in mitigating CSR decoupling.Research Findings/InsightsThe study finds that CSR‐focused governance mechanisms diminish CSR decoupling and enhance CSR credibility in UK firms. In addition, the simultaneous presence of CSR committees and standalone CSR reports has a complementary effect in mitigating CSR decoupling. Conversely, the combinations of CSR committees and CSR contracting as well as standalone CSR reports and CSR contracting exhibit a substitute relationship. These impacts remain consistent when categorizing CSR decoupling into underreporting and overreporting. During the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the complementary relationship between CSR committees and CSR reports remained consistent, although the substitution between CSR committees and CSR contracting, and CSR reports and CSR contracting, is only observed after the crisis.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThe study innovatively contributes to the agency theory literature by adopting a bundle corporate governance approach while focusing on specific CSR governance mechanisms to address agency issues. It empirically shows that complementary combinations of CSR‐focused governance mechanisms signify a marginal benefit in reducing CSR decoupling, leading to a reduction in agency costs.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThe study offers several implications. First, it helps firms create ideal combinations of different CSR‐focused governance mechanisms that provide superior marginal benefits. Second, firms' stakeholders, especially the investors, could identify the usefulness of adopting CSR‐focused governance mechanisms in CSR reporting. Finally, it could also attract regulators' attention toward the weaker aspects of the existing corporate governance code regarding CSR.
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注重企业社会责任的治理机制对企业社会责任脱钩的互补和替代效应
研究结果/启示研究发现,以企业社会责任为重点的治理机制(企业社会责任委员会、独立的企业社会责任报告和企业社会责任契约)在减轻企业社会责任脱钩方面是互为补充还是相互替代。此外,企业社会责任委员会和独立的企业社会责任报告的同时存在对减轻企业社会责任脱钩具有互补作用。相反,企业社会责任委员会和企业社会责任契约以及独立的企业社会责任报告和企业社会责任契约的组合则表现出一种替代关系。将企业社会责任脱钩分为报告不足和报告过度时,这些影响仍然是一致的。在 2008-2009 年金融危机期间,企业社会责任委员会与企业社会责任报告之间的互补关系保持一致,但企业社会责任委员会与企业社会责任契约、企业社会责任报告与企业社会责任契约之间的替代关系仅在危机后才出现。 理论/学术启示本研究采用捆绑式公司治理方法,同时关注特定的企业社会责任治理机制以解决代理问题,为代理理论文献做出了创新性贡献。它从经验上表明,以企业社会责任为重点的治理机制的互补组合在减少企业社会责任脱钩方面具有边际效益,从而降低了代理成本。首先,它有助于企业创建不同企业社会责任治理机制的理想组合,从而提供卓越的边际效益。其次,企业的利益相关者,尤其是投资者,可以发现在企业社会责任报告中采用以企业社会责任为中心的治理机制的益处。最后,它还能引起监管机构对现有公司治理准则中有关企业社会责任的薄弱环节的关注。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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