Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-27 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007

Ori Haimanko

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie-breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie-breaking rule used in the auction.

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具有相互依赖类型的全酬拍卖中的贝叶斯纳什均衡

我们证明了在具有统计上相互依赖的类型（信号）的全付拍卖中，在价值、成本和打破平局规则的一般假设下存在行为策略贝叶斯纳什均衡。此外，对于拍卖中使用的任何打破平局规则，均衡集都是相同的。

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology

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