Ignorant experts and financial fragility

IF 3.8 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE North American Journal of Economics and Finance Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI:10.1016/j.najef.2024.102200
Koji Asano
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Abstract

We examine expertise acquisition incentives in a model of debt funding markets in which expertise reduces the cost of acquiring information about underlying collateral. Lenders acquiring expertise gain advantages in financial contracts with borrowers and extract rents from them by creating fear of information acquisition that gives rise to illiquidity. As information about collateral decays over time, there is growth in credit and expertise acquisition, making the economy more vulnerable to an aggregate shock. This result suggests that expertise acquisition is an endogenous amplification mechanism of an aggregate shock.

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无知的专家和金融脆弱性
我们研究了债务融资市场模型中的专业知识获取激励机制,在该模型中,专业知识降低了获取相关抵押品信息的成本。获取专业知识的出借人在与借款人签订金融合同时获得优势,并通过制造对信息获取的恐惧来攫取租金,从而导致流动性不足。随着时间的推移,有关抵押品的信息会逐渐减少,信贷和专业知识的获取也会增加,从而使经济更容易受到总体冲击的影响。这一结果表明,专业知识获取是总体冲击的内生放大机制。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
8.30%
发文量
168
期刊介绍: The focus of the North-American Journal of Economics and Finance is on the economics of integration of goods, services, financial markets, at both regional and global levels with the role of economic policy in that process playing an important role. Both theoretical and empirical papers are welcome. Empirical and policy-related papers that rely on data and the experiences of countries outside North America are also welcome. Papers should offer concrete lessons about the ongoing process of globalization, or policy implications about how governments, domestic or international institutions, can improve the coordination of their activities. Empirical analysis should be capable of replication. Authors of accepted papers will be encouraged to supply data and computer programs.
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