Can policy packaging help overcome Pigouvian tax aversion? A lab experiment on combining taxes and subsidies

IF 5.5 3区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103010
Gøril L. Andreassen , Steffen Kallbekken , Knut Einar Rosendahl
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Abstract

Tax aversion makes it politically challenging to introduce Pigouvian taxes. One proposed solution to overcome this resistance is to package policies. Using an online lab experiment, we investigate whether combining a tax and a subsidy is perceived as more acceptable than the tax or the subsidy alone. The purpose of the policies is to reduce demand for a good with a negative externality to the socially optimal level. We find that support for a combination of a tax and a subsidy equals the simple average of support for the two instruments alone. Combining a tax and a subsidy therefore does not reduce tax aversion. We examine potential mechanisms behind the tax aversion. Participants believe they will receive a lower share of the tax revenue when the tax is implemented alone than when it is combined with a subsidy, i.e. the participants in the tax alone group hold more pessimistic beliefs about the tax revenue. We also find that the participants expect the tax to be more effective in reducing demand for the good with a negative externality than both the subsidy alone and the combinations of tax and subsidy. This belief does not, however, translate into support for the tax.

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政策组合能否帮助克服皮古夫避税效应?税收与补贴相结合的实验室实验
避税心理使得引入皮格夫税在政治上具有挑战性。为克服这一阻力,我们提出的一个解决方案是将政策打包。通过在线实验室实验,我们研究了税收与补贴相结合是否比单独征税或补贴更容易被接受。这些政策的目的是将具有负外部性的商品需求降至社会最优水平。我们发现,对税收和补贴相结合的支持等于对单独两种手段的支持的简单平均值。因此,将税收和补贴结合起来并不会降低避税效应。我们研究了避税背后的潜在机制。参与者认为在单独征税时,他们获得的税收份额将低于结合补贴征税时,即单独征税组的参与者对税收持有更悲观的看法。我们还发现,与单独补贴以及税收与补贴相结合的方式相比,参与者认为税收能更有效地减少对具有负外部性的商品的需求。然而,这种信念并没有转化为对税收的支持。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
91
期刊介绍: The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.
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